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PREFACE
Alexius Meinong and his student, Ernst Mally, were the two
most influential members of a school of philosophers and psychologists
working in Graz in the early part of the twentieth century. They in-
vestigated psychological, abstract, and nonexistent objects—a realm
of objects which weren’t being taken seriously by Anglo-American
philosophers in the Russell tradition. I first took the views of
Meinong and Mally seriously in a course on metaphysics taught by
Terence Parsons in the Fall of '78. Parsons had developed an axiomatic
version of Meinong' s naive theory of objects. The theory with which I
was confronted in the penultimate draft of Parsons' book. Nonexistent
Objects
,
had a profound impact upon me. I was convinced that Parsons'
work would serve as a new paradigm for philosophical investigations.
While canvassing the literature during my research for Parsons'
course, I discovered, indirectly, that Mally, who had originated the
nuclear /extranuclear distinction among properties (a seminal distinc-
tion adopted by both Meinong and Parsons)
,
had had another idea which
could be developed into an alternative axiomatic theory. This dis-
covery was the result of reading both a brief description of Mally 's
theory in J.N. Findlay's book, Meinong' s Theory of Objects and Values
(pp. 110-112) and what appeared to be an attempt to reconstruct Mally'
s
theory by W. Rapaport in his paper "Meinongian Theories and a Rus-
sellian Paradox." With the logical devices Parsons had used in his
IV
book, plus others that I had learned from my colleagues, I began
elaborating and applying the alternative theory in a series of un-
published papers written between November 1978 and August 1979. These
papers were then assimilated into the first draft of this work in Fall
1979.
The entire project could not have been carried off without the
inspiration and aid of teachers and colleagues. Throughout the project,
Parsons served as a sharp critic. Our conversations every couple of
weeks always left me with an idea for improving what I had done or with
an outline of a problem which had to be tackled and solved. It is to
his credit that he was such a great help despite the fact that our
theories offered rival explanations to certain pieces of data.
Barbara Hall Partee graciously gave of her time in weekly dis-
cussions during the writing of the first draft. Her enthusiasm, en-
couragement, and suggestions were invaluable.
My colleague, Alan McMichael, also deserves special mention.
Besides teaching me the techniques of algebraic semantics, and discover-
ing a paradox within the theory, McMichael served as my first critic.
Whenever I discovered a new application of the theory or got stuck on
a point of logic, I frequently presented it to Alan. His criticisms
and suggestions helped me to sharpen up many of the intricate details.
I'd also like to thank Mark Aronszajn, Blake Barley, Cynthia
Freeland, Edmund Gettier, Gary Hardegree, Herbert Heidelberger , Larry
Hohm, Michael Jubien, and Robert Sleigh. Spirited discussions with
these individuals forced me to think deeply about a variety of
v
issues. They were some of the many people who helped to make the
philosophy department here such a stimulating one.
Finally, thanks goes to Nancy Scott for her dedication in
typing unfriendly looking manuscripts
Ed Zalta
October, 1980
University of Massachusetts/Amherst
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ABSTRACT
An Introduction to a Theory of Abstract Objects
(February 1981)
Edward Nouri Zalta, B.A., Rice University,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Terence Parsons
An axiomatic theory of abstract objects is developed and used
to construct models of Plato’s Forms, Leibniz's Monads, Possible
Worlds, Frege's Senses, stories, and fictional characters. The theory
takes six primitive metaphysical notions: object (x,y,...); n-place
J-^gticms (F
,
G x 1 ,..,x_ exemplifv F
n
("F
n
x, ...x ") : x
-1
- n In
-
.
x
—
s E s ( E!x ) ; it is necessary that
<J)
(" 04>")
; and x encodes F^
("xF "). Properties and propositions are one place and zero place
relations, respectively. Abstract objects ("A!x") are objects which
necessarily fail to exist ("0~E!x"). The two most important proper
axioms are that (1) no possibly existing object encodes any properties
((x)(C> E!x -* ~(3F)xF)), and (2) for every expressible condition on
properties, there is an abstract object which encodes just the proper-
ties satisfying the condition ((3x)(A!x & (F) (xF E $)), where <J> has no
free x's). Semantically, an abstract object encodes a property iff the
property is an element of the set of properties correlated with the
object. Two abstract objects will be identical just in case they en-
code the same properties. Abstract objects may exemplify properties as
vii
well—being non-red, not having spatial location, etc.
The models of Forms, Monads, and Possible Worlds consist in:
(a) identifying these philosophical entities as different species of
abstract objects through definitions of the object language, and (b)
either showing that there are consequences of the theory which are
reasonable facsimiles of assertions made by important philosphers (for
example, Plato's One Over the Many Principle and Leibniz's principle
that monads mirror their worlds are theorems) or showing that there are
many interesting theorems which capture our own intuitions about these
entities (for example, we prove that every world is maximal, every
world is consistent, there is a unique actual world, and that a propo-
sition is true at a world iff everything exemplifies at that world
being such that that proposition is true). The model for Frege's
Senses consists in: (a) developing a language in which the abstract
objects generated by the theory serve as the senses of names and de-
scriptions, and (b) showing that the data (propositional attitude
triads, identity statements, etc.) may be consistently translated into
the language preserving truth. Finally, the model for fictional char-
acters consists in: (a) assigning abstract objects to serve as the
denotations of names of stories and characters, and (b) showing that
such an assignment allows us to understand how the intuitively true
sentences about stories and characters have the truth value that they
do.
The material is structured as follows. In Chapters I, III, and
V, the elementary, modal, and typed theories of abstract objects are
viii
developed, respectively. In Chapters II, IV, and VI, these theories
are applied, respectively. Each of the theoretical chapters is sub-
divided as follows: §1—The Language; §2—The Semantics; §3—The
Logic; and §4—The Proper Axioms. Thus, the proper axioms of the
theory are couched in a precisely defined and interpreted language,
and the logic (logical axioms and rules of inference) allow us to prove
the consequences of the theory.
ix
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INTRODUCTION
§1. Theory, Data, and Explanation
In this book, we shall discuss the things there are. In addi-
tion to existing objects (like you, me, my desk, sub-atomic particles,
etc.) and the properties and relations they exemplify, we theorize
that there are abstract entities as well. Among the abstract entities,
we find abstract objects, abstract properties, and abstract relations.
For the major part of this book, the theory of abstract objects is
developed and applied (Chapters I- IV) . At the end, the theory of ab-
stract properties and relations is developed and applied, using the
resources of a new kind of type theory (Chapters V-VI) . We refer to
the overall theory as the theory of abstract objects, and the first
principles of this theory tell us not only the conditions under which
there are particular such objects, but also the conditions under which
any two of them are identical. The first principles serve as the
cornerstone of the theory and a good reason for accepting them is that
they will help us to construct explanations of data which have yet to
be assimilated in a natural way into the current philosophical para-
digm.
The current philosophical paradigm is a metaphysical theory
that many philosophers have attributed to Russell. It can be stated
roughly as follows: existing (actual, or real) objects, first level
properties (and relations) exemplified by these objects, second level
1
2properties (and relations) exemplified by these first level properties,
and so forth, are the only things that there are . 1 This metaphysical
theory gives us a background ontology and philosophers working in the
tradition usually supplement the theory with certain views about the
history of philosophy and about language. A supplementary view about
the history of philosophy is that if earlier philosophers who postu-
lated theoretical entities were describing anything at all, they must
have been describing entities (i.e., objects, properties, relations)
which can be found in the background ontology. The supplementary view
about language is a closely associated one: if the terms of a natural
language denote anything at all, they must denote entities found in
the background ontology. These supplementary views help to organize
the data to be explained and help to ground the methodological prin-
ciples of investigation and explanation that are part of this philo-
sophical tradition. For example, here are two methodological prin-
ciples grounded by these supplementary views:
A. Try to construe the philosophical discussions of earlier
philosophers who described theoretical entities (like
Forms, Monads, Possible Worlds, Senses) as discussions
about existing objects or properties and relations.
B. Show that there are no true sentences of natural language
which contain terms that denote entities not found in the
ontology.
In what follows, we shall not argue that there are data which
are not, or cannot, be accounted for by the current paradigm. Enough
ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses could be added to any theory to enable it
to handle the data. Instead, we shall try to establish one thesis—
namely, that the alternative metaphysical theory developed here does
help us to explain certain pieces of data. Then, any philosopher or
3linguist who agrees that the data we've chosen to explain are important
and currently lack natural explanations should either consider our
theory as a serious alternative or be prompted to find natural explana-
tions from within the current paradigm. Let's then describe the data
we shall try to explain.
The data consists of true sentences which we suppose to be
philosophically important, for one reason or another. Some of these
true sentences are a priori. For example, Plato and Leibniz developed
a priori hypotheses about Forms and Monads, respectively:
(i) If there are two distinct F-things, then there is a Form
of F in which they both participate (Plato, Parmenides
,
132a)
(ii) . . . each simple substance (i.e., monad) . . . is a
perpetual living mirror of the universe (Leibniz,
Monadology
,
§56)
It turns out that certain abstract objects display features resembling
those of Platonic Forms, while others display features resembling
Leibnizian Monads. By saying, for example, that certain abstract ob-
jects display features resembling those of Platonic Forms, we mean
three things: (1) a definition such as the following,
x is a Form == ...x...,dfn
can be given using only the primitive and defined notions of the
theory, (2) features of the Forms that Plato describes are definable in
the theory as well, and (3) it follows from the first principles of the
theory that the abstract objects which satisfy the definition of Form
have the features Plato says his Forms are supposed to have. Conse-
quently, we shall suppose that data like (i) and (ii) have been ex-
plained if there are reasonable facsimiles of them which turn out to be
4consequences of the theory.
There is another group of a priori truths which we take to be
data. Here are some examples:
(iii) The round square is round.
(iv) The fountain of youth is a fountain.
(v) The set of all sets which aren't members of themselves is
a set of all sets which aren't members of themselves.
We shall try to show that abstract objects can serve as the denotations
of the descriptions in (iii)-(v). And as with all a priori data, we
shall suppose that (iii)-(v) have been explained if we can deduce them
as consequences of the first principles of our theory.
The a posteriori data also fall into two major groups. The
first group consists of statements we ordinarily make about fictional
characters, mythical figures, dream objects, and the like. Here are
some examples:
(vi) Santa Claus doesn't exist.
(vii) Stephan Dedalus is a fictional character.
(viii) In the myth, Achilles fought Hector.
(ix) Some Greeks worshipped Dionysus.
(x) Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth.
(xi) Franz Kafka wrote about Gregor Samsa.
To construct a prima facie case for thinking that fictional characters,
mythical figures, etc., just are abstract objects, we shall focus on a
formal language that we develop in Chapter III. Certain definitions
tell us the conditions under which a given sentence of the formal
language is true. We then translate (vi)-(xi) into our formal
5language, using names and descriptions in the language which denote
abstract objects (as well as existing ones). Thus, an explanation of
and others like them, consists in showing that they can be
translated into sentences which preserve their intuitive truth value.
The other group of a posteriori data contains triads of sen-
tences. These are sentences which involve verbs of propositional at-
titude and the "is" of identity:
(xii) S believes that Socrates taught Plato.
(xiii) S doesn't believe that the son of Phaenarete taught
Plato
.
(xiv) Socrates is the son of Phaenarete.
(xv) S believes that Woodie is a woodchuck.
(xvi) S doesn't believe that Woodie is a groundhog.
(xvii) Being a woodchuck just is being a groundhog.
We follow Frege in supposing that the English terms inside proposi-
tional attitude contexts do not have their ordinary denotations and
that they denote their senses instead. This was Frege's explanation
of why (xii) and (xiv) don't imply the negation of (xiii), and why (xv)
and (xvii) don't imply the negation of (xvi). However, the senses of
terms denoting objects will be construed as abstract objects and the
senses of terms denoting properties (relations) will be construed as
abstract properties (relations). To do this, we again focus on a for-
mal language developed in Chapter V. (xii)- (xvii) are translated into
our language, using names and descriptions of the language which de-
note abstract entities that serve as the senses of the English terms.
Thus, our Fregean explanation of the consistency of each triad lies
in showing that the sentences which translate the members of a given
triad are consistent.
6These, then, will be the kinds of data and explanation which
shall occupy our attention. But in the course of setting up our
theory, many other philosophical issues will be confronted. For
example, we will end up developing a full-fledged theory of relations
(where properties and propositions turn out to be one-place and zero-
place relations, respectively). This includes a definition which
tells us when any two relations (properties, propositions) are in fact
the same. Semantics for our formal languages are developed in which
we may consistently suppose that logically equivalent relations are
distinct. The resulting metaphysical system should be attractive not
only because it might handle important kinds of data which seem
problematic for the current tradition, but also because it exhibits
many interesting and philosophically satisfying qualities in its own
right.
§2. The Origins of the Theory
The theory we develop has its origins directly in the naive
theory of nonexistent objects which Meinong and Mally investigated at
the turn of the century. A very simple statement of the theory upon
which Meinong seemed to be relying in his early work is the following,
which we call Naive Object Theory:
(NOT) For every set of properties, there is an object which
exemplifies just the members of the set.
To make this theory precise, we could capture it in a second order
predicate calculus as follows:
(NOT') (3x) (F) (Fx = $), where <J> has no free x's.
7(NOT') yields an object with just two properties, roundness ("R") and
squareness ("S") as follows:
(3x)(F)(Fx = F=R v F=S)
(NOT') also gives us an object which exemplifies just the properties
that Socrates ("s") exemplifies:
(3x) (F) (Fx = Fs)
By Leibniz's Law, it follows that this object just is Socrates.
Unfortunately, we can derive both falsehoods and contradictions
from (NOT'). Consider the following instance, where "E!" stands for
existence, "G" stands for goldenness, and "M" stands for mountainhood
:
(3x)(F)(Fx = F=E! v F=G v F=M)
This asserts the falsehood that there is an existing golden mountain.
(NOT' ) also implies the falsehood that Russell never thought about the
round square (as generated above), since this latter object (provably)
doesn't exemplify the property of being thought about by Russell (on
the assumption that the property of being thought about by Russell is
distinct from both the property of being round and the property of
being square).
A contradiction that (NOT') entails comes about as follows.
Let "[Ax Rx & ~Rx] " denote the property of being-red-and-not-being-red
.
We then have
:
(3x) (F) (Fx = F= [ Ax Rx & ~Rx])
Call an arbitrary such object a^. It follows that [Ax Rx & ~Rx]aQ,
i.e., a
Q
exemplifies the property of being-red-and-not-being-red. But
by ordinary A-conversion , it follows that Ra^ and So (NOT ) is
inconsistent
.
8One suggestion by Mally to refine (NOT) was to distinguish two
2general types of properties—nuclear and extranuclear
. The nuclear
properties an object has are more central to its being and identity
than are its extranuclear properties. Terence Parsons follows up on
3this suggestion. He adds this distinction as one new primitive to a
standard second order predicate calculus. He develops the theory and
logic associated with nuclear and extranuclear relations. He restricts
the range of the property quantifier in (NOT') so that it ranges just
over nuclear properties. His theory is therefore based on the follow-
ing three principles, where "Fn " ranges over extranuclear n-place rela-
n 4
tions and "f " ranges over nuclear n-place relations:
(I) (3x) (f
1
) (f
1
x = <J>) , where (J) has no free x's.
For every set of nuclear properties, there is an ob-
ject which exemplifies just the members of the set.
(II) x=y = (f 1 )(f 1x = f Xy)
Two objects are identical iff they exemplify the
same nuclear properties.
(Ill) (3Fn ) (x1 ) . . . (Xjj) (Fx]_. . .xn = 4>), where <J> has no free F
n,
s.
For every set of objects, there is an extranuclear
property which just those objects exemplify.
So on Parsons' theory, there is one kind of object and two kinds of
properties. Also, each extranuclear property is associated with some
(not necessarily distinct) nuclear property which serves as its
"watered-down version."
Consequently, Parsons avoids generating the above falsehoods
and inconsistencies. The existent golden mountain exemplifies watered
down existence, not the more important kind of extranuclear existence.
The object which exemplifies just nuclear roundness and nuclear square
ness could, and in fact did, exemplify the extranuclear
property of
9being thought about by Russell. Also, "[Ax Rx & ~Rx]" denotes an
extranuclear property. So his theory doesn't imply that there is an
object which exemplifies being-red-and-not-being-red
. And with these
obstacles out of the way. Parsons finds interesting applications for
his theory. In particular, he models fictional characters (and the
like), Leibnizian Monads, and suggests how to model Plato's Forms . 5
These models served as prototypes for the models we have constructed in
our alternative object theory.
Our theory of abstract objects is based on a different sug-
gestion of Mally's, however. He distinguished two relationships which
relate objects to their properties. On Mally's view, properties can
determine objects which don't in turn satisfy the properties. ^ For
example, the properties roundness and squareness can determine an ab-
stract object which satisfies neither roundness nor squareness. The
properties of existence, goldenness, and mountainhood can determine
an abstract object which doesn't satisfy any of these properties. The
properties which determine an abstract object are central to its
identity. For a recent attempt to reconstruct Mally's theory, see W.
Rapaport's discussion in "Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Para-
dox."
^
In what follows, we construct languages capable of represent-
ing the distinction between satisfying and being determined by a
property. However, we shall employ different terminology. We shall
say that an object exemplifies a property instead of satisfying it. We
shall say that an object encodes a property instead of saying that the
object is determined by the property. The distinction between
10
exemplifying and encoding a property is a primitive one and will be
represented by a distinction in atomic formulas of the languages we
construct. The primitive metaphysical notions that we shall need in
order to state the first principles of the theory are:
object (x,y , z , . . .
)
n-place relation (Fn ,Gn ,Hn
, . .
.
)
x exemplify Fn ("Fnx„ ...x ")
i n — t :p- 1 n
x encodes F ("xF ")
x exists ("E!x")
necessarily
, $ ("<{>")
Using these basic notions, we define a property to be a one-place re-
lation and define an abstract ("A!x") object to be an object which
fails to exemplify existence (in the modal theory, abstract objects
g
necessarily fail to exemplify existence) . We also say that two ob-
jects are identical ("x= y") iff they both exemplify existence and
lit Hi
exemplify the same properties (in the modal theory, two objects are
identical iff they both possibly exemplify existence and exemplify the
same properties)
.
In the context of the work of Meinong, Mally, Parsons, Findlay,
and Rapaport, the following two principles seem to be the cornerstones
9
for a theory of abstract objects:
(I) For every expressible set of properties, there is an ab-
stract object which encodes just the properties in the set
(3x)(A!x & (F) (xF = <(>)), where <j) has no free x's.
(II) Two objects are identical iff they are identical£ or
they are both abstract and encode the same properties
x=y = x=gy v (A!x & A!y & (F) (xF = yF))
Principle (I) gives us "being" conditions for abstract objects. In-
tuitively, to say that x encodes F is to say that F is an element of
11
the set of properties corresponding to x. Principle (II) gives us
identity conditions for objects in general. On our theory, in contrast
with Parsons, there are two kinds of objects and one kind of property.
Given these two principles, we will find an abstract object
which encodes just roundness and squareness ((3x)(A!x & (F) (xF - F-R
v F=S) ) ) . This object won't exemplify these properties, but may
have
exemplified the property of being thought about by Russell.
We also
find an abstract object which encodes just existence, goldenness,
and
mountainhood ((3x)(A!x & (F) (xF S F=E! v F=G v F=M) ) ) . By
definition,
this abstract object fails to exemplify existence. Also, we
will find
an abstract object which encodes being-red-and-not-red
((3x)(A!x &
(F) (xF = F= [Ax Rx & ~Rx] ) ) ) • But we won’t
get the contradiction dis-
cussed above because this object provably doesn't
exemplify this
property
.
In Chapter I, we shall couch principles
(I) and (II) as an
axiom schema and definition, respectively,
of an interpreted formal
language. We also axiomatize the other
logical and non-logical
principles which round out the theory.
This should make the details
of an ontology rich with abstract
objects sharp and accurate. Once
our background ontology is set, we
too shall adopt corresponding sup-
plementary views about the history of
philosophy and the philosophy of
language. Our methods should
therefore be familiar to most
analytic
philosophers
.
INTRODUCTION ENDNOTES
*1 shall not attribute this theory to Russell, though I will
call this view "Russellian" because so many philosophers seem to make
the attribution. Russell explicitly maintained ([1918], p. 269) that
the ordinary things we speak of as existing (you, my desk, sub-atomic
particles) are logical fictions. For Russell, there are no such ob-
jects. Moreover, some objects that there are, are ones we would
ordinarily consider to be nonexistent, for example, phantoms, hallu
cinations, and their constituents ([1918], pp. 274-276).
Today, many philosophers would supplement the "Russellian
view with either propositions or possible worlds (I'd like to thank
Mark Aronszajn for helping me to get straight about these details).
2 See J.N. Findlay [1933], p. 176. Findlay references Meinong
[1915], pp. 175-177.
3There are a host of good papers by Parsons on the
subject:
[1974], [1975], [1978], [1979b], and [1979c].
However, the most im-
portant statement of his theory is in his book N
onexistent Object s
[1980] .
^Parsons [1980], Ch. IV.
^Parsons [1980], Chs. VII, VIII.
6Findlay describes Mally's theory of determinates
in his
[1933], pp. 110-112 and pp. 183-184. He
cites Mally [1912], pp. 64,
76.
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Rapaport [1978], pp . 153-180. For some reason, Rapaport
doesn't attribute the theory he is working on to Mally. He calls it
a reconstruction of Meinong's theory. His Meinongian objects clearly
seem to be Mally' s determinations. Although Mally uses the word
"determiniert ," he also uses "Konstitutiven" ([1912], p. 64). Compare
Rapaport' s use of "being constituted by."
Q
In what follows, I use the word "abstract" purely as a piece
of technical terminology. Also, I take the words "existing," "actual,"
and "real" to be synonymous.
We could make a long list of entities which, at some time or
another, philosophers have supposed to be abstract. It is not to be
presupposed that the set of abstract objects which we will investigate
is (intended to be) identical with the set of objects which some other
philosopher pretheoretically intuits to be abstract. Many philosophers
have firm intuitions to the effect that certain objects are abstract.
However, these intuitions are rarely supported by presenting precise
conditions which tell when there are abstract objects or which tell us
when any two abstract objects are identical.
There is both a perogative and an intellectual obligation to
specify how one plans to use the word "abstract. This has been done
informally with principles I and II which follow in the text, and will
be done formally in Chapter I (§§ 1, 4). The notion we end up with
may not correspond exactly with that of others, but at least it
should
be clear. And in the course of our investigations, we shall
discover
that certain objects that other philosophers have taken to be abstract
are identifiable among our abstract objects.
14
For a long time, I thought I had been the first to formulate
these principles. But I’ve subsequently discovered that versions of
these principles are embedded in Rapaport’s dissertation [1976]. His
thesis T7a (p . 190) is similar to principle I, and his identity condi-
tions (p. 184) form part of principle II.
CHAPTER I
ELEMENTARY OBJECT THEORY
The full presentation of the elementary theory of abstract
objects shall occupy the first four sections of this chapter. In each
of these sections, we concentrate on the following major groups of
definitions
:
§1—The Language
§2—The Semantics
§3—The Logic
§4—The Proper Axioms
The proper axioms are stated in the language. Since the semantics
contains a definition which tells us the conditions under which an
arbitrary sentence of the language is true, we will know what is being
asserted by our proper axioms. The logic we associate with the lan-
guage allows us to prove the consequences of the proper axioms.
In the course of the definitions which follow, we frequently
provide examples and make extended remarks to explain and motivate
unusual features. In the remarks, we frequently define (with the help
of underlines and lists) certain syntactic or semantic concepts which
will help us to single out classes of expressions or entities which
have certain properties. We use quotation marks to mention expressions
of the language. We generally omit these standard devices
(quotation
marks, corner marks) for mentioning and describing pieces of language
15
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when the intent is clear. We use quotation marks inside parentheses
(".
.
.
"), to give readings and/or abbreviations of formulas. All
definitions of the object language appear with the label "Dn ."
With the exception of "X" and "l," we always use lower case
Greek letters as variables ranging over classes of expressions of the
object language. In particular, we always use:
<p, ip, x to tange over formulas
o's to range over object terms
p
n
's to range over relation terms
a, 6, Y to range over all variables
x’s to range over all terms
v's to range over object variables
7T
n,
s to range over relation variables
p, £, C to range over X-expressions
Finally, we note that in most of Chapter I, we shall not give
the intuitive readings in natural language of the formulas and complex
terms of the object language. That’s because our aim is to focus on
the expressive capacity of a formal language, without prejudice as to
how English sentences and terms are to be translated into the language.
However, it will be useful to provide some examples in natural language,
since this will help the reader to picture what the language and theory
can, and ultimately will, say.
§1. The Language
We shall utilize a slightly modified second order language.
One interesting modification is that new atomic formulas have
been
17
added— they express the fact that an object encodes a property. These
new atomic formulas are called "encoding formulas," and whereas the
ordinary "exemplification formulas" (which we shall still have around)
have n object terms to the right of an n-place relation term, encoding
formulas have a single object term to the left of a one-place relation
term. These atomic encoding formulas can combine with other formulas
to make molecular and quantified formulas. The complex formulas which
result may be constructed solely out of atomic exemplification sub-
formulas, solely out of atomic encoding subformulas, or may be of mixed
construction (many of the interesting definitions, axioms, and theorems
are mixed formulas).
A second modification of the standard second order language is
that there will be two identity signs—one primitive and one defined.
"= " shall denote the primitive relation of identity among existing
objects. A proper axiom will guarantee that two objects exemplify the
relation "= " denotes just in case they both exemplify existence and
exemplify the same properties. However, a more universal identity
among objects, and identity among relations and properties will be de-
fined with the help of encoding formulas. We shall use the symbol "=,"
as distinct from for these definitions (in the metalanguage, we
E
shall distinguish "identity^' from "identity").
These two modifications result in a language which has more
expressive capacity than the normal second order language. We subdi-
vide the definitions for our new language as follows:
A. Primitive symbols
B. Formulas and terms
C. Identity definitions
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A. Primitive symbols . We have two kinds of primitive object terms :
names and variables . Officially we use the subscripted letters a^, a
a^
>
••• as primitive object names, but unofficially, we use a, b, c, ...
for convenience. Officially, we use the subscripted letters x^, x^,
x^, ... as primitive object variables, but unofficially we use x, y,
z, ... . There are also two kinds of primitive relation terms : names
and variables . Officially, we use the superscripted and subscripted
letters P™, P^,-.. > n^l, as primitive relation names (unofficially:
P
, Q , ...) and F , ru-l, as primitive relation variables
(unofficially: Fn
,
G
n
,
...). E! is a distinguished one-place relation
name; = is a distinguished two-place relation name.
In addition we use two connectives, ~, and &; a quantifier:
3; a lambda: A; and we avail ourselves of parentheses and brackets to
disambiguate
.
B. Formulas and terms . We present a simultaneous inductive definition
of (propositional ) formula , object term , and n-place relation term .
The definition contains six clauses:
1. All primitive object terms are object terms and all
primitive n-place relation terms are n-place relation
terms
2. Atomic exemplification: If p
n
is any n-place relation
n
term, and 0-.,...,C>
n
are any object terms, p
is a (propositional) formula (read: "(>^,...,0^
exemplify relation p ")
3. Atomic encoding: If p
1
is any one-place relation term
and 0 is any object term, op
1
is a formula (read: ' o
1„ N
encodes property p )
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4. Molecular: If
<j) and i|
>
are any (propositional) formulas,then (~<J)) and (cj) & ip) are (propositional) formulas
5. Quantified: If
<J>
is any (propositional) formula, and
a is any (object) variable, then (3a)<J> is a (propo-
sitional) formula
6. Complex n-place relation terms: If <|> is any proposi-
tional formula with n— free object variables V^,...,v
then [Xv^...v^ $] is an n-place relation term
We rewrite atomic exemplification formulas of the form =00
E 1 2
as
°1~E°2* We drop Parentheses to facilitate reading complex formulas
whenever there is little potential for ambiguity. We utilize the
standard abbreviations: (<f> - i|>) , (<J> = ip) , (<f> v t|;) , and (a)4>. And we
define
:
D x is abstract ("A!x") = . ~E!x
I dfn
O
Here then are some examples of formulas: P axb ("a, x, and b
3
exemplify relation P ")
; aG ("a encodes property G") ; ~(3x)(xQ & Qx)
("no object both encodes and exemplifies Q"); (x)(E!x -* ~(3F)xF)
("every object which exemplifies existence fails to encode any
properties"); and (3x)(A!x & (F) (xF = Fa)) ("some abstract object
encodes exactly the properties a exemplifies").
By inserting all the parenthetical remarks when reading the
above definition, we obtain a definition of propositional formula .
In effect, a formula (J) is propositional iff <J> has no encoding sub-
formulas and (f) has no subformulas with quantifiers binding relation
variables.'*' Only propositional formulas may occur in X-expressions
.
2
X-expressions allow us to name complex relations. We read
[Xv_...v
<J)] as "being objects V, , . . . ,V such that <J>(v , . . . ,V )," orin in In
as "being a first thing, second thing, ...» and n^-thing such that <f>."
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For example: [Xx ~Rx] ("being an object x such that x fails to exem-
plify RM ); [Xx Px & Qx] ("being an object x such that x exemplifies
both P and Q") ; [Xx x=
E
b] ("being identical with b") ; [Xxy Px & Syx]
("being objects x and y such that x exemplifies P and y bears S to x") ;
[Xx Gy)Fxy] ("being an x such that x bears F to something");
[Xxyz Gzx & Ely] ("being a first, second, and third thing such that
3
the third bears G to the first and the second exists").
Since arbitrary formulas <{> cannot appear after X's, the fol-
lowing expressions are ill-formed: [Xx xP]
,
[Xy yP & Py], [Xx (3F)Fx]
,
and [Xx (3F) (xF & ~Fx) ] . The first two are ill-formed because the
formula after the X has an encoding subformula; the third because the
formula contains a quantifier binding a relation variable ("relation
quantifier"); the fourth fails both "restrictions" on propositional
formulas
.
Although a more detailed discussion is reserved for §5, we
indicate briefly why these restrictions appear. The "no encoding sub-
formulas" restriction is essential— it serves to avoid paradoxes in
the presence of the proper axioms (see §5). The "no relations quanti-
fiers" may not be essential, however, it allows us to effect a huge
simplification of the semantics. Since we shall not critically need
to use X-expressions with relation quantifiers in the applications
of
the theory, we choose not to complicate the semantics any further
than
necessary. We shall eliminate this latter restriction once we
move to
the typed theory of abstract objects (Chapter V). The semantics for
the language which couches the typed theory more easily
assimilates the
interpretation of X-expressions with "higher order"
quantifiers. The
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net result of these restrictions is that no relation denoting ex-
pression not already found in the standard second order language can
be constructed. Intuitively, this means we'll be working with fami-
liar sorts of complex properties and relations.
These A-expressions widen the possibilities for atomic and com-
plex formulas: [Xxy Px & Qy]ab ("a and b exemplify being two objects
x and y such that x exemplifies P and y exemplifies 0"); x[Xy ~Ry]
2
("x encodes failing to exemplify R") ; (3x)(A!x & (F) (xF = (3G )((Gab
& F=[Ay Gyb]) v (Gba & F=[Ay Gby])))) ("some abstract object encodes
just the relational properties a exemplifies with respect to b").
Finally, we say that t is a term iff T is an object term or
there is an n such that T is an n-place relation term.
C. Identity definitions . The identity definitions are presented with-
out the use of metavariables:
D„ x=y = ,_ x= y v (A!x & A!y & (F) (xF = yF))
2 din E
In the presence of the proper axiom governing identity£ among
objects
(i.e., x= y = E!x & Ely & (F) (Fx = Fy)), our first definition tells
us that objects x and y are identical iff either x and y both exist
and exemplify the same properties or x and y are both abstract and
encode the same properties. Note that [Axy x=y] is not well-formed—
"x=y" abbreviates a formula with both encoding subformulas and
rela-
tion quantifiers.
(x) (xF = xG)
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Two properties are identical iff they are encoded by the same objects.
At first glance, it will not be apparent why this should be a good, in-
sightful definition of property identity. We justify this definition in §4.
(x
1 )
. .
.
(x
n
) ( ( X;L [Ay F
n
yx
2
...x
n
] E x-JAy G
n
yx
2
...x
n
])
& (x
1 [
Ay F
n
x
2
yx 3> . .x^] E x^Ay G^yx^ . .x ] )
& ... & (x [ Ay F
n
x_ . . . x y ] E Xl [ Ay G
n
x . . . x y ] )
)
This definition may be read in the following, intuitive manner: rela-
tions Fn and Gn are identical iff the one place properties which result
no matter how n-1 objects are "plugged" into them (provided Fn and Gn
are plugged up in the same way) are identical (encoded by the same ob-
jects). This is meant to "generalize" the definition of property iden-
tity.
All of the definienda in these identity definitions have the
form a=$. The proper axiom governing substitutions of identicals
operates on these defined forms (see §4).
In the definitions which follow in § § 2 , 3, and 4, it shall be
useful to have precise definitions for certain syntactic concepts
which up until now, we have used on an intuitive basis: all and only
formulas and terms are well-formed expressions . An occurrence of a
variable a in a well-formed expression is bound ( free ) iff it lies
(does not lie) within a formula of the form (3cc)(J) or a term of the
form [Av . . .a. . .v <f>] within the expression. A variable is free
1 n
(bound ) iff it does (does not) have a free occurrence in that
expres-
sion. A sentence is a formula having no free variables.
Furthermore, a term T is said to be substitutable for a
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variable a in a formula
<f> iff for every variable 6 free in T, no free
occurrence of a in $ occurs either in a subformula of the form (3ft) ^ in
or in a term [Av^
. . 6. . . iJj] in <p. Intuitively, if T is substitutable
for a in <j>, no free variable ft in T gets "captured" when T is sub-
stituted for a, by a quantifier or A in 0 which binds ft. We write
4>(ot^
,
. .
. ,oO to designate a formula which may or may not have a
T t
In
occurring free. Finally, we write A 1
’ * n
to designate the formula
ul» ’ * * >an
which results when, for each i, l^i^n, x is substituted for each
i
free occurrence of a. in d>.
i
§2. The Semantics
The definitions which help to determine the conditions under
which the formulas of the language are true may be grouped as follows:
A. Interpretations
B. Assignments and Denotations
C. Satisfaction
D. Truth under an interpretation
In the definitions which follow, we use script letters as names and
variables for sets, entities, and functions which are all peculiarly
associated with the semantics.
A. Interpretations . ^ An interpretation, I, of our language is any
6-tuple <V, R, CXtj-,, L, &x£., F> which meets the conditions described
in this subsection. The first two members, V and R, must be non-empty
classes— they provide entities for the primitive and complex names of
the language to denote and they serve as the domains of quantification.
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V is called the domain of objects
,
and we use 0 ' s as metalinguistic
variables ranging over members of this domain. R is called the domain
— -
relations and it is the union of a sequence of classes R^
,
R^
,
R^,
i.e., R = Each R
n
is called the class of n-place rela-
tions. We use 4. as a metalinguistic variable ranging over the ele-
ments of R
r
. R must be closed under all of the logical functions
specified in the fourth member of the interpretation (L).
Intuitively, the third, fourth, and fifth members of any inter-
pretation are functions (or classes of functions) which impose a cer-
tain structure on the elements of V and R. We suppose that for each
n-place relation in R^, there is a set of n-tuples drawn from V which
serves as the exemplification extension ("extension^") of the relation.
Each n-tuple of the set represents an ordered group of objects which
exemplify (bear, stand in) the relation. The third member of an inter-
pretation is therefore a function, &xtv , which maps each ft e R intoK n
V
n
,
i.e., R
n
•* V
n
. We call exX^(4.
n
) the exemplification exten-
sion of ^n .
The fourth member of any interpretation, L, is a class of
logical functions which operate on the members of R^ and V to produce
the complex relations which serve as the denotations for the X-
expressions. Each complex relation receives an exemplification
extention^ which must mesh, in a natural way, with the extensions^ of
the simpler relations it may have as parts.
There are six elements in L— the first four are each families
of indexed logical functions: PLUG
^
("i-plug")
,
PROJ
^
("i-
projection")
,
CONV
. .
("i
,
j-conversion")
,
and REFL ("i,j-
1 J l,
j
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reflection"), where i and j are elements of the set of natural numbers.
The other two members of L are particular functions COSIJ ("conjunc-
tion") and MEG ("negation"). These six elements of L work as follows:
(a) PLUG for each i, l^i^n, is a function mapping
(R
i+lURi+2^ ’ * * ^ ^ ^ into (^ iU^ i+1 U. • • ) subject to the
condition: ex£^(PLUG (An ,o)) = (<0_,...,o. .,(> ,... f o >1
'v x J- i—± i+1 n
<
0l,...,0._i,0,0 i+1 ,...,0n
> £ (LXt
R
(/I
n
)}
This basically says that the extension^ of the new relation,
PLUG^(fin ,o) ("the i th-plugging of /in by o")
,
includes just those n-1
tuples which result by deleting the object 0 from the ith place of
every n-tuple in the extension^ of the original relation A.n which has
0 in its i^ place. This ensures, for example, that an object 0^ which
falls in the extension^ of the property PLUG^in ,0 is such that
o
<
°1’°2 > is in ttie extension £ of % • Also, if <0 1 >° 2 > is in the
extension^ of PLUG
2
(gxveA
,
0
^) , then <0^ 90y0j> is in the extension R
of gl\J<H,.
(b) PROJ^, for each i, l£i£n, is a function mapping
(R
.
,
-
UR U.
.
.
)
into (R.UR U...) subject to thel+l i+2 l l+l J
condition: e.xt^(PR0J^(An )) = {<0^ , . .
.
>
• • • »°
n
>
I
(Jo)(<o
1
,...,o
i_ 1
,o,o.
+1 ,... ,on
> e ex£^(si
n
))}
This tells us that PR0J^(si
n
) ("the i^-projection of A.n ") is an n-1
place relation which has in its extension all those n-1 tuples which
result by deleting the i^ object of every n-tuple in the extension^ of
2
Si
n
.
Intuitively, PROJ (A ) is a property an object 0^ has just in case
2
0^ bears H. to something. If 0^ exemplifies this property, then there
2
is at least one object 0 such that <0^,0
2
> £ C.xt
R
(A ).
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(c) COWl/^
,
for each i,j, l5i<j5n, is a function mapping
*nt °
^j^j+1^***) su^J ect to the con-
dition: exX^COWLC ^(^in )) =
{<o
1
,...,o
i_1
,o
j
,o i+1 ,...,oj _1
,o
i
,oj+1 ,...,on>|
<o o > e e>ct„(/i )}
This says that COW l/.
.
(A.
n
) ("the conversion of A.n about its i^ and
J
places") is an n-place relation which has in its extension,, all those
K
n-tuples which result by switching the i and j members of every n-
tuple in ex^
R
(4.
n
). So <o^o^> z exX
R
(C0WV
1 2
(n2 )) iff <0^0^ e
ext
R
(*
2
)
.
(d) REFL. for each i,j, l^i<j ^n, is a function mapping
1
»
J
(R.UR U. .
.) into (R. -UR.U...) subject to the con-
J 3+1 J-l 3
dition: e.xX^(REF ^(/tn )) =
{< 0 ^,. .., 0 ^,..
^j+l ’ * ' ’ ’ ^n^ ^
<0 , , . .
.
,0 . » . .
.
,o
.
,
.
.
.
,0 > e ex^r,(^
n
) and o. = 0 .}
1 ’ i j n R l j
When given place numbers i and j, REFL. . (A.
n
) ("the ijj*^ reflection1
»
3
of ^
n
") is an n-1 place relation which has in its extension^ all those
til
n-1 tuples which result by deleting the j member from every n-tuple
in the extension^ of A.n which has identical i^ and j 1"*1 members. This
2
ensures that any object 0 which falls in the extension^ of REFL )
2 2
is such that 0 bears to itself, i.e., e )•
(e) COWJ is a function from (R^t^U...) X (R-^l^U...) into
(R
2
UR
3
U . .
. ) subject to the condition: ex£g(C0NJ (si™ ,4
m
) ) =
{<o
1
,...,o
n
,
0|,...,o;>
I
<O
1
,..., 0
n
> e exX
R
(^i
n
) and
<o’ . .
.
,o’> z extp (-4
m
)>
i m K
COWJ maps any n-place relation A.
n
and m-place relation 6 to an n+m
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place relation which has in its extension^ any n+m-tuple which has an
n-tuple from (LxXg(Si ) as its first n members and an m-tuple from
ex£g(4m ) as its second m members. So <0^0^ £ £Kt^(C0SJJ (K1 ,i 1 ) ) iff
°
1
E ex^C^
1
) and 0
^
£ £XX^(6 1 ) .
(f) WEG is a function from (R^UR^...) into (R UR U...)
subject to the condition: ext^(NEG(Sin )) =
^
<0
l , *"’°n
>
I
<0
1
’* ,, ’°
n
> i }
WEG(^.n ) is an n-place relation which has in its extension^ all of the
n-tuples not in the extension^ of A.n .
This completes the definitions of the logical functions. They
guarantee that the domain of relations, R, houses a rich variety of
complex relations.
The fifth member of an interpretation is the last function
which imposes a structure on the domains V and R. We suppose that
every property in R^ has an encoding extension ("extension^"). The
encoding extension of a property is a set of members of V which encode
the property. The fifth member of an interpretation is therefore a
function, which maps each £ R^ into V, i.e., R^ -* V.
The final member of an interpretation, the F function, maps the
simple names of the language to elements of the appropriate domain.
For each object name a., F(a.) e V. For each relation name P^,J 1 1 i
F(Pn ) E R . Since "E!" is a simple property name, F ( E ! ) £ R. , and soin x
ex^(F(E!))C p. We call this subset of V the set of existing objects
("E"). We call the complement of E on V (i.e., CX^(MEG(F(E! ) ) )) the
set of abstract objects ("A").
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B. Assignments and denotations . As usual, an assignment with respect
to an interpretation I will be any function, j$j, which assigns to each
primitive variable an element of the domain over which the variable
ranges. And, a denotation function with respect to an interpretation
I and an I-assignment j$ 7 , will be any function, cL , , defined on the
1 * > o j
terms of the language, which: (1) agrees with Fj on the primitive
names, (2) agrees with on the primitive variables, and (3) assigns
to the complex terms on the basis of the denotations of their parts and
the way in which they are arranged. But consider a complex term like
"[Ax Px & Syx] . " Suppose that F^(P) is the property of being a
painting and Fj(S) is the study relation. Our A-expression would then
read: "being an object x such that x exemplifies paintinghood and y
bears the study relation to it." This A-expression might serve to
translate the English phrase "is a painting which ( ) studied." The
denotation of this A-expression will be assigned in terms of the deno-
tations of "P," "S," and "y," and the way in which these parts of the
expression are arranged.
Since the denotation function dj
^
(for convenience, we drop
the subscript on the j$) must agree with Fj, we know.
d-, , (P) = paintinghood
*
> 6
cL ,(S) = the AtudiJ relation
* f U
d will also agree with & on its assignment to
"y"
;
so let’s suppose
*
» u
that dj
^(y) =0. However, there are three
ways to construct a complex
property which might serve to interpret the way in which
these simple
parts are arranged in the A-expression. One alternative
is to
plug dj /(y) into the first place of dj^(S), conjoin
wlth the
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one place property which results, and then reflect the first and second
places of the 2-place relation resulting from the conjunction. This
would give us
:
REFL12 (C0NJ(dj^(P) t PLUG^dj
^
(S), d^(y))))
On the other hand, we might first conjoin d, ,(P) with d, ,(S) to get
a three place relation, reflect its first and third places to get a
2-place relation, and then plug dj y ) into the second place of the
result. This would give us:
PLUG
2
(REFL
1
'
2
(C0\lJ(d
J
^(P), dj ^(S))), d^Cy))
Finally, we might conjoin dj ^,(P) with dj ^(S), then plug dj y ) into
the second place of this 3-place relation, and then reflect the first
and second places of the result. This would give us:
REFL^
2
(PLUG
2
(C0NJ(dj^(P), d^ (S)), dj^(y)))
That is, the following three properties are all sitting around
in and could equally well serve as the denotation of [Xx Px & Syx]
with respect to I and
REFL
^ 2
(C0NJ (pcuntinghood, PLUG^Citudij, o)))
PLUG (REFL (COW
J
(painting hood, Atudy)) , o)
Z
-1 j -3
REFL (PLUG (CONJ(pcuntingkood, Atudy ) , o))
1
,
z z
The claim that these three complex properties are in fact the
same property is a metaphysical thesis of great interest. The idea is
that these complicated looking script expressions which are displayed
immediately above just represent different decompositions of the same
property. Of course, such a thesis needs to be supported, preferably
with a (mathematical) theory which predicts when any two such proper-
ties or relations are identical.^ But such a theory has yet to
be
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devised
.
Consequently, we face the question, which of the above three
properties should be assigned as the denotation-. , of our A—expression
[Ax Px & Syx] ? In order to answer this question, we shall develop a
mechanical procedure which selects one of the above properties and which
makes a similar kind of selection for each of the other A-expressions
.
This mechanical procedure is embodied primarily in a definition which
partitions the A-expressions into seven syntactic equivalence classes.
Six of these classes will correspond to the logical functions found in
L. The seventh houses all of the "simple" A-expressions. [AxPx&Syx]
will be categorized as a 1,2-reflection of the expression [AxuPx&Syu],
which in turn will be categorized as the conjunction of the two expres-
sions [Ax Px] and [Au Syu] . The first of these is simple and the
s t
second will be categorized as the 1 -plugging of [Auw Swu] by term y.
Once the A-expressions have been partitioned, it will be straightforward
to define I-assignment and denotation
j ^
so that [Ax Px & Syx] denotes
the first of the above three properties. The definitions of I-assign-
ment and denotation-,
,
follow the partitioning.
I
> 6
Partitioning the A-expressions . We use y, £ as metavariables
ranging over A-expressions. Suppose y is an arbitrary A—expression.
Then y = [Avr ..V <|>] , for
some <J>, Utilizing the following
five major rules, we then define: y is the i,j -conversion of ^ , y is
the negation of £» y is the disjoint conjunction of £ and C , U is the
j % j ^-projection of £, y is the i.j -reflection of y is the i—
^
plugging of C by o , and y is elementary .
1. If (3i)(l<i<n and V, is not the i
th free object variable in $ and
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i is the least such number), then where v is the ith free obiect
j J
variable in d> y is the i ,j ^-conversion of
Uvr . ViVi+r . . ,vn 4>]
2. If y is not the i,j ^-conversion of any A-expression
,
then:
(a) if d = ~d> P is the negation of [Xv, ...v iL» 1
— 1 n
(b) if d = (d & X) > and d and y have no free object variables in
common, then where V
,
. .
.
,v are the variables in d and
1 P
V
p+l’*'* ,Vn
are the variables in X, P is the (disjoint ) con-
junction of [Av„...v dl and [Xv v vl1 p p+1 n A
(c) if 4> = (3v)d> and v is the i^ free object variable in
<f>
,
then y is the i
t
^-projection of [Xv, ...V. ,vv.v. , . . .v dl— 1 l-l l l+l n r
3. If y is none of the above, then if (3i)(l<i<n and occurs free in
more than one place in d and i is the least such number), then where
(a) k is the number of free object variables between the first and
second occurrences of v.,
i
(b) d' is the result of replacing the second occurrence of with
a new variable v, and
(c) j = i+k+1,
til
y is the i, j -reflection of [Av^. . . V^+^VVj
• • * v
n
0’]*
4.
If y is none of the above, then if o is the left most object term
occurring in d> then where:
(a) j is the number of free variables occurring before o,
(b) d' is the result of replacing the first occurrence of o by
a new variable v, and
(c) i = j+1,
y is the i
th
-plugging of [Av
1
. . . W^+1
. • • V
r
d'l hi 0 •
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5. If y is none of the above, then
(a) (}> is atomic,
(b) the order in which these variables first
occur in (p,
(c) y = [Xv^— p V^..,v ], for some relation term p
n
,
and
(d) y is called elementary .
Rules (1) — (5) partition the class of X—expressions into seven equiva-
lence classes. The reader should verify that: [Xx Rxb] is the 2°d -
plugging of [Xxy Rxy] by b; [Xx (Px & Skx) ] is the 1,2-reflection of
[ Xxy (Px & Sky)]; [Xxy (3w)Bwxy] is the 2nd -projection of [Xxwy Bxwy];
and [Xxy (Rxx & Syy) ] is the conjunction of [Xx Rxx] and [Xy Syy];
among other examples.
I-assignments .^ If given an interpretation I of our language
an I-assignment
, ,
will be any function defined on the primitive
variables of the language which satisfies the following two conditions
1. where V is any object variable,
^
(v) e V
2. where tt 11 is any relation variable,
^
(Ti
n
) c
Denotations . If given an interpretation I of our language,
and an I-assignment ($ , we recursively define the denotation of term T
with respect to interpretation I and I-assignment ("dj
^( T
)
") as
follows
:
1 .
2 .
3.
where K is any primitive name, dj ^(k) = Fj(k)
where v is any object variable, dj ^(v) = |^(v)
where tt
11
is any relation variable, dj
^
(tt ) = ($(tt )
where [Xv, ...V p
n
v,...V ] is any elementary X-expression,
1 n 1 n
d
!,«
([XV-- Vn PV-- Vn I) = d 7,<
(pn)
4 .
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5. where y is the ith-plugging of ^ by o,
- PLU6
i<
di,t<Z>- di ,<«»>
6. where y is the i th-projection of
d
7,^(y > = PR0J±(dj t f(O)
til
7. where y is the i,j -conversion of
8. where y is the i, j ^-reflection of
dM (y) REFh, j (dM (0)
9. where y is the disjoint conjunction of E, and
dj^(y) = co\ij(dj^(o, d
x
^(c))
10. where y is the negation of
dj^OO - NEG(dj .(O)
Here are some examples of X-expressions and their denotations:
dj ^([Xx Rxa] ) = PLUG
2
(dj ^(R), dj ^(a))
dj^dXx Sxbd ] ) = PLUG
2
(PLUG
3
(dj ^(S), dj ^(d)), dj ^(b))
dj ^([Xx Px & Skx] ) = REFL
1 2
(C0NJ(dj
^(p), PLUG^dj ^(S),
dM<k»»
dj
^
( [ Xxy (3w) Bxwy ] ) = PR0J2 (dj ^(B))
dj ^([Axy Rxx & Syy]) = C0WJ(REFE^ 2^1 » ^FE^ 2^d l ^^)))
dj ^([Xx Bx & (3y)(Wyx & Lmy ) ] ) = REFL^ 2 (C0NJ(dj ^(B),
PR0J
1
(REFL
1 3
(C0NJ(dj ^(W), PLUG^dj
^
(L)
,
d^^m)))))))
C. Satisfaction .
11
If we're given an interpretation I, and an as-
signment j$, we may define jJ satisfies <p, recursively, as follows:
1. If <p = p
n
o
1
...O
n
,
satisfies <}) iff <d^ ^(c^),..., dj^(°n )>
e ex^(dj
^(p
n
))
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2. If cf) = op\ fa satisfies 4> iff
dj ^(o) e axt^dj
^(p
1
))
3. If <j) = (~lp)
» fa
satisfies 0 iff fa fails to satisfy <J)
4. If cf> = (iJj&x) , fa satisfies 0 iff fa satisfies both and x
5. If 4> = (3a)^, fa satisfies cj) iff
(3^*) (fa' =fa and satisfies $) > where:
fa' =fa
=
jfn is an 1-assignment just like fa except
, c ^ . . 12perhaps for what it assigns to a.
D. Truth under an interpretation . <}> is true under interpretation I iff
every I-assignment fa satisfies $. Using this definition, we say that <{>
is valid ( logically true ) iff <J> is true under all interpretations. The
logical axioms which follow in the next section are all valid. We say
that an interpretation I is a model of elementary object theory iff
all the proper axioms of the theory (§4) are true under 7.
§3. The Logic
The logic for our interpreted language consists of:
A. Logical axioms
B. Rules of Inference
A. The logical axioms . There are an infinite number of
formulas which
are logically true (valid) . Some of these are designated as
logical
axioms and they, together with the rules of inference,
store the ana-
lytical power of the theory. The logical axioms
are introduced by
schemata, which indicate that all formulas of a
certain form are to be
The schemata fall into three groups: the
propositional
axioms
.
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schemata, the quantificational schemata, and a schema governing A-
13
expressions.
Propositional schemata
.
LAI :
(f>
-* (\p -y cj>)
LA2: (<J> + -*• x)) + ( (4> ij>) + (<J) > x))
LA3: (~<f) -> ~i|j) -» ((~<J> \p) -+ (j))
Quantificational schemata .
LA4: (a)cj> - cj)
,
where T is substitutable for a
LA5
:
(a) (<J) + \p) -* (<J> ->• (a)ip), provided a isn't free in
(J)
Lambda schema .
X-EQUIVALENCE : For any formula <j) where Fn isn't free, the
universal closure of the following is an axiom:
X*i
, X
(x )...(x )([Av . ..V (J)]x
n
.
. .x = 6
’
’ n
) , providedi n Inl v, V1’ * * •
’ n
x^,...,x
n
are substitutable for V^,...,V
,
respectively.
For example, (x)([Ay ~Ry]x = ~Rx) is an instance of A-EQUIVALENCE
which says that an arbitrary object x exemplifies failing-to-exemplify-
R iff x fails to exemplify R. If we let "P" denote the property of
being a painting and "S" denote the study relation, then
(x^) (x
2
) ( [Ax^x^ Px^. & Sx^x,- ]x^x
2
= Px
x
& Sx 2
x
1
)
is an instance of A-EQUIVALENCE which asserts that arbitrary objects
x^ and x
2
exemplify being two objects such that the first exemplifies
paintinghood and the second bears the study relation to the first iff
x^ exemplifies paintinghood and x
2
bears the study relation to x^.
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B. Rules of inference .
^
1. Arrow Elimination ("->E") : If h <j> and \-<$> + i<, then h \p
2. Universal Introduction ("UI") : If then b(aH
Officially, these are all the rules we'll need. In the usual manner,
a proof will be any finite sequence of wffs which is such that each
wff in the sequence is either an axiom (logical or proper) or follows
from earlier members of the sequence by a rule of inference. A
theorem is any wff that appears as the last member of a proof. We
distinguish the logical theorems from the proper theorems: the former
are derivable using only logical axioms as premises, whereas the
latter are derivable from some proper axiom.
It is convenient to employ other standard, derived rules of
inference. For example, we call the rule of inference derivable from
-HE and LA4 universal elimination ("UE") . Standard formulations of
the existential introduction and elimination rules ("El" and "EE")
,
the quantifier negation rules ("QN")
,
and the introduction and
elimination rules for ~, &, v, and = are also employed. We avail
ourselves of conditional and indirect proof techniques. The proofs
which follow (as well as those in the appendices) are usually con-
structed with the aid of these derived rules.
By using UE on the universal quantifiers of the instances of
A-EQUIVALENCE, we obtain biconditionals. Rules of inference governing
the biconditional allow us to introduce (eliminate) A-expressions into
proofs when the right (left) side of the biconditional is added as a
premise. We may shorten this process by formulating two rules of in-
ference derived from A-EQUIVALENCE, =1, and =E
:
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where 41 is any propositional formula with object terms o
, . . . ,o
,
a
In
and V
,
...,v are object variables substitutable for o
,x n I n
respectively, then the following are rules of inference:
1. X-Introduction ("XI") : If |— (p, then
f— [Xv . ..v 4)0 ^-’
’
0
n ]o ...o
1 n 1 * • • • » n 1 n
2. X-Elimination ("XE") : If f— [Xv. . . .v
’ '*
"
’
n
n ]o ...o
1 n • • •
>
u
n
J
1 n’
then [— 4)
Also, since [Xv . ..V^ 4>] is an n-place relation term, it is subject to
existential introduction. We get an important logical theorem schema
by applying El to X-EQUIVALENCE
:
THEOREM(S) ("RELATIONS") : where 4> is a propositional formula
which has no free Fn, s, but has x, , . .
.
,x free, the universal
I n
closure of the following is a theorem:
(3Fn ) (x ) . . . (x ) (F
n
x . . .x = <j>)
1 n 1 n
The instances of this schema tell us what complex properties and rela-
tions there are. Here are some examples:
(a) (3F)(x)(Fx = x=
£
x)
(b) (3F)(x)(Fx = x^
£
x)
(c) (3 F)(x)(Fx = ~Gx)
(d) (3F)(x)(Fx = Gx & Hx)
(e) (3 F) (x) (Fx E Gx v Hx)
(f) (3F) (x) (y) (Fxy = Gyx)
(g) (3 f) (x) (Fx = (3y)Gxy)
Axioms (a) and (b) assert that there is a universal property and empty
property among the existing objects, respectively; (c)-(f) assert,
respectively, that every property has a negation, every two properties
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have a (non-disjoint) conjunction and disjunction, every two place
relation has a converse, and every two place relation has a projec-
tion on its second place.
RELATIONS and constitute a full-fledged theory of n-place
relations (n>l) . We no longer need to suppose that relations are
"creatures of darkness." They have precise "existence" and identity
conditions. It is not a consequence of our theory that logically
equivalent relations are identical—we cannot prove that relations
which have the same exemplification extension are identical. For
example, it does not follow from the fact that being a rational ani-
mal and being a featherless biped are logically equivalent properties
that they are identical.
If we restrict ourselves to properties, we should note that
there are two senses of "F is logically equivalent to G." One sense
is that F and G have the same exemplification extension. The second
sense is that F and G have the same encoding extension. If F and G
are logically equivalent in this latter sense, then, by definition,
they are identical. In what follows, we always use "logical equiva-
lence" in the former sense.
We call our modified second order language, together with its
semantics and its logic, the ob~iect calculus . The object calculus is
the metaphysical system in which the proper axioms of elementary ob-
ject theory are stated.
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§4. The Proper Axioms^
We state the theory of abstract objects using two axioms and
two schemata. Though these axioms are not logically true, we neverthe-
less suppose them to be true a priori. The first two axioms express
truths about existing objects. The first schema tells us about any
objects or relations which satisfy the definitions for identity. The
second schema tells us what abstract objects there are. Since the
schemata indicate that all sentences of a certain form are to be
axioms, we end up with a denumerably infinite number of proper axioms.
These axioms, plus the three definitions of identity in §1, constitute
the first principles of abstract object theory.
The first axiom tells us that two objects bear the identity
h
relation to one another iff they both exist and exemplify the same
16
properties
:
AXIOM 1 ("E-IDENTITY")
:
(x) (y) (x= y = E!x & Ely & (F) (Fx = Fy))
With this axiom, we prove the following theorem schema for identity:
THEOREMS ("IDENTITY INTRODUCTION")
:
(a) (a=a)
,
where a is any variable
Proof: Clearly, if ot is an object variable x, and E!x, then since
we have (F) (Fx 5 Fx) from propositional logic and UI , we may use E-
IDENTITY to prove x=£x.
So x=x, by D
2
(§1). If ~E!x, then x is ab-
stract and similar techniques get us the right hand disjunction of D^
If a is a one place property variable f\ we easily get (x) (xF = xF)
.
So by D^, F^ = f\ And a generalized version of this procedure gets us
AO
a-a, when a is any n-place relation variable. M
In what follows, we abbreviate "IDENTITY INTRODUCTION" as "=I."
The second axiom tells us that no existing object encodes any
properties.
AXIOM 2 ("NO-CODER")
:
(x) (E ! x ~(3F)xF)
The third axiom is the schema for identity:
AXIOM 3 ("IDENTITY"):
a=6 -*• (4>(a,a) 4>(a,8)), where (j)(a,8) is the result of re-
placing some, but not necessarily all, free occurrences of
a by 8, provided 8 is substitutable for a in the occurrences
of a it replaces.
This identity schema governs both primitive and defined identities.
It clearly governs the latter. It also governs the primitive x= y
formulas since if x= y, it follows by D„ that x=y. The rule of infer-
ence derivable from ->E and IDENTITY is called identity elimination
("=E" )
.
The schema for abstract objects generates the most important
set of axioms of the theory. In effect, the schema guarantees that for
every expressible set of properties, there is an abstract object which
18
encodes just the members of the set. However, the schema does this
without a commitment to sets. We generally use open formulas with one
free property variable with this axiom. The formulas express condi-
tions on properties. Metalinguistically , it is legitimate to talk
about the set of properties satisfying a given condition, but in the
object language, our schema says something more like: for every condi-
tion on properties, there is an abstract object which encodes just the
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properties which meet the condition : 19
AXIOM(S) ("A-OBJECTS") : For any formula <p where x isn't free,
the universal closure of the following is an axiom:
(3x) (A! x & (F) (xF E <J))>
Some examples will help. If we let "F=R v F=S" be our formula (f>, and
suppose that "R" denotes roundness and "S" denotes squareness, then
our axiom guarantees that there is a "round square" as follows:
(3x) (A! x & (F) (xF E F=R v F=S))
Suppose a^ is such an object. It is easy to see that a^ must be
unique. For suppose some other abstract object a^
,
a^a^, encoded
exactly roundness and squareness. By D^, it would follow that either
a^ encoded a property a^ didn't, or vice versa, contrary to hypothesis.
In fact, given D^, we have the following theorem schema:
THEOREM (S)
:
("UNIQUENESS") For every formula
<f>
where x
isn't free, the universal closure of the following is a theorem:
(3!x)(A!x & (F) (xF E <£))
Proof : An arbitrary instance of A-OBJECTS says that there is an
abstract object which encodes exactly the properties which satisfy the
given formula. But there couldn't be distinct such objects, since
distinct abstract objects must differ with respect to at least one of
the properties they encode.
Another instance of the schema for objects says there is an
"existent golden mountain." Suppose "G" denotes goldenness and "M"
denotes mountainhood . We then have:
(3x) (A! x & (F) (xF E F=E! v F=G v F=M)
)
It follows that there is an abstract object which encodes a property
(existence) it fails to exemplify.
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By letting $ -
r
FiiF~\ we obtain the empty object— it fails to
encode any properties. By letting <(, = rF.F~’, we obtain the universal
object— it encodes every property.
Suppose "a
5
" denotes Socrates. Then the following instance of
A-OBJECTS yields an A-object which encodes exactly the properties
Socrates exemplifies:
(3x)(A!x & (F) (xF E Fa ))
We might call this object Socrates’ blueprint
,
and call Socrates the
20
correlate of the blueprint. We define these terms as follows:^
D
5
x is the blueprint of y and y is the correlate of x
("Blue (x,y) " and ”Cor(y,x)") =
dfn (F) (xF E Fy)
A-OBJECTS guarantees that every object, existing or abstract, has a
unique blueprint:
(y) (3lx) (A!x & (F) (xF E Fy))
This is an instance of the theorem schema since it is the universal
closure when "Fy" is the formula
<J).
Given any object b, A-OBJECTS yields an object which encodes
all the properties b fails to exemplify. Given any two objects b and
c, A-OBJECTS yields an object which encodes (1) just the properties b
and c have in common, (2) just the properties exemplified by either b
or c, and (3) just the relational properties b has with respect to c.
This last object is yielded by the following instance:
(3x)(A!x & (F) (xF E (3G^)((Gbc & F=[Ax Gxc]) v
(Gcb & F= [ Ax Gcx] ) ) )
)
These examples give one a pretty good idea of what A-OBJECTS says.
We use A-OBJECTS to justify the definition we've proposed for
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property identity. Suppose that instead of defining identity between
properties as in D
3 ,
we had added primitive identity formulas between
property terms. Then the following would have been a consequence of
A-OBJECTS:
(G) (H) ( (x) (xG E xH) -> G=H)
To see this, suppose arbitrary properties P and Q were encoded by ex-
actly the same objects, but were distinct. By A-OBJECTS, it would have
followed that there is an object which encodes just P, without encoding
Q, contrary to hypothesis.
Since we would have had this consequence had property identity
been primitive, there was every reason to just define identity among
properties. Semantically, our definition ensures that two properties
which have the same extension^ are identical. But our theory doesn't
commit us to the view that properties exemplified by the same objects
(i.e., which have the same extension^) are identical. An overriding
reason for choosing the style of semantics we’ve employed is that
properties and relations are not identified with their extensions^.
The semantics doesn't force upon us a view to which the theory is not
committed
.
E-IDENTITY, NO-CODER, IDENTITY, and A-OBJECTS jointly are
called the elementary theory of abstract objects and I believe that
22 23the theory is consistent. ’ In the next section, we shall see that
it is protected from the known paradoxes.
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§5
. Avoiding Known Paradoxes
As in set theory, unrestricted abstraction schemata lead to
paradox. The A-EQUIVALENCE schema has been restricted indirectly (and
RELATIONS has been restricted directly) so as to avoid these paradoxes.
There are two paradoxes that have been discovered—one by Romane Clark,
the other by Alan McMichael. 4 In Appendices A and B, we provide strict
derivations of these paradoxes, demonstrating how they result from A-
expressions without restrictions on the formulas which appear behind
them. It is important, however, to sketch the proofs here.
Suppose we dropped the two major restrictions on A-formation
and RELATIONS (i.e., the restrictions imposed by the definition of
propositional formula)
. We could then form the following two A-
expressions
:
[Ax (3F)(xF & ~Fx) ] ("encoding a property that's not
exemplified"), and [Ax (F) (xF -+ Fx)] ("exemplifying every property
that's encoded"). Alternatively, we could produce instances of RELA-
TIONS as follows:
(3F)(x)(Fx = (3G)(xG & ~Gx) )
(3F) (x) (Fx = (G) (xG -* Gx))
But then consider the following argument ("Clark's paradox"):
Consider the abstract object a^ which encodes just
[Ax (3F) (xF & ~Fx) ] , and suppose it exemplifies [Ax (F) (xF -»• Fx) ] . By
AE, it follows that (F) (a^F -* Fa^)
,
so a^ must exemplify
[Ax (3F) (xF & ~Fx) ] as well as encode it. Again, by AE,
(3f) (a
Q
F & -FaQ)
,
i.e., ~(F)(3qF -* Fa^) . But then a^ must fail to
exemplify [Ax (F) (xF -> Fx) ] (by A-EQUIVALENCE and =E) , contrary to
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hypothesis
.
So suppose a
Q
fails to exemplify [Ax (F) (xF -* Fx) ] . Then
(F)(a
0
F Fa0^’ i,e *’ (^ F ) ( a
0
F & ~Fa
0
). Call this property "R" and
note also that by Al, a
Q exemplifies [Ax (3F)(xF & -Fx) ] . Since a Q
encodes just one property, R must be [Ax (3 f)(xF & ~Fx) ] . But by
definition of R, aQ fails to exemplify R, i.e., ~[Ax (3 f)
(
xF & ~Fx)]a
Q ,
contradiction. E
A second contradiction would also be provable because we could
form the following A-expression: [Ay y=x] ("being identical to x")
,
where this abbreviates a much longer A-expression with encoding sub-
formulas and relation quantifiers. Again, by RELATIONS, we would know
that there is such a property. But then consider the following argu-
ment ("McMichael ' s paradox"):
By A-OBJECTS, we have that (3x)(A!x & (F) (xF E (3u)(F=[Ay y=u]
& ~uF))), Call this object a^ and consider the property [Ay y=a^]
.
Assume that a^ encodes [Ay y=a^] . By definition of a^, we know
(3u)([Ay y=a^] = [Ay y=u] & ~u[Ay y=a^]). Call this object a So,
[Ay y=a^] = [Ay y=a^ ] & ~a^ [ Ay y=a^]. By =1, we know a^=a^, and by
Al, we know [Ay y=a^]a^. Since [Ay y=a^] = [Ay y=a
2 ],
it follows by
=E that [Ay y=a
2
]a^. So by AE, a^=a
2
* But then, ~a^[Ay y=a^] (from
the definition of a
2
and =E)
,
contrary to hypothesis.
So suppose that ~a^[Ay y=a^]. By definition of a^,
~(3u)([Ay y=a^] = [Ay y=u] & ~u[Ay y=a
]L
]). That is, (u)([Ay y=a_
L
]
=
[Ay y=u] -> u[Ay y=a
2
l). But since [Ay y=a^] = [Ay y=a^] , it follows
that a^[Ay y=a^]. Contradiction.
E
It is doubtful that the source of these paradoxes lies with the
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presence of relation quantifiers in 1-expressions. Logicians have not
found any special trouble with the second order predicate calculus, in
which one finds relations defined with quantification over other rela-
tions. For example, here's a standard instance of the relations schema
of the second order predicate calculus:
(3f) (x) (Fx = (3g)Gx)
This asserts that there is a property of "having a property." This
property would be denoted using "[Ax (3g)Gx]." Properties such as
these don t seem to cause any special consistency problems. The only
reason for adding the "no relation quantifiers" restriction on A-
expressions is that given the style of semantics we have employed, it
is rather complicated to interpret such expressions without the re-
sources of type theory (in type theory, we suppose that "[Ax (3g)Gx]"
abbreviates [Ax (3g)ExGx], m where "Ex" is a predicate which denotes
the exemplification relation between a property and an object which
exemplifies it. We then interpret this latter A-expression as
PR0J
1
(dj
^
(Ex) ) , i.e., as the first projection of this exemplification
25
relation)
.
Consequently
,
the elimination of encoding subformulas from
A-expressions appears to us to be the most theoretically satisfying way
of avoiding the paradoxes. This move makes [Ax (3f) (xF & ~Fx) ]
,
[Ax (F)(xF -* Fx) ] , and [Axy x=y] all ill-formed. It affords us the
convenience of not having to interpret A-expressions containing such
subformulas. It leaves us with a rich variety of properties and rela-
tions—all the ones we’re familiar with from the second order predicate
26
calculus.
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The theory with which this move leaves us is rather powerful,
and there is one interesting consequence to which the reader should be
alerted. It turns out that some complex properties and relations do
not have unique constituents. 27 It is provable, for example, that for
some objects and a^, a^, that [Ay Ryaj] = [Ay RyaJ. Here's how:
Let R be any two place relation. By A-OBJECTS, (3x)(A!x &
(F)(xF = (3u) (F= [Ay Ryu] & ~uF) ) ) . Call this object a
3
and suppose a
3
doesn't encode [Ay Rya 3 ] . By reasoning similar to the second part of
McMichael s paradox, it follows that a
3
does encode [Ay Rya
3
] . So sup-
posing a
3
encodes [Ay Rya
3 ], it follows by definition of a_ that for
some object, say a^, [Ay Rya^ = [Ay Rya^ and
-a^Ay Rya^
. Since a
3
encodes [Ay Rya ] and a doesn't, it follows that a.^a.
,
28
3 H 3 4
There is a weaker, though fairly useful, version of our theory
in which this is not a consequence. That is the theory which results
by banishing encoding subformulas from the formulas <p used in the
29A-OBJECTS axiom. By doing this, the instance of A-OBJECTS which
begins the preceding proof will be ill-formed. I think one could then
consistently suppose (add axioms which guarantee) that complex rela-
30tions and properties do have unique constituents. With only a few
exceptions, almost all of the applications of the present theory could
31
be preserved. Officially, however, we shall not work with this ver-
sion of the theory—we prefer to work with the most powerful version of
the theory which has a reasonable degree of probability of being con-
sistent .
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§6. An Auxiliary Hypothesis
In Chapter II, we shall put the theory we've now formulated to
work. For these applications, we add to our primitive vocabulary ab-
breviations of the "gerundive versions" of standard English transitive
verbs, intransitive verbs, predicate adjectives, and predicate nouns. 3 '
By the "gerundive version" of these words, I mean the phrases con-
structed out of English gerunds which can appear in the subject places
or direct object places of English sentences. Here are some examples:
A. Transitive verbs
kick
worship
hate
B. Intransitive verbs
run
walk
C. Predicate adjectives
red
courageous
happy
D. Predicate nouns
horse
person
building
Gerundive Version
(the) kicking (relation)
(the) worshipping (relation)
(the) hating (relation)
(the property of) running
(the property of) walking
(the property of) being red
(the property of) being courageous
(the property of) being happy
(the property of) being a horse
(the property of) being a person
(the property of) being a building
We abbreviate these gerundive versions in our language with single
letters, appropriately chosen. For example, "K" might abbreviate "the
kicking relation," etc. (Also, we shorten our readings of A-expressions
so that they more closely resemble their natural language counterparts.
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So instead of reading "b[Ax Cx & Px]" as "b encodes the property an
object x exemplifies iff x exemplifies being courageous and x exempli-
fies being a person," we read it as "b encodes being a courageous per-
son.")
These additions to our primitive vocabulary are supposed to
reveal our pretheoretic conceptions about what properties and rela-
tions there are. By adding these properties and relations to our sys-
tem, A-OBJECTS provides us with a rich variety of abstract objects
which encode familiar sorts of simple and complex properties.
These additions also make it possible to state an auxiliary
hypothesis of the elementary theory—an hypothesis to which we shall
appeal on occasion in the applications. Despite its rather vague
character, it grounds a wide range of intuitions some of us may share
about abstract objects. Pretheoretically
,
we have a pretty good idea
of what properties existing objects exemplify. And the theory tells us
the conditions under which both existing and abstract objects encode
these properties. But other than being abstract (i.e., [Ax ~E!x]), we
haven't said anything about which properties abstract objects exemplify.
Some of us may share the following intuitions. Abstract ob-
jects do not exemplify the following properties: being round, having a
shape, being red, having a color, being large, having a size, being
soft, having a texture, having mass, having spatio-temporal location,
being visible, being capable of thought (this is not to say that they
aren't thought of), being capable of feeling, etc. In addition, it
might seem that no two abstract objects could ever meet each other,
kick each other, kiss each other, etc. I'm sure the reader can provide
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many more examples.
These properties and relations are "ordinary" properties and
relations of existing objects. Mally, Meinong, Findlay, Parsons, and
others call them "nuclear" relations. They are to be distinguished
from "extranuclear" relations such as being abstract, being thought
about, being written about, being worshipped, being dreamed of, being
possible, being more famous than, etc. We can easily imagine that
abstract objects exemplify these extranuclear relations
.
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We shall not be interested in pursuing this distinction among
relations in any detail. We mention it because there will be occasion
to appeal to the above intuitions and it would be nice to ground them
all in some general principle. Consequently, we suppose that no ab-
, . 34stract objects exemplify nuclear relations.
We incorporate this hypothesis into elementary object theory
by supposing that we can divide the n-place relation terms of our
35language according to whether they are nuclear or extranuclear. We
then add:
AUXILIARY HYPOTHESIS: Where p
n
is a nuclear n-place relation
term, the following is an axiom:
(x ) . . . (x )(A!x., & ... & A!x -»• ~p
n
x,...x )Ini n In
We trouble the reader with this hypothesis because it seems possible
that some such set of truths like these govern abstract objects a
priori .
CHAPTER I ENDNOTES
Every formula is a subformula of itself. If 4> =
,
(\p & X) > or (3ct)\p, then ^ is a subformula of (f>. If ^ is a subformula
of x> and x is a subformula of 4>, then f is a subformula of <J>
.
2
See Alonzo Church [1941].
3
For convenience, we will read "Ely" as "y exists" and
"[Ax x=
E
b]" as "being identical^ to b," instead of using the more
cumbersome readings.
4
These definitions are all standard.
^Compare Parsons [1980], Ch. IV, §3.
^Most of these logical functions can be traced back to Moses
Schonfinkel [1924]. Quine picked up the trail in his [I960].
McMichael, after seeing my work with PLUG (a function I picked up from
Parsons [1980]), developed the other logical functions, using Quine's
operators as the prototypes. Quine has no need for PLUG since his
project was to explain away singular terms. I learned these algebraic
techniques from Alan, and together we wrote [1979b]. We used these
logical functions to validate A-EQUIVALENCE, the relations schema I
had been using informally along with the formal monadic theory de-
veloped in my [1979a].
Since [1979b], I have made several improvements to these
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logical functions. The place numbers have been indexed to those func-
tions which operate on specific places in a relation. The definitions
are now sharpened up so that we don’t have an infinite number of empty
relations like the plugging of a two place relation in its 15 th place,
the projection of a 3-place relation in its 300 th place, etc. Also,
I've added l/AC and NEC in Chapter III.
^I’m indebted to T. Parsons for pointing this problem out to me.
g
One possibility I’ve yet to explore is a reference made by Quine
in a footnote in [I960]. He says that Bernays had developed a system
which included axioms. So maybe there is such a theory. Also, Tarski's
cylindrical algebra or a polyadic algebra might be relevant here.
9
I was motivated to construct these definitions after reading
Bealer [1981] (in manuscript), Ch. 3. The definition he had constructed
to partition his complex terms seemed too complicated. I then had the
idea that by subscripting the place numbers to the relevant logical
functions and by ordering the rules for assignments, a much simpler
procedure for partitioning X-expressions could be found. Thanks goes
to Alan McMichael for his valuable help in working out many of the de-
tails in the following definition.
h
^I'd like to thank Michael Jubien for pointing out a flaw in an
earlier version of the definition of T-assignment
.
hh
See Alfred Tarski [1944].
"^With this definition of satisfaction, we may define what it is
for a property or relation of a given interpretation to be expressible.
Property of I is expressible =
cj£n
C-3cJ>) (4> has one free object
variable V and (|$) satisfies <J> = dj ^([Xv 4> 3 ) = ^ )))•
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Relation An of I is expressible =
dfn (3$) (cj) has n free
variables V
, . .
.
,v and ( £) (ft satisfies 4> E d 7 ,([Av, ...v 6])11
1
1
ft 1 n
= O)).
13
I follow Eliot Mendelson [1964], p. 57. Also, see Robert
Rogers [1971], pp. 87-88.
^^I've adopted E.J. Lemmon's procedure of stating rules of in-
ference as introduction and elimination rules. We use "+E" instead of
"MP," and "UI" instead of "Gen."
The axioms which follow represent the culmination of the
process of axiomatization which first began in my [1979a]. The axioms
found here are basically the same as those found in that paper, with
the exception of A-EQUIVALENCE, which first appeared in [1979b]. The
only real difference is that they are now stated in a language which
doesn't sort terms denoting abstract objects from terms denoting
existing objects. The most important axiom, A-OBJECTS, was visualized
after reading Parsons, Findlay, and Rapaport.
^The reader might wonder here why we haven't just defined
x= y instead of taking "= " as primitive. The reason is as follows:
Lj Ju
We shall want to be able to form A-expressions like [Axy x= y] . Had
we defined x=^,y as E!x & Ely & (F) (Fx = Fy)
,
[Axy x=£y] would be ill-
formed, due to the presence of the relation quantifier. Recall that
we've banished relation quantifiers to simplify the semantics. The
slight loss of elegance which results by having to add a non-logical
axiom governing x= y is minor compared to the complexity which would
result from having to add the technical apparatus required to interpret
A-expressions with relation quantifiers.
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In Chapter V, we will eliminate the primitive identity
,
since
E
the resources of the type theory more easily handle the interpretation
of A-expressions with "higher order" quantifiers. It is for this rea-
son that we do not mention identity
£
in the list of primitives pro-
vided in the Introduction.
In the standard second order predicate calculus, where
identity is defined (x=y (F) (Fx E Fy)), a restricted version of
this proper axiom would be a logical theorem. If we were given that
for object terras 0^ and 0^, °Y
=
°2 y we cou -*-^ show that for a formula
oi c>2
<f> with one free object variable V,
<{>^
-*
<J) . Here's how:
Since °^=° 2 > (F) (Fo^ E Fo^) . In the second order predicate
calculus, every formula <t> with one free object variable can be turned
into a property denoting expression [Av <f)]. Thus we may instantiate
the universal F quantifier to get [Av 4>]o^ E [Av ]
o
^ • But by A-
C>2 c>2
abstraction, [Av <{>]o^ = 4)^ and [Av = <J>^ • So cf>^ -* <|>^ .
Note that no such proof could be carried out in the object
calculus since not every formula 0 with one free variable v can be
turned into a property denoting expression [Av 4)]. Therefore, our
identity schema is necessary, since it is not derivable. Our identity
schema has even greater significance since it governs identities be-
tween relation terras as well. You generally don't even find identity
among relation terras defined in the standard second order calculus.
"^We define:
a set S of I properties is expressible =dfn (3<P) (<P
has exactly
free F^-variable and satisfies (J> iff dj ^(F ) C S)).one
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19
Compare Parsons [1980], Ch. IV, §2. Also compare Rapaport
[1976], p. 190, T7a. Also compare Castaneda [1974], pp . 15-21,
C**l~-7, and *C.l-.7. And compare Routley [1979], p. 263.
20
,I've adapted these terms from Rapaport [1978].
21
We use abbreviations like "Notion (x,y)" to remind the
reader that these formulas do not abbreviate formulas which can appear
behind X's.
22
I have yet to discover the proof, however. Although I've
looked hard for paradoxes, this is no guarantee that there aren't any
lurking around. I think, however, that the probability of finding a
proof is higher than the probability of finding a contradiction. But
I would be delighted if the logician who discovers either a proof or
an inconsistency would send me a copy of the result
.
23v ,You can t just model abstract objects as sets of properties.
That's because sets of properties can't exemplify the very same
properties which serve as their elements. This would be a violation
of type (just as in ZF, no set of sets can be an element of one of its
members). However, in object theory, A-objects may exemplify the very
properties they encode. For example, the A-object which encodes
[Ax ~E!x] also exemplifies this property. And the A-object which en-
codes not-being-red may very well exemplify this property.
Nor can you: (1) model existing objects as individuals, (2)
model A-objects as sets of nuclear properties (or as sets of sets of
individuals), (3) model properties as extranuclear properties (or as
sets of sets of nuclear properties)
, (4) map down the extranuclear
properties so that they become correlated with nuclear, "watered down"
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versions, and (5) define "x encodes F" as "the nuclear version of F is
an element of x. That’s because distinct extranuclear properties
sometimes get mapped down to the same nuclear, watered-down version.
In object theory, if P^Q, then the object encoding just P is distinct
from the object encoding just Q. But on the above model, these two
objects would be identified if the nuclear versions of P and Q were
identical.
These two suggestions exhaust the obvious first moves for
modelling the theory, and I suspect that the consistency proof will
not be straightforward. I also suspect that we may have to construe
A-objects as sets of extranuclear properties, in some careful manner,
and somehow "cook up" the right relations necessary to define exempli-
fications and encoding. I’ve yet to discover how to do this.
24
The Clark Paradox is reported by Rapaport in both [1976] and
[1978]. McMichael's paradox is unpublished, though it is described in
a footnote of our paper [1979b].
^See Chapter V, § § 1
,
2.
26
I'm assuming here that our type theory is one where X-
expressions with higher order quantifiers are interpreted successfully
o
-j
For a similar result in Parsons’ theory, see [1980], Ch. IX,
§ 1 .
28
The reason we don't get McMichael's paradox here is because
we don't have the facts about R like we would have about the identity
relation. For example, we don't get a contradiction from
(F) (a^F = (3u)(F = [Xy y=£u] &
~uF))
and the supposition that a^[Xy y^a^J because we don t know that a^-^a^
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On this version, we would have to add F=G as a primitive to
the language in order that the following instance of A-OBJECTS
,
and
others like it, be well— formed:
(3x) (A! x & (F) (xF E F=G)
)
Note that by banishing encoding subformulas from all expressions in
formulas used in A-OBJECTS, Clark's Paradox and McMichael’s Paradox
don t arise, even if we were to allow A-expressions, in general, to
have encoding formulas. Consequently, this move alone would be an
alternative way of avoiding the paradoxes. Clearly, it is not as
theoretically satisfying as just banishing encoding subformulas from
A-expressions it may weaken the theory more than necessary, it re-
quires the addition of the primitive identity formulas for relation
terms, we would have to interpret A-expressions with encoding sub-
formulas in them, etc. This alternative is to be preferred over the
one developed in the text only if the latter should prove to be incon-
sistent
.
30
For example, the following four axioms would guarantee that
complex relations and properties had unique constituents:
AXIOM: y^£, where y and £ are A-expressions in distinct equi-
valence classes of the partition.
thAXIOM: y=£ E y’=£', where y(£) is the i,j -conversion (nega-
t li th
tion, i projection, i,j -reflection) of y'(£').
AXIOM: y=£ E (y’=£' & y"=£")
,
where y(£) is the conjunction
of y'(C) and y"(£").
AXIOM: y=£ E (y'=£' & o =c>
2
), where y(Q is the i th-plugging
of y* (£' ) by o^c^) .
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See Bealer [1981], Ch. 3, §16.
In particular, we couldn’t model stories in the manner sug-
gested in Chapter IV, 54. However, alternative suggestions would work,
though they are not quite as elegant.
2
By "standard," I mean that the verbs are not propositional
attitude verbs and that, intuitively, they do not denote higher order
properties
.
33
For more on this distinction, see the previously cited works
of Meinong, Mally, Findlay, and Parsons. Note that we differ with
these authors on the property of existence. These authors suppose
that it is extranuclear. This would mean that A-objects might exem-
plify this property. But, by definition
,
we suppose that A-objects
fail to exemplify this property. We take existence to be nuclear.
34 t .It may very well be true that the negations of nuclear
properties are extranuclear. A-objects exemplify properties like not
being red, not being colored, not having spatio-temporal location, etc.
This agrees with Parsons' suggestion in [1979b], p. 658.
Of course, this suggestion needs to be spelled out for the
complex expressions which contain a mixture of simple nuclear and
extranuclear terms. For a rough idea of what this involves, see
Parsons [1979b], pp . 658-660.
CHAPTER II
APPLICATIONS OF THE ELEMENTARY THEORY
§1. Modelling Plato's Forms 1
In this section, we construe certain assertions by Plato as
consequences of the theory. Most philosophers today regard Plato's
Forms as first level properties of some sort and view participation as
just exemplification. But this view of Plato from within the Rus-
sellian background theory turns Plato’s major principle about the Forms
into a triviality.
Plato s major principle about the Forms is the One Over the
Many Principle. It is stated principally in Parmenides (132a). 2 The
following characterization is, I think, a faithful one:
(OMP) If there are two distinct F-things, then there is a
Form of F in which they both participate.
According to the orthodox view,
The Form of F = Fdfn
x participates in F = _ Fxdfn
So translating (OMP) into a standard second order predicate calculus,
we would get:
x^y & Fx & Fy + (3g) (G=F & Gx & Gy)
But the consequent of this conditional just follows from the antecedent
by existential introduction. Clearly, we don't want to attribute such
3
a triviality to Plato. Yet it is difficult to conceive of it as an
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interesting metaphysical truth from within the Russellian framework.
In object theory, however, we may think of Forms
special kind of A-object. When (OMP) is translated into
it turns out to be an interesting theorem. To see this
as just a
our language
consider the
following series of definitions and proofs: 4
D
6
X 13 3 F°r” ° f G
-
dfn A!x & (F)(xF E F=G)
So a Form of G is any abstract object which encodes just G. So we
have
:
Theorem 1 : (G) C?x)Form(x,G)
Proof: By A-OBJECTS.
In fact, given UNIQUENESS, it also follows that:
Theorem 2 : (G) (3!x)Form(x,G)
Given Theorem 2, we may introduce a symbol to name the Form of G.
Let's use "$
G
" to denote it. Clearly,
Theorem^: $
q
G ("The Form of G encodes G")
Now we can define participation:
D
? y participates in x ("Part (y ,x)") =dfn (3F) (xF & Fy)
So something participates in the Form of G just in case there's a
property the Form encodes which the object exemplifies. All objects
which exemplify redness participate in the Form of Redness ("$ ")
.
R
These definitions validate (OMP)
. The translation of (OMP)
into our language turns out to be a theorem:
Theorem 4: x^y & Fx & Fy (3u) (u=$
F &
Part(x,u) & Part(y,u))
Proof: By considering and the definition of participation.
Another theorem quickly falls out of these definitions:
Theorem 5 : Fx = Part(x,$ )
F
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P£oof: (-*) Assume Fx. By Theorem 3, Part (,.*,)
. MAssume
Part(x,$
F). call the property encodes and x exemplifies, G. since
$
F
encodes just F, it must be that G=F. So Fx. EJ
So in our system, the notions of exemplification and participa-
tion are distinct (unlike the orthodox view) though nonetheless equiva-
lent. This should preserve at least some of the intuitions of orthodox
theorists.
On our theory, some Forms participate in other Forms, and in-
deed, some Forms participate in themselves. Consider the property
[Ax
-E!x] ("El"). Let's call this property: Platonic existence. Since
all A-objects fail to exist, they all exemplify Platonic existence.
In particular, we have:
Theorem 6 : (x)((3F)(x=$ ) -> e!x)
F
So the Forms exemplify a kind of existence which is different from the
existence exemplified by actual objects. 5 But now consider <t>-
,
which
we may call "Platonic Being," or "Reality." From Theorems 5 and 6 it
follows that:
Theorem_7: (x) ( (3F) (x=$_) + Part(x,$- ))F 9 El y y
So all Forms participate in Platonic Being. 6 In particular, $- par-
E
!
ticipates in itself, justifying our earlier assertion.
To reach this conclusion, we might also have used the AUXILIARY
HYPOTHESIS and the assumption that being blue, for example, is a nu-
clear property. It would follow that all A-objects fail to exemplify
this property. So all A-objects would exemplify [Ax ~Bx] ("B")
,
where
B denotes being blue. Then by Theorem 5, all Forms participate in
$-
. So would .
o B
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Consider now the Third Man Argument. This is a puzzle which
commentators say Plato produces in the Parmenides (132aff.).^ The
puzzle is that several of Plato's principles about the Forms seem to
be jointly inconsistent. We've seen two of these principles: (OMP)
(Theorem 4) and the Uniqueness Principle (Theorem 2). There are two
others: the Self-Predication Principle and the Non-Identity Principle:
(SP) The Form of F is F
(NI) If something participates in the Form of F, then itis not identical with that Form.
We can prove a contradiction if we assume that there are two distinct
F- things x and y. By (OMP), there is a Form of F in which x and y par-
ticipate. By (SP), the Form of F is an F-thing. By (NI)
,
it is dis-
tinct from x and y. But then, (OMP) guarantees that there is another
Form of F in which x and the first Form participate. Then (NI) yields
the conclusion that the latter Form must be distinct from the first.
But this violates the uniqueness principle, which says that the Form of
F is unique
.
On the theory we've presented, NI must be false. We can derive
its negation as a theorem:
Theorem 8 : - (x) (Part (x, $ ) -* x^<J> )F F
Proof: Consider
.
E!
So by rejecting NI, we dissolve the puzzle.
However, it is worthwhile to examine (SP). If we translate (SP)
into our language as $
F
exemplifies F, then it must be false. This
time, consider
. But if we translate (SP) into our language as $
F
encodes F, then it turns out to be Theorem 3. Does the word "is" in
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en-
( SP) principle mesh the distinction between exemplifying and
coding a property?
Of course we can't generalize on this one example, but we can
look for further evidence for thinking that the "is" of English is am-
biguous. Maybe we have an option of translating a sentence involving
the predicative "is" as an exemplification or as an encoding formula.
And in case there is such an ambiguity, let us now stipulate that when-
ever we use the word "is" in what follows, we shall mean "exemplifies."
We may conclude, with respect to the Third Man Argument, that
our theory rules that (OMP) and (U) (Uniqueness Principle) are true,
that (NX) is false, and that (SP) has a true reading and a false one.
Since we abandon the (NI) principle, further research should be directed
toward the question of how deeply Plato was committed to it.
Finally, we discuss the Sophist
. The four assertions by Plato
m that work that we discuss are ones which, taken together, are some-
what mysterious. Many scholars regard Plato's theory of Forms as his
attempt to reconcile two major philosophical schools of thought. The
first was the school of Parmenides, founded as the view that the world
had to be considered as a whole without parts, without motion and
change, and without generation and decay. The opposing school (Thales,
Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the Atomists) de-
nied this and attempted to isolate the elementary parts of the world,
the interaction of which was responsible for motion, change, generation,
and decay. Plato s Forms were entities he postulated to capture cer-
tain truths of the Parmenidean school—they were changeless, motionless,
and eternal. Yet Plato allowed that there were ordinary objects which
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moved, changed, came into being, and passed ™-.v « f-away. But, apparently, he
supposed them to have a lesser degree of reality.
Plato’s attempt to capture the Parmenidean truths wasn’t com-
pletely successful. Some Forms gave him trouble, especially the ones
which reflected some of the more mundane things in the world. He could
never quite accept the fact that there were Forms with respect to hair,
dirt, or mud. And the Form of motion-did it move? If so
,
how could
it remain a Form? Forms were supposed to be motionless. Given the
(SP) principle, how could there be a real Form of Motion if it didn’t
move? And how do the Forms of Motion and Rest interact with each other?
In this context, the following four assertions by Plato in the
Sophist seem mysterious:
(1) Rost and Motion are completely opposed to one another (250a)
(2) Rest and Motion are real (250a)
(3) Reality must be some third thing (250b)
(A) In virtue of its own nature, then, reality is neither at
rest nor in movement (250c)
To analyze these assertions, we need the following definitions and
(reasonable) assumptions, where "M" denotes being in motion.
D Being at rest ("R") - [Ax ~Mx]
° din
Aj Being in motion is a nuclear property
Being in motion, being at rest, and Platonic existence
are distinct properties
(1) may be interpreted as a true statement about the Forms.
Consider (la)
:
(la) (x) (Part(x,<I>
M )
=
~Part (x , <J>
R
)
)
ihis is provable, given D^, A-EQUIVALENCE
,
and Theorem 5. That is, by
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D
g
and A-EQUIV, something exemplifies being in motion iff it fails to
exemplify being at rest. So by Theorem 5, something participates in
it: fails to participate in $ .
R
There is also an uncharitable way to interpret (1) as a state-
ment about the Forms. Consider (lb):
(lb) & ~M$r ("The Form of Motion doesn't exemplify being
at rest and the Form of Rest doesn't exemplify being in
motion")
This is false, since by Al, D
g ,
the AUXILIARY HYPOTHESIS, and A-EQUIV,
the Form of Motion does exemplify the negation of a nuclear property.
Consider (2), "Rest and motion are real." (2a) seems to be a
good candidate for translating it:
(2a) E!$R & E!$^ ("The Forms of Rest and Motion exemplify
Platonic existence")
(2a) is a theorem. We also know that both and participate in .
If we define "blend with" as "participate in," we get that both of
these Forms blend with Being or Reality. (3) could be read as (3a):
(3a) V*!- ‘ V*E-
This is provable from assumption A2
.
Finally, we consider (4), "In virtue of its own nature, reality
is neither at rest nor in motion." (4) is another example of a sen-
tence which turns out false when we read the copula "is" as exemplifi-
cation and true when read as encoding. Consider (4a):
(4a) ~R<*>-, & ~M$-,
Since we've defined Platonic Being, or Reality, as $-j, (4a) captures
(4) when "is" is read as "exemplifies." (4a) is false since
exemplifies being at rest. But consider (4b):
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(4b)
^e! R &
^ key to seeing that this might be right comes from the following
definition:
D
o The nature of $ = v
F dfn
The nature of a Fort, is the property it encodes. Thus, we read "in
virtue of its own nature" as a clue to thinking that Plato is going to
conclude something about the fact that E! is central to the identity ofV Assumption tells us that the nature of
^ ls dlstlnct frQm
the natures of $
R
and *
M
. So (4b) is a theorem.
Assertion (4) has always been rather puzzling to me, and I
interesting that the distinction between exemplifying and
encoding a property has helped us to find a true reading for it.
IS there, after all, some unity to the history of philosophy?
Do we have here a prims facie link between Plato, Meinong, Mally, and
the theory of abstract objects? Maybe further investigations along the
above lines will help us to answer these questions.
§2. Modelling the Round Square, etc
.
In our first encounter translating certain theoretical state-
ments of natural language into the language of the theory, we dis-
covered a few of them containing the copula "is” which turned out true
when translated using an encoding formula yet which turned out false
when translated using an exemplification formula. In this section, we
look at a class of English sentences which exhibit this feature. These
sentences can be recognized by the facts that: (1) they have the form
The F
1
’
F
2
’* ,,
’
F
n
is F-j/' (1-i-n)
,
and (2) there isn’t (or couldn't be)
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an object which jointly exemplifies F F1*2
examples
:
**’ F
n’
Here are some
(1>
r
n
=et
e
of
0
fets
t
which
Ch
"f^ "le”bers of themselves is
F is F)
e" ' n,embers of themselves (The
(2) The round square is round (The F,G is F)
(3) The existent golden mountain is existent
a mountain. (The F,G,H is F,g!h)
’
’
"
These sentences see. to be true a priori. But if „e translate
the description in (2), for example, as "the object which exemplifies
roundness and squareness," then the description would fail to denote.
It would then be hard to see how to account for the intuitive truth
value of the sentence. And similar remarks apply to (1) and (3).
However, if we translate the description in (2) as "the object
which encodes just roundness and squareness," and read the "is" as
"encodes," we end up with the truth: the object which encodes just
roundness and squareness encodes roundness. In a similar manner, we
read (1) as: the object which encodes just being a set of sets which
aren't self-members encodes being a set of sets which aren't self-
members. And we do something similar for (3). The suggestion, then,
is to translate ''The is F." as "the object which encodes
just F
, ...,F encodes F. ."in i
To make this suggestion precise, we need to incorporate defi-
nite descriptions into our language and focus on a certain subset of
them those which can be used specifically to implement our suggestion.
After investigating the interpretation and logic of our descriptions,
we should be in a good position to translate the data properly.
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The first thing to do is to specify that where * is any formula
with one free "-variable, Ox)* ("the object x such that *•) is to be a
complex object term of our language. Some examples are: (ty)( E!y & Typ)
("the object y such that y exists and bears the teaching relation to
P"), and (lx) (A!x & (F) (xF = *)), where * is any formula where x isn't
free ("the A-object which encodes just the properties which satisfy *••).
Semantically, we interpret these descriptions as denoting the
unique object which satisfies *, if there is one, and as not denoting
anything if there isn’t one. We can make this precise as follows. Re-
calling the definitions of interpretation and assignment, we assign a
denotation to these descriptions with respect to an interpretation and
an assignment by the following stipulation: 8
dj' ^((ix)<J>) = 0 iff (3jJ )(^ ^ (x)-o & satisfies <p &
^ ^ ^ x^
& ^ (x)=o* St satisfies <p -* o ,=o))
undefined, otherwise
Consequently, the logical behaviour of our new descriptions is
governed by the following logical axiom schema ("DESCRIPTIONS")
:
- (3!y)(
*x
S & (3!y)<. where * is any atomic
formula with one free object variable v
This ensures that any closed atomic formula, containing a defi-
nite description (lx)<j> is true iff there's a unique object y which
satisfies both <p and ip and there is a unique object satisfying
<f>. For
example
:
E! (ix)Txp = (3! y) (Typ & Ely) & (3ly)Typ
This might say: the object x which exemplifies being the teacher of p
exists iff there s a unique object y which exemplifies being the teacher
of p and which exists, and there is a unique teacher of p.
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Wxth this rather nonMl understanding of deflnUe descr . pt . ons
a certain subset of the, prove to be interesting. These are thfi ^
scnptions of the for,: (tx)(A!x
«, (F) (xF = x» • We call this class
of descriptions
^objec^JescriEti^, and the reason they are inter-
esting is because when v jo am, n . ,X ny formula with no free x's, the resulting
description always has a denotation. This is a result of the UNIQUE-
NESS theore, schema for objects. In fact, MIQUENESS and DESCRIPTIONS
allow us to prove an interesting set of theorems governing the A-object
descriptions
:
THEOREM (S) ("A-DESCRIPTIONS"):
^ = (lx)(A!x & (F) (xF = x))(;
Pr°° f
' ^ Suppose G satisfies X- By UNIQUENESS, there is a
unique A-object, say b, which encodes exactly the properties which
satisfy X . So b encodes G. So there is a unique A-object which en-
codes exactly the properties satisfying X and which encodes G. So by
DESCRIPTIONS, the A-object which encodes exactly the properties which
satisfy x encodes G. («-) By reversing the reasoning. 13
Using this theorem schema, it now becomes possible to prove
facts regarding the objects denoted by A-descriptions
. Con-
sider (lx) (A! x & (F)(xF = F=R v F=S)
,
where "R" denotes roundness and
"S" denotes squareness. If we let X = (F=R v F=S)
,
then X* and Xp. So
by A-DESCRIPTIONS, (lx)(A!x & (F) (xF E F=R v F=S)) encodes both R^and
S, as we might have expected. In general, when X = (G=
^
v G=F
2
v. . .v
G=F
n
) » it is provable that:
(lx) (A! x & (G) (xG E G=F v...v G=F ))F
1 n i
’
where l<i5n, given A-DESCRIPTIONS.
This provides us with the key to the proper translation of our
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For simplicity, let's shorten A-descrlptions by using restricted
variables to range over A-objects. In fact, throughout the remainder
of this work, we use z-variables to range over A-objects. 10 So our
A-object descriptions now have the form: (lz)(F)(zF
= x ) . where "S"
Snores being a set, »e" denotes the membership relation, and where the
other abbreviations are obvious, we may translate the descriptions in
as (a)-(c), respectively:
(a) (lz)(F)(zF = F= [ Ax Sx & (y) (yex E Sy & y^y)])
11
(b) (lz)(F)(zF E F=R v F=S)
(c) (lz)(F)(zF = F=E! v F=G v F=M)
And in general, the descriptions in the class of English sentences
we’ve singled out are to be translated as:
(lz)(G)(zG = G=F
1
v G=F_ v.
. .v G=F )
In the metalanguage, we will signal the fact that we intend this read-
ing of the English definite article by writing "the
r\
Now let (iz)ip^, ( 1 z ) l|^
2 ,
and (iz)ip^ abbreviate the descriptions
m (a)-(c), respectively. We then translate (l)-(3) into our language
as (1) * — (3) f , respectively:
(1)
' (lz)^
1
[Ax Sx & (y)(yex E Sy & yfty)]
(2)
' (iz)\p2R
(3)
' ( iz)i^
3
E! & (iz )^G & (iz)^
3
M
(l)’-(3)’ are all theorems, hence the a priori character of the English.
In general, our translation of "The F
, ...,F is F.," where there isn'ti n i
(or couldn't be) an object which jointly exemplifies F
, . .
.
,
F
,
will
1 n
always be a theorem of the following form:
(lz)(G)(zG E G=F v...v G=F )F.
1 n 7 i
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There is a closely related use of the English definite article.
Here are some examples
:
(4) The fountain of youth is a fountain
(5) The set of all non-self-membered sets is a set
(6) The existent golden mountain is colored
(7) Necessarily, the teacher of Aristotle is a teacher
These sentences will be represented with the help of a slightly modi-
fied version of our A-descriptions. For example, "the fountain of
youth shall be translated as "the A-object which encodes being a
fountain of youth or any property implied by this property." To rep-
resent and interpret this reading of the definite article, we must
define F implies G" as necessarily, everything exemplifying F ex-
emplifies G. So we postpone further investigation until the modal
theory has been developed.
§3. The Problem of Existence
The property of existence has puzzled philosophers for years.
The assertion that some particular thing fails to exemplify existence
(or being) strangely carries with it a commitment to the existence (or
being) of the very thing which serves as the subject of the assertion.
This is partly a result of trying to keep the theory of language as
simple as possible—we try to account for the truth of a sentence by
supposing that the objects denoted by the object terms are in an exten-
sion of the relation denoted by the relation term. But when we have a
true non-existence claim, talk about "the object denoted by the object
name" seems illegitimate.
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The theory we've developed so far Is rather flexible with re-
spect to this issue. Although we've defined "abstract" to mean "non-
existent," we didn't have to do it this way. We could either have all
objects, abstract or otherwise, exemplify existence, or we could have
called the property of nonexistence by a less puzzling name. We can
develop alternative "versions” of our theory based on these suggestions.
But before we do this, let’s examine the present course in more detail.
For one thing, keeping things as they are preserves some in-
tuitive data about objects. Before we are uncorrupted by philosophy,
it is perfectly natural to say "the round square doesn’t exist" or
"Santa Claus doesn't exist." If „e read the description in the former
sentence as we did in the last section, then it is provable that the,
A
round square doesn’t exemplify existence. 12 In Chapter IV, §4, we make it
plausible to think that the proper name in the latter sentence denotes
an abstract object. Consequently, we have an account of sentences
like these in accordance with a simple theory of language
—the objects
denoted by the object terms fail to be in an extension of the relation
denoted by the relation term.
Another reason for preferring the present formulation of our
theory is that it leaves us with a formal language which can be used
to investigate the claim that there is a distinction in natural lan-
guage between the quantifiers "there is" and "there exists." Some
philosophers, myself included, believe that there is an exploitable
difference in meaning between these two quantifiers of English. Our
view can be made precise by investigating a language in which this dif-
ference in meaning might be represented. The language we have now is
73
such a language. We could use "n xwQX)0 t0 exPress the fact that there
“ " X ^ that
*• ^
* )» to express the fact that
exists an x such that *. In a theory which supposed that all
Che things there are exist, it would not be possible to do this.
Of course, other philosophers fail to see a distinction between
there is and "there exists"— fm- t-uor them, everything there is exists.
They will claim that the A-obiects we'vp a n •ODj e allowed into our ontology must
really be there. So they must exist.
The following suggestions should show that our theory is
flexible enough to accommodate the views of these philosophers. We
could use the primitive predicate "A!" instead of "E!
" (i.e., we could
have taken the property of being abstract as primitive). We could then
define
:
x is concrete ("Cx") = ~a'v
dfn
x exists ("E ! x") A!x v Cx
We could then revise NO-CODER as follows:
(x) (Cx ~ (:3F) xF)
Finally, we could relabel "=
E
" as "»
c>
" change E-IDENTITY to C-IDENTITY
(i.e., Cx S Cy S (F) (Fx E Fy) * x^y)
,
and redefine general identity
(l.e., x=y >
d(n x=cy v A!x & A!y & (F) (xF i yF)). Me would leave A-
OSJECTS as it stands and call the theory which would result: VERSION 2.
On VERSION 2, it's provable that everything exists. VERSION 2
can do all the work the original theory can do. That's because the
exemplification/encoding distinction, and the distinction between two
kinds of objects, remain intact. Of course, we have to reapproach
the analysis of data like "The round square doesn't exist" and "Santa
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Claus doesn t exist." We still suppose that the object terms denote
abstract objects, but we interpret "doesn't exist" as meaning that
there are (exist) no concrete objects which exemplify the properties
encoded by these abstract objects.
1 think that philosophers who insist that VERSION 2 is the only
correct version are mistaken. The theory remains useful no matter
which of the two versions you choose. Meinong used to say that "the
Object as such stands beyond being and non-being” and that "the Object
is by nature indifferent to being."13 I' m not a Meinong scholar, so I
don’t claim to know what Meinong meant by this "doctrine of ausser-
sein," and I don't suppose that he had these two versions of our theory
before his mind when he said things like this. Nevertheless, something
like these cryptic utterances of Meinong are relevant here. It just
doesn't matter whether you conceive of A-objects as existing or failing
to exist. It mostly ends up a question of how you prefer to use the
word "exists."
Maybe the word "exists" is an ambiguous word, one of the senses
of which is a property which has a negation that also turns out to be a
14
sense of the word. To make this idea plausible, we could stick with
the original version of the theory, and read "E!" as "real existence"
and "[Ax ~E! x] " as "Platonic existence." Now we have two kinds of
existence, with A-objects exemplifying the latter kind. This reading
of [Ax ~E!x], besides working to our advantage in §1, is further justi-
fied by the fact that in the modal theory which follows, A-objects end
up having being in every possible world and the class of A-objects
stays fixed from world to world. Platonic beings are necessary beings,
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and A objects turn out to be necessary beings
.
15
They, therefore, ex-
hibit a more perfect kind of existence.
^
So talking in terms of two kinds of existence is yet a third
way of approaching the problems of existence. This means that we
really don t have to commit ourselves on the question: Do A-objects
fail to exist? Three equivalent versions of the theory decide the
question in different ways. The version one prefers to go with will
be mostly a result of a decision about which of the various senses of
the word "exist" one prefers to use . 17
CHAPTER II ENDNOTES
The results in this section were detailed principally in two
early papers [1979c] and [1979d], I'd like to thank Cynthia Freeland
for her assistance in locating the relevant passages in Plato's works.
2
See also Phaedo, 100c7-e2, 101a.
3
An orthodox theorist might suggest that Plato discovered that
existential generalization (introduction) on predicate terms was a
valid rule of inference. This would turn Plato into a language theor-
ist, whereas on our view, he was doing metaphysics.
4
Compare Parsons [1980], Ch. VIII, §5; also Castafieda [1974].
^See Timaeus
, 52c.
6
See Timaeus
,
51e, 52a. Also, see The Republic
. 518ff.
7
See Vlastos
’ [1954]; and Strang [1971].
g
Given the following definition, there will be terms in the
language which might fail to denote. Consequently, LA4 (one of the
logical axioms governing quantification) must be revised to cover such
cases. It should now read as follows:
LA 4: (ot ) cf) ( (3f3)3=T -* (f> ) , where T is substitutable for a
Also, the biconditionals in the first two clauses of the definition of
satisfaction (I., §2, C.) must be understood as follows: the clauses
will be false iff the sides of the biconditional have opposite truth
value or the right side is undefined.
9
For those who think more syntactically, let (f> = A!x &
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(F)(xF
_ X ). Let ip = vG. Then Q
We then deduced the right side of
(lx)<J>
V
= (A! x & (F)(xF E X ))G.
DESCRIPTIONS using UNIQUENESS and the
fact that G satisfies y.
10
.
As usual, with restricted variables:
(i) Qz )<f£ abbreviates (3x) (A'.x &
<J>)
(ii) (z)c^ abbreviates (x) (A! x
<f>)
One suggestion for understanding the ontological status of
mathematical objects is to say explicitly which objects exist when
formulating the relevant set of axioms. So, for example, we formulate
axioms for set theory as follows:
NULL: Qx)(E!x & Sx & (y)(y $ x )
)
UNIONS: (x) (Sx - (3y)(E!y & Sy & (w) (wey E (3u) (u£x & weu))))
POWER: (x) (Sx + (3y) (E!y & Sy & (w) (wey E wcx ) ) )
SUBSET: For any formula
<f> with one free variable u, the following
is an axiom: (x) (Sx - (3y)(E!y & Sy & (z) (zey E z£x & <f>*)))
It should be clear how to then formulate INFINITE, REGULARITY, and RE-
PLACEMENT. On this kind of formulation, it's provable that there
doesn't exist an object which exemplifies being a set of all non-self-
membered sets, though A-OBJECTS guarantees that some objects encode
this property.
Note also that we could get much the same effect by formulating
the axioms of set theory in the usual way with the addition of the
extra axiom that all sets exist.
i2
Note that xt is also provable that the^ existent golden moun-
tain doesn't exist. We cannot prove the contingent truth that there
doesn t exist an object which exemplifies all the properties that the^
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existent golden mountain encodes.
13jee Meinong tl904), p. 86 (54 ofV Gegenstandstheorie")
.
When we talk about the various senses of an ambiguous proper-
ty name, we mean the various properties it denotes. are not refer-
ring to its "Fregean" sense.
Necessary beings exist in every possible world or fail to
exist in every world-they do not go in and out of existence from world
to world. In the next chapter, we redefine A-objects as objects which
necessarily fail to exist.
6
Some philosophers may hesitate because they prefer to reserve
the term "Platonic existence" to describe properties, relations, and
propositions. But we've seen that a certain class of A-obJects behave
like the Forms and this is how we justify calling the kind of existence
objects exemplify Platonic." Those who now hesitate probably used
"Platonic" in connection with properties, etc, in the first place be-
cause of the orthodox view that Plato's Forms just are properties.
Those philosophers who still wish to preserve "Platonic exis-
tence" for properties, etc, would at least agree that on this usage,
the term denotes a (higher order) property of properties. But that
won't have bearing on the important question we're now facing—whether
it’s plausible to think of the negation of the first level property of
existence as some special kind of existence.
Those philosophers who believe both that properties exist and
that sets exist may wonder why we can't dispense with A-objects by
modelling them as sets of properties. For the reasons why we can't do
this, see footnote 23, Chapter I.
CHAPTER III
THE MODAL THEORY OF ABSTRACT OBJECTS
(WITH PROPOSITIONS)
§1. The Language
A. Primitive symbols
. To the language of Chapter I, we add the
operator (to express the English sentential adverb "necessarily") and
names of (and variables ranging over) propositions. By allowing the
superscripts on the primitive relation terms to reach zero, we obtain
names and variables for propositions. For convenience, we use P^
, ,
R
,
... and F
,
G^, H^, ... as names and variables, respectively, for
propositions. Officially, however, our new list of primitive symbols
is as follows:
1. Primitive object terms
Names : a^
,
, . • .
Variables: x ,X
2
»...
2. Primitive n-place relation terms
Names: P^P^ , . .
.
,=
E>
E! n>0
Variables: F^ , F^ , . .
.
3. Connectives: ~, &
4
.
Quantifier : 3
5 . Lambda : A
6. Iota: i
7. Box:
8. Parentheses and brackets: (, ), [, ]
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B. Formulas and_terms. We simultaneously define
—
rmUla
’ °bj£«_term, and n-place relation
follows
:
(propositions
n
inductively, as
1 . All primitive object terms
primitive n-place relation
terms
are object terms and all
terms are n-place relation
2 . Tf •/ p ls any zero-place relation term,(propositional) formula
0
.
p is a
3. Atomic exemplification: If p
n
is any n-place relation
term and <^,..., 0
^
are any object terms, pn0 ...o i s
a (propositional) formula n
4. Atomic encoding: If p
1
is any one-place relation term
and o is any object term, op1 is a formula
5. Molecular, Quantified, and Modal: If 0 and 0 are any(propositional) formulas, and a is any (object)
variable, then (~4>)
, (0 & 0) , (3a)<f>, and (D0) are(propositional) formulas
6. Object descriptions: If 0 is any formula with one
free object variable x, then (ix)0 is an object
term
7. Complex n-place relation terms: If 0 is any proposi-
tional formula, and are any object variables
which may or may not be free in 0, then [Av ...V 01
1 n J
is an n—place relation term (n^l) and
(J) itself is a
zero-place relation term
In addition to the standard abbreviations for the connectives and
quantifiers, we use <00 to abbreviate ~O~0. However, we now
define
:
D x is abstract ("A!x") =,_ Q~E!xdtn
D
2
x is a possibly existing object
= fn
Qe'.x
are some examples of schemas and formulas : QQ ("it is necessary
that Q")
; Q(3x)(A!x & (F) (xF = 0)) ("necessarily, some abstract object
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encodes exactly the properties satisfying <(,");
<> (3y) (F) (xF * Fy)
("possibly, there Is an object which exemplifies every property x
encodes"); and (x) (0 E! x -*» ~ GFUxF'l ("nncoaiv ( possibly existing objects fail
to encode any properties")
.
We say that a formula
<J> necessarily implies a formula ijj
( <J>=^ ) iff ($ -* ip). <p is necessarily equivalent to ip ("tp&ip")
iff (<j> = \p) .
There are two kinds of complex terms—object descriptions and
complex n-place relation terms. Modal formulas may appear in both.
For example, (lx)(A!x & (F) (xF = F=R) is an object description which
reads: the abstract object which encodes just R. 1 The inductive
clause for complex n-place relation terms differs from its counterpart
m the elementary theory in three important respects: (1) it allows
modal formulas to appear after Vs if the formula is propositional,
(2) it allows A's to bind variables which aren't free in the ensuing
formula, and (3) it allows propositional formulas themselves to be
relation terms. Here are some examples of new complex n-place rela-
tion terms: [Axy ClQb] ("being a first thing and a second thing such
that necessarily, b exemplifies Q")
; [Ax D(E!x + Px)] ("being an x
such that necessarily, if x exists, x exemplifies P")
; DGb ("b
exemplifies G essentially").
As before, t is a term iff either t is an object term or t is
an n-place relation term.
C. Identity definitions
.
°
3
x=y =dfn x
=
Ey
v (A! x & A!y & 0(F) (xF = yF))
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D
4
F "G
~dfn ^OOCxF
1
= xG
1
)
°5
pn=Gn
n
'dfn (*!>•• •Cxn_i)([»y F"yx1 ...VlHA7 cVr ..Vi ] 4[Ay F Xj^yXj.
. .x
n_ 1 ]
= [Xy Gnx
iyx 2 . . ,xn_ I ] & ... &
[Ay Fnx
1
...x
n_iyJ =Uy G
n
x
1
...x
n_ 1y]> (n>l)
°6 F
°'G° =
dfn [Ay F°] = [Ay G°]
That is, F° and G° are identical iff the property of being such that
F is identical with the property of being such that G°. We shall see
the usefulness and insightfulness of this definition when we prove
that there is a unique actual world.
As usual, these definitions for identity will be governed by
the proper axiom for identity (and the rule of inference, =E, deriv-
able from it )
.
§2. The Semantics
Ar. Interpretations . An interpretation, I, of our modified second order
modal language is any octuple, <W,U)
Q
,V,R, ex^, L, ex^, F>, which meets
the conditions described in this subsection. The first member of I is
a non-empty class, W, called the class of possible worlds . 2 The second
member of I, u>
Q , is chosen from W and is called the actual world . The
third member, V, is a non-empty class and is called the domain of ob-
lects. The fourth member, R, is also a non-empty class, and is called
the d omain of relations
.
R is the union of a sequence of non-empty
classes R
0 »^
» ' *
’ *
1 * e •
»
R = U ^
• Each R is called the class of
n>0
nri).Iace relations (we call R
^
the class of properties
,
and R
^
the class
of propositions ) . R must be closed under all the logical functions
specified in the sixth member of the interpretation (1).
The fifth, sixth, and seventh members of I impose a structure
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on W, P, and R. The fifth member of I,
R
n
X W into V*> whe^e n>l, and which maps R
Q X
1S the exemplification extension ("extension "
IA)
is a function which maps
W into {t,F}. aU (*n )
tAJ
in the metalanguage) of
relation H. at world ia).
The sixth member of I, t, is a class of loglcal £unctions
which operate in a manner simiiar to their counterparts in the seman-
tics of the elementary theory. However, we: (1) add two additional
functions, IMC
±
("i-vacuous expansion") and NEC ("necessitation")
,
(2) constrain the extensions^ of the complex relations resulting from
all the logical functions at every possible world, and (3) allow PLUG
i
and PROJ. to operate on properties, allow CONJ and NEG to operate on
propositions, and allow l/AC. and NEC to operate on all relations. The
definitions which make these three major changes precise go as follows:
(a) PLUG^, for each i, l^i—n, is a function mapping
(RiURi+fL** * ‘ ) ^ V into (R
i
_^UR
i
U. .
. ) subject to the
conditions
:
( 1 )
( 2 )
for n>l
, ext
iv
(PLUG
iU
n
,o)) =
{<o
1
,...,o
i_1
,o
1+1
,...,o
n
>
|
<01 Vi>Mi+i>—V e «V*n) >
for n=l
,
exX
u)
(PLUG
1
(/L
1
,o)) =
f
T iff o e dxt Ot1 )
J or
F otherwise
(b) PROJ
,
for each i, 1-i-n, is a function mapping
( R i
UR
i+l
U ' * ‘ ) :‘-nto (^i-i^i^ • * * ) subject to the
conditions
:
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•V
( 1 ) for n>l, (LrtXPROj. Oin )) =
(AJ 1
{<0
i 0i-i ,0m V
(3°) <<0
1 °i-1 ’ 0 , 0 i+l>-'
£ ex^
w
(^
n
))}
( 2 ) for n=l, e.x£ (PROJ (/11 )) =
iAJ
_L
T iff (3o)(o e ex^C/t1 ))
F otherwise
(c) COW.^, for each i,j, l«<j<n
,
is a function
upping (R.UR.
+1
U...) into (R.UR.
+1
U. .
.) subject
to the condition:
Mu)(C°Wl/i>:j (^n )) =
{<0
i>
• •
•
>°i-i'°j '° 1+i>
• •
• Vi’VVi v i
< o
1 ,...,o i ,...,oj
,...,o
n
> e ex^
w(^
n
)
}
(d) f° r each i,j, l-i<j-n, is a function
mapping (R
.
URj+1 U . . . ) into (R^UR.U. . . ) subject
to the condition:
eH« (REF 1
-i > j
(An))
=
{<0
1 °i °j-l’°j+l V I
< 0
^.,
... ,0
, ,0 , ,0 > £ e.xX (A.
n
) and 0 .=0 }x j n iaj i 2
(e) IM(\, for each i, 1-i-n+l, is a function mapping
* * * ) into (^-^URi+1 U . . . ) subject
conditions
:
( 1 ) for n^l
,
<Lx£
i0
(VAC
±
(si
n
)) =
{<01 0 i-i’ 0 ’ 0 i ,0i+i V I
<01 °i V e zxtw (,in)}
to the
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(2) for n=0, exyj/AC^*0 )) = {o
|
ex^(*°) = T }
(f) CONJ is a function mapping (R^U...) X (R
QUR U...)
into (RqUR-j^U.
.
. ) subject to the following conditions:
(1) for n>l, m>l, etf (CONJ (n.n ,6m ) ) =tv
{ <Oi,...,o
n ,Oi
,
,...,o
m
’
>
I
<o
1 ,...,on
>
e ex;t
w^1 ^ and <0i' »
•
• • e ext
w
(4
m
)}
(2) for n=0, m>l, dxX^CONJ (M° ) =
{<C»i, . . . ,0m
>
| ZxXM (si°)
= T and
<0i’*--’V £ exv*
m
>}
(3) for n>l, m=0, dx£
ii}
(C0NJ (*n ,A°)) =
tv
{< or ...,on> I <o 1 ,...,on>
e ex^(/
i
n
) and ex^Od 0 ) = t}
(4) for n=0, m=0, ext
.
.(CONJ (X 0 ,A°)) =
tv
f T iff ext^C*
0
) = T and ext
w
(4°) = T
I F otherwise
(g) NEG is a function mapping (R UR-^U...) into
(R
0^iU...) subject to the conditions:
(1) for n>l, e.x£ (NEG (sin )) =
tv
( 2 )
{<V-’°n> I
ft ext^(/i
n
)
}
for n=0
,
<Lxt (NEG(S10 )) =
tv
( T iff ex^<Vi°) = F
>
n
F otherwise
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(h) NEC is a function mapping (R
Q
UR U...) into
( R0
UR
l
U
---> subject to the conditions:
(1) for n>l, ex^(NEC(/in )) =
I
(W ) (<o , . .
.
f o >
e ext^ (^
n
) )
}
(2) for n=0
,
ext TNEC (*.°) ) =
IV
f
T iff (W»)(ext
wl (JL
0
) = T)
F otherwise
This completes the definitions of the logical functions. 3 The seventh
member of I, £X^, is a function which maps R into V. extAn^) is
called the encoding extension ("extension^’ in the metalanguage) of
The final member of I, the F function, maps the simple names
of the language to elements of the appropriate domain. For each ob-
ject name a^ F(a^) e V. For each relation name P*?, F(P^) e R . We
call exX^(F(E! ) ) the set of existing objects a_t u) ("E "). We call
exAu0
(F ( E! )) the set of existing objects (i.e.,E=dfn Ew )
.
We call
{o
|
(3i0) (o e ext^(E (E\)))} the set of possibly existing objects
("PE"). The complement of PE on V is called the set of abstract ob-
jects ("A").
B. Assignments and denotations
.
Partitioning the A-expressions
. Since we have A-expressions
in the modal language which were ill-formed in the elementary language,
we must incorporate rules to classify the new possibilities. These new
rules correspond to l/AC\ and NEC—they help to classify A-expressions
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with vacuously bound A-variables and with 0’s.
The following six major rules partition the class of A-
expressions into nine equivalence classes. If y is an arbitrary A-
expression, [Av^..^
<f>] , y is defined as follows:
1. If (3i)(l<i<n and v
±
doesn't occur free in
(J> and i is the least
such number), then y is the ith-vacuous expansion of
[xV--Vivi+r*- vn * ] -
2. If y is not an i
th
-vacuous expansion, then if (3i) (l<i<n and
V
i
ls not the ith free object variable in
<f> and v
±
is the least
such number), then where v is the i th free object variable in
(p, y is the i, j ^-conversion of fXv ...\j v \)
1 i-1 j i+1*
v. ,v.v. ... . . .v d>] .
J-l i j+1 n yj
3. If y is neither of the above, then
(a) if
(J)
= (~i|j)
, y is the negation of TAv. ...v il;l
1 n r
(b) if (p = (ip & x)
»
and if; and y have no free object variables
in common, then where are the variables in ip
and v
p+i»--*> vn
are the variables in y, y is the disjoint
conjunction of [Av, ...v tbl and TAv) v vl .
' 1 p p+1 n AJ
til(c) if (j) = (3v)\|i and v is the i free object variable in (p
,
til
then y is the i -projection of [Av, ...v. , w.V. „ . . .1 l-l l l+l
V
n
M
(d) if c{) = (CHif;), then y is the necessitation of [Av^...v if;] .
4. If y is none of the above, then if (Ji)(l^i^n and occurs free
in more than one place in
<J>
and i is the least such number)
,
then where
:
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(a)
(b)
k is the number of free object
and second occurrences of v..
variables between the first
<$>'' is the result of replacing the second occurrence of v
with a new variable v, and i
5.
(c) j = i+k+1,
til
P is the i,j
-reflection
If p is none of the above
Of [Xvr ..v1+kvvJ
...v
n
*'].
then if o is the left most object term
occurring in
<J>, then where:
j -i- s the number of free variables occurring before o,
(b) (p is the result of replacing the first occurrence of o
by a new variable v, and
(c) i = j+1,
h is the i
th
-plugging of [ Av ... v .w ...... v d>' 1 by o.
1 J j+1 n —JL
6. If y is none of the above, then
(a) (p is atomic
(b) v1> ...,v is the order in which these variables first occur
in o,
(c) y = [Av^...V
n p
n
v^...\>
n
], for some relation term p
n
,
and
(d) y is called elementary .
In addition to the examples we saw from the elementary theory, we now
have: [Ax D(Px & ~Qx) ] is the necessitation of [Ax Px & ~Qx]
;
[Axwy Px & Qy] is the 2
n<
^-vacuous expansion of [Axy Px & Qy ] ;
[Axvwy Px & Qy] is the 2
nc
^-vacuous expansion of [Axwy Px & Qy] ; etc.
I-assignments . If given an interpretation I of our language,
an 7-assignment, will be any function defined on the primitive
variables of the language satisfying the following two conditions:^
1. where v is any object variable, ^(v) e V
2. where TT
n
is any relation variable, j$(Trn ) £
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Denotations. If g iven an interpretation I of our language, and
assignment then we recursively define the denotation of term T
with respect to interpretation 7 and 7-assignment
^
("
dj (t)") as
follows
:
1. where K is any primitive name, cL (K ) = F(<)
9 0
2. where a is any primitive variable, d ,(ol) = ^(a)
* > o
3. where ( 1 x ) 4) is any object description,
d
I(< (0x)4,) - fo iff f (x) =0 & gatisfles
with respect to & ($")(*"=* & T(x)=o' &
6" satisfies
(f> with respect to m; -> o'=o))
undefined, otherwise,
where satisfaction is defined as in subsection C.
4. where is any elementary 1-expression,
d
I,|j (IXvl--- Vn 0
nV Vn !) = dl, (5 <pn>
5. where p is the i*" -plugging of £ by o,
dM (U) - PLUG.id^^), du6 ( o))
til6. where y is the i -projection of £,
d
Ij|( (u)
=
7. where y is the i
,
j
^-conversion of £,
di,< ( u) cowi. j
w
i > <«»
8. where y is the i,j ^-reflection of
d
ui (v) = REHu .(dJti (O)
9. where y is the i^-vacuous expansion of £,
= WC.(dI4 (0)
10.
where y is the disjoint conjunction of £ and £,
=
,
dj ^(O)
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11. where y is the negation of £,
= WEG(rf
7 ^(0)
12. where y is the necessitation of
rf
7 ^
(y) = WEC(d
T ^(0)
13. where 0 is any propositional formula, dj
^(0) ±s defined as follows
:
(a) if Ms a primitive zero-place term, dj
^
(<f>) is defined above
(b) if 0 = p
n
0 . . .o
,
d7 .(0) =1 n* i,r
PLUG
l(
PLUG
2
( . .
.
(
PLUG
n
(d
7 ^
(p
n
) , dj ^ (on ) ),...),
dM (02»’
(c) if 0 = (~0), d
T ^(0) = NEG(dj ^(0))
(d) if 0 = (0&X ) , d
T ^(0) = C0WJ(d x ^(0), dj ^(X ))
(e) if 0 = (3v)0, dj ^(0) = PR0J(dj
^
( [Xv 0]))
(f) if 0 = D0, dj
^(0) = NEC(dj ^(0))
Here are some examples of A-expressions and their denotations with
respect to a given I and
dj
^([^x D(Px & ~Qx)]) = NEC(dj ^([Ax Px & ~Qx]))
dj^( [Axvwy Px & Qy]) = UAC
2
(dj ^([Axwy Px & Qy]))
dj,^([Axwy Px & Qy]) = l/AC
2
(dj ^([Axy Px & Qy]))
^I,^([^xy Px & Qy]) = COMJ (dj ^(P), dj ^(Q))
d
x
^([Ay QGb]) = l/AC
1
(f^EC(PLUG
1
(d
J
^
(G)
,
^(b))))
dj ^(D(E!b + Gb)) = MEC(MEG(COUJ(PLUG
1
(d
J
^
(E!
)
,
dj^(b)), MEG (PLUG
±
(dj ^(G)
,
dj^(b)))))).
C. Satisfaction . If we're given an interpretation I, and an I-
assignment we may define satisfies 0 with respect to world {<; as
follows
:
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1. If * is any prtaitiva zero-place term,
* satisfias * with
raspact to Ml iff exydj
,(<(,))- T
If p °^***°
n >
satisfies p with respect to w iff
<d
T,^ (0l ) * dI,
l(
(0
„>
> e exVd i
1 ’
0
3. If (p - op
, ^ satisfies <P with respect to U) iff
d
L( (°) e vaA (d^(p1 ))
4. If (p - ( ip )
, ^ satisfies (p with respect to u> iff
^ fails
to satisfy ip with respect to U)
5. If
<P = (^&X)» iS satisfies (p with respect to W iff
^
satisfies both ip and y with respect to U)
6. If
(f> (3 ot) ip
, ^ satisfies <p with respect to UJ iff
Grf'Xrf's* and satisfies ip with respect to u))
7. If $ = (Qi/j),
^ satisfies <p with respect to u) iff
(W ) (fi satisfies ip with respect to W'
)
—
—
Truth
.
u
.
gd
.
e r an interpretation
. 0 is true under interpretation I
iff every I-assignment satisfies 4> with respect to The defi-
nitions of validity and model remain the same.
§3. The Logic
A. Logical axioms . Each of the following logical axioms should be
valid. The logical theorems which are provable from these axioms
and the rules of inference should also be valid.
We retain LA1-LA5 intact from the elementary theory. They
have greater significance, however, since they cover a wider variety
of formulas. For example, we now have modal formulas in the language
“ ” ' °" ““ “ " « u,. U4 „
fled Id c.v.r d«cilp t lons Hhlch au [c denott ,
LAI:
<p -+ (\jj - 0)
LA2: 4 + W + x) + ((4 + if,) - ($+
x))
LA3: (~<t> - -</,) + ((^ + ^ ^
LA4. (a)<J> - ( (3B)S=t - cf>^)
,
where T is substitutable for a
LA5: (a)(0
- *) - (* - (a)\p )
,
provided a isn’t free in 0
In addataon to these propositional and quantificational schemata, we
also have the modal axioms. There are three standard modal axioms of
S5, plus one other interesting modal consequence of our semantics:
LA6 r Q 0 -* 0
LA7: (<£ > ip) -> ($ -
LA8: 0<J> - 0 00
LA9: (x) (F) (OxF - DxF)
LA9 is a consequence of the fact that the encoding extension of a
property is not relativised to a world. The conditions for satisfac-
tion with respect to encoding formulas (§2. C.
, 3) are totally inde-
pendent of the worlds. So if an encoding formula is true at some
world, it is true at every world.
Finally, we have two schema which govern our complex terms
the first governs definite descriptions and the second governs A-
expressions.
DESCRIPTIONS: s (3,y)(*y t ft 4 G ,yHy, „here
^ is any atomic (or identity) formula^
A-EQUIVALENCE: For any formula <p where Fn isn’t free, the
universal closure of the following is an axiom:
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(X
1 )...(x )0([Xv ...V x E **1 Vn I n , . .
.
, v >
»
provided x
q
are substitutable for
respectively, in (p
^-EQUIVALENCE also has greater significance due t0 the £acc ^
among the
^-expressions there are vacuous expansions and necessita-
tions
.
^HiSs^Onference. In additlon t0 ,E and 0I> the Qnly other
official rule of inference is the box introduction rule ("or).
If M, then h- <*., where 4 has no definite descriptions 6
Unofficially, we use the many standard, derived rules of the elementary
object calculus, as well as the obvious derived rules and logical
theorems of S5 (for example, diamond introduction, " Ol")
. Our
derived rules of A-i„troduction and A-elimination ate formulated as
in Chapter I.
Using these logical axioms and rules, the Barcan formulas
are derivable. 7 However, they are unobjectionable since the quanti-
fiers in them range over all objects, and not just over the objects
which exist. So O's commute with universal quantifiers and 0's
commute with existential quantifiers.
Finally, we note that the RELATIONS theorem schema (I, §3) is
now derivable without the restriction that x,,...,x be free in *•
RELATIONS: where <p is any propositional formula where Fn
isn t free, the universal closure of the following is
a logical theorem:
(3f")(x )...(x )D(fV...x =«
1 n 1 n Y
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In addition to the examples of this sche™ offered in Chapter I, „e
now have further examples:
(a) (3F) (x) (Fx E GGx)
(b) (3F) (x) (Fx = (E!x-*-Gx))
(c) (3F) (x) (Fx E Gb)
(d) (3F) (x)O (Fx E QGb)
(e) (3F) (x) (y)0 (Fxy E ClGb)
(a) tens ns that for any property G, there is a property of exempli-
8 essen tially
t (b) tells us that for any property G, there is a
property of necessarily exemplifying-G-ff-existing; (c) and (d) assert
_
respectively, that there is a property objects exemplify just in case
exemplifies 0 and just in case necessarily b exemplifies G; (e)
asserts that there is a two-place relation objects bear to one
another just in case necessarily b exemplifies G.
Note also that while the following is, strictly speaking, not
an instance of RELATIONS, it is nevertheless easily derivable:
PROPOSITIONS: Where
<f> is any propositional formula, the
universal closure of the following is a logical theorem:
(3F°)0 (F° E
<J>)
RELATIONS, PROPOSITIONS, D,.
,
and D
g
jointly comprise a complete
modal theory of n-place relations (n>0)
. It is an important feature
of this theory that relations with the same exemplification extensions
at each possible world may nevertheless be distinct. So, for example,
it is consistent with our theory that the properties of being an equi-
lateral triangle and being an equiangular triangle are distinct, even
though they have the same exemplification extensions at each world.
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And the properties of being-blue-or-not-blue and being
green may be distinct, though logically equivalent.
We call the metaphysical system which consists
green-or-not-
of the inter-
preted modal language, together with its logic,
£UJ-US
_
(with propositions '}
.
the modal object cal—
§4. The Proper Axioms
We assert that the following four axioms are true a priori:
AXIOM 1 ("E-IDENTITY"): (x) (y) (x=y = <>E!x f. OE'y &
(F) (Fx = Fy) )
AXIOM 2 ("NO-CODER"): (x)(OE!x ->
~(3F)xF)
* ("IDENTITY"): a=B - OKcx.a) - <Ka,8))
,
where
(p(
» ) is the result of replacing some, but not neces-
sarily all free occurrences of a by g, provided g is
substitutable for a in the occurrences of a it replaces
AXIOM 4 ("A-OBJECTS")
: For any formula
<p where x isn’t freethe universal ciosurc of the following is an axiom:(3x) (A! x & (F) (xF E <£))
Given our discussion of the axioms and theorems of the elementary
theory, these axioms should be straightforward. Intuitively, each
possible world looks somewhat like a model of elementary object
theory— there are objects which exist at that world, and objects which
fail to exist at that world. But from the point of view of a given
world, say the actual world, the objects which fail to exist divide
up into two mutually exclusive classes— the objects which necessarily
fail to exist and the objects which exist at some other possible world.
So from the point of view of the actual world, E-IDENTITY and NO-CODER
govern the objects which either exist at this world or exist at some
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other world.
The IDENTITY axiom has greater significance than its counter-
part in the elementary theory because of the many new kinds of terms
that have been added to the modal language. For example, F°=G° -
(F * Qg ) is an instance of IDENTITY. So is: b=(lx)<f + (iib
V
Y V ' *
A-OBJECTS also has greater significance since it now yields
objects which encode vacuous properties and modal properties. Given
our rule of necessitation, Ol, the following is a consequence of A-
OBJECTS:
(3x) (A!x & (F) (xF = 4>) ) , where <p has no free x's.
Semantically, this tells us that given a world IV and wff (p, there is
an abstract object at U) which encodes just the properties satisfying
<j> with respect to U>. A formula like "Fs" ("Socrates exemplifies F")
is satisfied by different properties at different worlds. At each
world, then, there is an A-object which encodes just the properties
Socrates exemplifies at that world. A formula like "F=R v F=S" is
satisfied by the same two properties, roundness and squareness, at
each world. Given LA9
,
and the definition of identity, it follows
that the^ round square of one world is identical with the^ round square
of any other world. Intuitively, all of the A-objects from each of the
worlds can be grouped into one set, the set of A-objects, which stays
fixed from world to world. In the future, when we use restricted
z-variables, they will range over this set.
E-IDENTITY, NO-CODER, IDENTITY, and A-OBJECTS jointly consti-
tute the modal theory of abstract objects and I believe that the theory
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is consistent. It is provable that some propositions as well as some
complex relations don't have unique constituents. 9 However, it is
possible to weaken the theory in the manner described in Chapter I,
guarantee the unique constituency of all relations, and still preserve
most of the applications which follow.
In these applications, it will be important to distinguish
three senses of the phrase "possible object." On one sense of this
Phrase, objects which satisfy D., (§1) are possible objects, whereas
abstract objects are not. We always use "possibly existing object" to
indicate this sense of "possible object."
The other two senses of the phrase are ones in which abstract
objects are possible objects. Consider D
?
,
where "z" is a restricted
variable ranging over abstract objects:
°7 z is strongly possible ("SPoss(z)") =
dfn 0 (3x)Blue(z ,x)
We always use the phrase "strongly possible object" to indicate this
sense of "possible object." For example, Socrates' blueprint is
strongly possible, and so is the blueprint of Socrates' blueprint.
^
The third sense of possible object" we distinguish requires
a preliminary definition.
Dg x is weakly correlated with z ("WCor (x, z) ") =
^
(F) (zF -* Fx)
For example, abstract objects which encode just some of the properties
a given object exemplifies are incomplete blueprints of the object
—
the object is weakly correlated with them. We now have,
D z is weakly possible ("WPoss(z)") = 0(3x)WCor (x,z)
y d tn
Weakly possible A-objects are "possible objects" in the sense that they
do not encode any contradictory properties. F and G are contradictory
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properties iff it’s not possible that some object exemplify both of
them. We shall keep these distinctions straight in the applications
which follow. To prepare for these applications, we add to our primi
tive vocabulary the usual abbreviations of standard English gerunds.
Also, we adopt a modal version of our AUXILIARY HYPOTHESIS—A-objects
necessarily fail to exemplify nuclear relations.
CHAPTER III ENDNOTES
Now that we are in a modal theory, we have to face the ques-
tion of whether our descriptions will vary in denotation from world
to world or be "rigid designators." On the first alternative, they
would denote at a world W, the unique object satisfying <p with respect
to IAJ (if there is one). On the second alternative, they would denote
at a world MJ, the unique object satisfying (p at (the base world).
We could have two kinds of descriptions in our language—rigid and
non-rigid descriptions. However, we shall employ just one type of
description, and suppose that all our descriptions are rigid desig-
nators .
We do this for two reasons. One is that we will not need non-
rigid descriptions in any of our applications. Instead, we shall try
to show that rigid descriptions have interesting, heretofore undis-
covered, applications. Secondly, by having just rigid descriptions in
the language, we can simplify the definition of denotation-, ,. Since
i
* 6
all of the terms of the language will be rigid designators, we need not
define the denotation
^ ^
o_f term T with respect to world U). Were we to
allow descriptions which might change denotations from world to world,
we'd have to define "cL
, ((ix)(f>, w>)." This would force us to revise
1
> t
the entire definition of denotation so that it becomes a binary func-
tion. See Appendix C for a definition of denotation
j
^(t,u;)
which is required by languages in which there are non-rigid designators.
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The technique here is due to Saul Kripke [1963], pp . 83-94.
3
Note that one can consistently maintain that logically
equivalent propositions (i.e., propositions *° such that for all
worlds, ext^0 ) = T) need not be identical. For example, the propo-
sition that either Carter is President or it’s not the case that
Carter is President (i.e., MEG(C0MJ (PLUG
±
(being Pn.eJ.lde.nZ, CanleA )
,
MEG (PLUG
^
(being Pnejldenl, CanleA))))) need not be identical with the
proposition that either Nixon is President or it's not the case that
Nixon is President (i.e., MEG(COM3 (PLUG^being Pn.eJldent, Mixon),
NEG(PLUG
1
(belng PneJ-bdent, Mixon)))))
.
Given our statement of the axioms of set theory as in footnote
10, II, §3, we need not believe that there is only one mathematical
proposition
.
4
Recall that, for convenience, we drop the subscripts on I—
assignment variables which relativize them to particular interpreta-
tions .
5
By inserting the parenthetical remark when reading the axiom,
it becomes, strictly speaking, a proper axiom. When you eliminate the
parenthetical remark, the axiom is true under all interpretations.
But since identity formulas are defined formulas, we have to guaran-
tee, for example, that T=(lx)cj) -* (p\ To do this, we could add the
following proper axiom:
,(lx)(p
^ (3 ! y) (<f>y & lp^) & (3!y)4>^, where ip is any defined
identity formula and V is any object variable
For convenience, however, we've combined this proper axiom with the
original logical axiom presented in Chapter II, §2. But if we were
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Co be more careful, we would distinguish L-DESCRIPTIONS (the logical
axiom) from P-DESCRIPTIONS (the above proper axiom) and add the latter
to the set of proper axioms described in §4.
6
Had we chosen to interpret our descriptions non-rigidly, this
restriction would be unnecessary. However, it is an interesting fact
about the logic of rigid descriptions that the rule of necessitation,
I, must be restricted. This prevents the following derivation of a
logical theorem which is not valid:
(a) F(lx)Gx Assumption
(b) (3!y)Gy DESCRIPTIONS, (a)
(c) F(lx)Gx -* (3!y)Gy CP, (a)-(b)
(d) (F(lx)Gx + (3!y)Gy) I, (c)
(e) F (lx)Gx - (3
!
y)Gy LA7, (d)
(e) is not logically true when the description rigidly denotes the
object in the base world, u)
Q , which satisfies Gx. Unrestricted Ol
seems to be the source of the trouble.
Unfortunately, this clearly leaves our logic for descriptions
incomplete, and I've yet to figure out just which logical axioms or
rules must be added in order to get a logic which might have a claim
to completeness. For example, as it stands, we can't derive:
(F ( lx)(}> F(ix)<j)). Nor can we derive: (lz)(F)(zF = F=P)P. Nor:
((x)(Px -+ Qx) & P ( l x) (J) -* Q(ix)<J>).
The problem cuts across all axiomatic modal theories which em-
ploy rigid descriptions. It may be easier to solve in a natural de-
duction system. Whatever the case, more investigation into the logic
of rigid descriptions is needed here (I'd like to thank Ed Gettier for
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pointing this problem out to me)
.
7
See A.N. Prior, [1956],
8
.
Again, the proof has yet to be discovered. However, I sus-
pect that if the elementary theory is consistent, then so is the modal
version
.
9
Here’s the proof. Let R be any one-place property. By A-
OBJECTS, we have Qx)(A!x & (F) (xF = (3u)(F=[Ay Ru] & ~uF))). Call
this object a
5
and suppose
-a^Ay Ra
5 ]
. Then, by definition of a
,
(u)([Ay Ra
5
] = [Ay Ru] + u[Ay Ra
5 ]
) . So a^Ay Ra
5 ] ,
contrary to
hypothesis
.
So suppose a,. [Ay Ra
$ ]
. By definition of a
g
,
for some object,
say a
6 ,
[Ay Ra
6 ]
= [Ay Ra
5
] and ~a
6
[Ay Ra
5
] . By definition of propo-
sition identity (§1, D
&
), Ra
5
=Ra
&
. But since a
5
encodes [Ay Ra
5
] and
a^ doesn't, a^a,
.
10
We can distinguish the strong possibility of Socrates' blue-
print from the strong possibility of its blueprint as follows:
z is strongly
^
possible = 0(3x)(E!x & Blue(z,x))
Socrates blueprint is strongly
^
possible, whereas its blueprint
isn' t
.
CHAPTER IV
THE APPLICATIONS OF THE MODAL THEORY
§1
.
Truth
By now, we should have a good grasp of what it means to say
"it’s necessary that" and "it's possible that." We took the notion
of a possible world as a primitive and used it in our semantics so
that we could interpret the modal, sentential operators "" and
0 which represent these English expressions. But we are really
interested in the object language. When speaking from the object
language, we may suppose that everything we say is analyzable in terms
of our six, primitive metaphysical notions: object, n-place relation,
exemplification, encoding, existence, and possibility. In this
chapter, all of our definitions will be constructed in terms of these
notions. We begin with some preliminary observations and definitions.
Since propositional formulas are also terms which denote
propositions, we shall follow Ramsey in supposing that the predicate
"is true" and the operator "it is true that" are eliminable from our
language.'*' The language we developed in the previous chapter allows
us to make Ramsey’s suggestion precise through the formulation of the
following definitions:
D
n _
is true == F^
10 dfn
.
0 0
D, . It is true that F = _ F
11 dfn
With these definitions, we may translate "Everything Aristotle asserted
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is true" as follows:
(F ) (Aristotle asserted -* f^ is true)
This reduces to
(F ) (Aristotle asserted F^ -> F^)
Both of these generalizations may be instantiated with complex propo-
sitional terms to yield intelligible sentences. And once we move to
type theory, we shall be able to symbolize these generalizations as:
(F°)(AaF° » F°)
,
where "A" denotes the asserting relation between a person and a propo
sition.
Ramsey s idea works fine as long as we're interested in truths
relative to the world we're in. A less mundane notion of truth is the
notion of truth at a particular world. We shall produce a definition
of this notion in the next section, once we've modelled possible
worlds. But before we do so, we require a few more preliminary defi-
nitions
.
We shall say that a property F1 is constructed out of a propo-
sition F° iff F 1 is the property of being such that F°
:
D
12
F
1
is constructed out of F° ("Const (F 1 , F°) ") =
F
1
= [Ax F°]
dfn
We then define a vacuous property to be one which is constructed out of
some proposition:
D „ F
1
is a vacuous property ("Vac(F 1 )") = (3F°)Const (F1 ,F°)din
Examples of vacuous properties are: being such that Carter is Presi-
dent, being such that Fischer defeated Spassky, being such that Nixon
did not resign the Presidency, being such that a Luxembourgian was the
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first man on the moon, being such that every man loves every fish, etc.
Finally, we say that if an abstract object encodes a vacuous
property, then the proposition out of which the property is constructed
is encoded in the abstract object:
D
14
F° is encoded in z ("E^F0 ") =
dfn z[Ay F°]
§2. Modelling Possible Worlds^
Possible worlds will be abstract objects which encode only
vacuous properties and which meet two other conditions. For one
thing, they must be maximal
,
i.e., for every proposition F^
,
either
F° or the negation of F° must be encoded in them.
D,
s
z is maximal ("Max(z)") = (F°) (E F° v E ~F°)i J din z z
So if an object z is maximal, it must encode, for every proposition F^
,
either being such that F° or being such that it's not the case that F°.
Secondly, inconsistent propositions must not be encoded in the
same world. One way to make this requirement precise would be to
stipulate that worlds must be weakly possible (i.e., as in III, §4,
Dg) . This would require that it's possible that some object exempli-
fies every property the world encodes. However, a more elegant way of
ensuring that inconsistent propositions won’t be encoded in the same
world is to stipulate that if an object z is to be a world, then it
3
must be possible that every proposition encoded in z is true.
We can formalize all these conditions on worlds in the follow-
ing definition:
D, , z is a possible world = - (F^) (zF -* Vac(F)) &
16 dtn
Max(z) & 0(F°) (E F° -> F°)
z
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Although this definition would serve us well, there is a more elegant
definition which is equivalent:
D
17
Z 1s a posslble world ("World(z)") ^ (F) (zF » Vac(F)) &
0(f°)(j: f° = f°)
Z
That is, an object z is a world iff every property it encodes is
vacuous and it's possible that all and only true propositions are
encoded m z. From D^, we can prove that worlds are maximal:
Theorem 1 : (z) (World (z) + Max(z)
)
Proof: Suppose z
Q
is an arbitrary world. By definition,
<X F ) ^z
q
f = F°). We want to conclude that for an arbitrary propo-
sition Q , that Z ZqQ or ^-Q0 . We do this in two stages: in stage
(A), we prove that 0 (Z^Q0 v Z ~Q°)
> and in stage (B)
,
we use a
theorem of (which distributes a 0 over a disjunction) and our new
logical axiom LA9, to prove that Z_ Q° or Z„ ~0°z
0 z0
(A) In this stage, we rely on the following theorem of :
(cf> + i|0 + ( 0 <f> 0^) • If we let <p = r(F°)(Z z F° E F°)n and =
0
0
^z
q
Q v ^Zq"Q > then by establishing that D (({) ip)
,
we can apply
the S
5
theorem using the fact that <> (F°) (Z z^F
0
EF°) and reap our
initial result. So we first establish that (4> -* \p)
,
and then use Ql.
So assume <J>, and instantiate the quantifier to both Q° and ~Q°. So
£ Z _Q = Q and Z z ~Q = ~Q^. Since v ~Q^, it follows that £„ v
0
.
0 0
S Zq-Q » i.e., 1p. So 0(4) -* ip), by Dl. And by the S,- theorem, we
have our initial result: v £~ ~Q^)
.
v Zq v Zq
(B) It is also a theorem of S<. that 0(<!> v \p) -* ( O v 0^)*
By letting <(>, \p be the disjuncts of our initial result, it follows that
Q v 0^7 ~Q°- By LA9, it follows that 0Z 7 v CJZ- ~Q^, sincez
0 0
z
0 z 0
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if possibly an object encodes a property, it does so necessarily. And
by another theorem of Sj, v I^-Q0 ). By LA6, I^Q0 v j;z .gO,
1 * e * * So every D^-world is maximal. E 4
Theorem 1 is instrumental for showing that D implies D
.1 • 16
It is a good exercise to show that D, , implies D 516 r 17-
Let us say that propositions F° and G° are inconsistent iff
it's not possible that both F° and G° be true. We then have:
Theorem 2: (z)(World(z) - ~ (3 f°) (3G°) (~ 0 (F° & G°) &
I F° & I G°))
z z
That is, inconsistent propositions are not encoded in any world.
Proof: Assume for reductio that World(z
Q ),
I^P0
,
Z z q°, and that
~<0>(P° & Q°>. By D 0(F°)(Z F° E F°) . So let = r(F°)(Ez F° E
,0,1F ) and assume
<f>. If we let = FPU & Q01, it is easy to see that
^ So by Dl, O (4> -* ip) . By using our S
5
theorem that (<(> -*•
(0$ Oip), it follows that 0 (P^ & Q^)
,
contrary to hypothesis. S
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 should give us a good grasp
of the second clause of D.^. They should help us to see that the
following definition is justified:
D
lg
F° is true at z =
df^ World (z) & Z^
0
So, whenever z is a world, the propositions encoded in the world are
just the propositions true at that world. This definition suggests
what it is for a world to be actual:
z is an actual world ("World^(z)")
=
^
World(z) &
<F°) (Z
z
F° » F°)
That is, an actual world is any world such that every proposition en-
coded in it is true. We now get the following result:
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Theorem 3 : (z) (z
' ) (World^z) & World^z') z’=z)
That is, there is at most one actual world.
Proof: Suppose, for reductio, that World^z-^ and World
A
(z
2
>,
where z_
L
^ z2
- Since z
±
and z
2
are distinct A-objects, they must dif-
fer with respect to at least one encoded property. Since they are both
worlds, any such property must be vacuous. So without loss of general-
ity, suppose Z
z ^Q & ~Z z ^Q . By Theorem 1, z 2 must be maximal. So
%-Q • But since both z^ and z
2
are actual, every proposition they
encode must be true. Contradiction. S3
We also get
:
Theorem 4 : (3z)World
A
(z)
Proof : By A-OBJECTS, there is an abstract object which encodes a
property F iff it’s a vacuous property constructed out of a true propo-
sition, i.e., (3z)(F)(zF E (3F°)(F° & F= [Ay F°])>. Call this object
Zq. To show zn is an actual world, we show that it satisfies both
clauses of D19' So we show (a) World (z A ), and (b) (F^) (£„ F^ -* F^)0 z 0
(a) Clearly, every property z^ encodes will be vacuous. So
we want to show that possibly, all and only the true propositions are
encoded in z^. Consider an arbitrary proposition Q^. (->) Suppose
s0 0 , /T,0 .0- n
Z z ^Q • Then by definition of z^, ( 3 F ) (F & [Xy Q ] = [Xy F ]). Call
'0
this proposition R^. Since [Xy Q^] = [Xy R^], it follows from the
.0 ,0
definition of proposition identity (III, §1, D^) that Q - R . Since
r0 is true, so is Q^. (-<-) Suppose Q^ is true. Then z^[Xy Q ], i.e.,
.0
.0 _
E
z Q0
Since we have established that Q = Q , for an arbitrary
'0
propos ition Q^, it follows that 0(F^)(E z^F = F )
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(b) Clearly, every proposition encoded in 2 is true, by
definition of z
Q
. K
With Theorems 3 and 4, we have proven that there is a unique
actual world (from a priori assumptions alone). We're entitled to
name this object, and so we do so as follows: w. = (iz)World (z)
.
A dfn A
It should be interesting that the actual world is an abstract,
and not an actual (existing) object. If we were to think that the
actual world was an existing object like you, me, or some sub-atomic
particle, it would fail to encode any properties (by NO-CODER). There
would be no reason why its vacuous properties were any more crucial to
its identity than the other properties it exemplified (like not being
a cat, being non-red, etc.). As Wittgenstein said, the world is just
all that is the case. w^ does encode all and only that which is the
case
.
It is important to distinguish w^ from the world of existing
things. Consider the following definition:
D
20 z is a world of existing things ("World E , (z) ")
=
(j^n
World (z) & (3x) (E!x & (F°)(z[Ay F°] = [Xy F°]x))
So a world of existing things is any world such that some existing ob-
ject exemplifies exactly the vacuous properties it encodes. From D^,
we get the following result
:
Theorem 5: (z) (z' ) (Worlds, (z) & Worlds, (z') -* z'=z)
E ! E
!
Proof : Assume, for reductio, World^^z^), World
E
,(z
2
), and z^ ^
Call the objects which exemplify exactly the vacuous properties
z^ and z
2
encode b^ and b
2 ,
respectively. Since z^ ^ z
2
»
there must be
a vacuous property one encodes which the other doesn't. Without loss
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of generality, suppose z, [Ay 0^1 & r>v c-
i L y V J 61 z 2 lAy Q J- Slnce z 2 is maximal,
z
2 f
Xy ~Q ]• So [Ay Q°]b
1
and [Ay -Q0 ]^. But by AE, Q° & ~Q°. ^
Consequently, there is at most one world of existing things.
If we add the contingent assumption that something exists, it would
follow that there is a world of existing things-just consider the
world which encodes exactly the vacuous properties the existing thing
exemplified. By Theorem 5, we would be entitled to talk about the
world of existing things, and give it a name.
This is why we distinguish the actual world, w., from theH
world of existing things. It is a contingent matter that there is a
world of existing things, whereas it is not a contingent matter that
there is an actual world. Indeed, some philosophers take it as an a
priori datum that there is a unique actual world. We may suppose this
on our theory without having to worry that we’ve attributed a priori
existence to a contingent object.
We now consider the implications of another definition which
seems justified:
D01 x exists at z = „ „ World (z) & Z E!x
zi drn z
That is, x exists at z iff the proposition that x exists is encoded in
world z. It is consistent with this definition that objects exist at
more than one world. However, some philosophers apparently like to
work with a notion of existing at a world on which objects can exist
at at most one world. ^ We could accommodate the views of these
philosophers were we to define existence at a world as follows:
x exists at z =dfn World(z) & (F°) (Z^F^ = [Ay F^]x)
Using this definition, we would get the result that individuals are
Ill
world-bound. To see this, suppose b exists at both z^ and z 2> Z;L +
V If Q ^ was the va<=uous property distinguishing z^ and z it
would follow that b both exemplified and failed to exemplify this
property. So b can't exist at both, on this definition of "exists at
Counterpart theorists will then prefer to use this latter definition
in their investigations.
We conclude this section on worlds with a proof of a lemma
which will be instrumental in §3. Let "w" be a restricted variable
ranging over worlds.
Lemma: (F°) (w) (x) (Z F° E I [Ay F°]x)
w
,0 .
w
That is, a proposition F is true at w iff everything exemplifies
being such that F^ at w.
Proof : (-») Let Q^, Wg, and bg be an arbitrary proposition, world,
and object, respectively. We assume and try to show that
£w
0
^y Q°] b0 - Since wQ is a world, <0>(F°) (£WgF° = F°) . So if we can
deduce Zw^[Ay Q^]bg from (F^) (ZW^F^* = F^) , we can apply our standard
S theorem: Q (4> ^ -* (0$ 040 • So suppose (F^) (Iw F^ = F^)
.
0 0 °
Then Ew Q = Q , and since we've assumed Ew Q^, we know (P
.
By Al,
0 0
[Ay Q ] bg . So this must be a proposition encoded in Wg, i.e.,
^Wg[Ay Q^]bg. By °Ur ^5 tbeorem ’ 0 ^Wgt^y Q
U
] bg ; and by LA9 and LA6,
SWq [Xy Q°]b0 .
(•<-) Suppose £w [Ay Q^]b_. We try to show Ew Q^. Again, since
0 u 0
wn is a world, 0(F^)(£W F^ = F^) . From (F^)(£w F*^ = F^) and our as-u 0 0
sumption, it follows that [Ay Q^]b_. By AE, we get Q . So Iw Q .u 0
So (F^) (£ F = F^) implies E„ Q , and since the former is possible, so
0 0
is the latter. Consequently, the latter is true as well.E3
0-
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13. Modelling Leibniz's Mon^c 8
The investigation of monads is as Philosophically satisfying
as the definition of truth and the investigation of worlds. Although
it is unclear what Leibniz intended his monads to be. they have tradi-
tionally been regarded as properties of some sort. 9 However, we model
them here as abstract objects which are strongly possible. 10 Strong-
ly possible abstract objects have correlates "at" some possible world.
For example, Socrates’ blueprint is a monad since it has a correlate
at the actual world. Intuitively,
"compossible" monads have cor-
relates at the same world. So your blueprint and my blueprint are
compossible. A monad "mirrors" the world at which it has a correlate
by encoding the vacuous properties the correlate exemplifies—proper-
ties constructed out of the propositions true at that world.
To make these ideas precise, we utilize the following defi-
nitions. As with the previous lemma, we use "w" as a restricted
variable ranging over the abstract objects which satisfy the defini-
tion of a world:
D
22
x is the correlate of z at w ("Cor (x,z ,w)") =
. 1 dfn
(F )(I Fx = zF)
w
That is, x is the correlate of z at w iff x exemplifies F at w iff z
encodes F.
D
23 z appears at w ("Appear (z ,w) ") »dfn (3x) Cor (x, z , w)
°24 2 is a monad ("Monad (z)") =^
n
(3w) Appear (z ,w)
D z mirrors w ("Mirror (z ,w) ") = (F°) (I F° = E F°)dtn w z
Using the lemma at the end of §2, we now get the following result:
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Theorem 6 : (z) (w) (Monad (z) & Appear(z,w) + Mirror (z ,w) )
That is, every monad mirrors any world where it appears.
Proof: Suppose z
Q
is a monad and z
Q appears at wQ
. We want to
show that for an arbitrary proposition, Q°
,
E^q0 =
. (-*) Sup-
pose £WqQ. Since zQ appears at wQ , call its correlate there b .
z
0
encodes exactly the properties b
Q exemplifies at w . In par-
ticular z
Q encodes [Ay Q°] iff bQ exemplifies [Ay Q°] at w. By our
assumption, IW( Q
0
. So ^[Xy Q°]b0> by the lemma. So Z2 Q°.
Suppose
• Again, let b^ be the object which ex-
emplifies at Wq exactly the properties z
Q
encodes. Clearly, b
Q
must
exemplify [Ay Q°] at w. So by the lemma, L. Q°. 13
0
Another interesting fact about monads is provable with the
help of Theorem 6:^
Theorem 7 : (z)(Monad(z) - (3!w)Appear(z,w))
That is, every monad appears at a unique world.
Proof : Suppose z^ is a monad. So there is a world, say w^
,
where it appears. We want to show that w^ is unique, so for reductio,
suppose Zq appears also at W
2 >
Since the worlds are distinct,
there must be some vacuous property which distinguishes them. With
out loss of generality, suppose Ew Q° and Q°. And since w„ is
1 2 2
maximal, Zw ~Q . But by Theorem 6, z_ mirrors both worlds. So
2 ®
Zz Q and Z ? ~Q . But this is impossible, since and would
0 0
both be true in any world where z^ has a correlate. S
Since we know that every monad appears at a unique world,
we’re entitled to talk about the world where it appears. Let us use
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m as a restricted variable ranging over the objects satisfying the
definition of monad. We then define:
°26 Wm
=
dfn (lw) Appear (m,w)
Theorems 6 and 7 allow us to say that every monad mirrors its world. 12
Here now is a definition of compossibility
.
°
27 ml is compossible with m ("Comp (m. ,m„) ") =z 12 dfn
(3w) (Appear (rn^w) & Appear (m ,w) )
With these definitions, we have the following lemma: 13
Lemma: (n^) (m
2 )
(Comp (mlt m 2 )
= wm^=wm^)
That is, two monads are compossible iff the worlds where they appear
are identical.
Proof: (->) Since and m
2
are compossible, call the world where
they both appear w
Q . By Theorem 7, w^^ and Wq-w^. So wm =wm2 .
("*") Clearly, if the worlds where they appear are identical, there
is a world where they both appear.
With the help of this lemma, we get the following result: 1^
Theorem 8 : (m
1 >
(m
2 >
(m^) (Comp (m^
,
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^) & (Comp (m.^ ,m2 )
Comp (m
2
,m^) ) & (Comp (m^ ,m
2 )
& Comp(m
2
,m
3
>
-*
Comp (m
1
,m
3
> ) )
That is, compossibility is an equivalence notion among the monads.
Proof : Clearly, compossibility is reflexive and symmetrical. To
show transitivity, suppose Comp(m
3
,m
2 )
and Comp (m
2
,m
3
) . By the pre-
vious lemma, and 1% “wm . So wm -w^ . ®
It should also be clear that by defining "embedding" as follows
:
D
28
Z
1
ls emb ecJded in z
2
("Embed (z^ ,z
2
)
") =d ^n
(F 1 ) (z^F -> z
2
F)
,
we can prove that every monad has the world where it appears embedded
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in it
:
Theorem 9 : (m)Embed(w ,m)
m
Proof: * mirrors its world by encoding exactly the vacuous
properties „
m
encodes. So „
m
must be embedded in m since the vacuous
properties exhaust the properties w encodes £3
m
Consequently, every monad will be maximal with respect to the
propositions encoded in it. But an even stronger claim is warranted-
monads are complete:
D
28 z is complete ("Com(z) ") =df^ (F) (zF v zF) ,
where F =
dfn [Ax ~Fx]
.
Theorem 10 : (z) (Monad (z) -* Com(z))
Proof : Clearly, if m
Q
is a monad, then some object is its corre-
late in the world where it appears. That object must exemplify, for
every property, either it or its negation. Consequently, m
Q will en-
code, for every property, either it or its negation. K1
Theorems (1)-(10) outline a certain picture of objects, monads,
and worlds. In addition to being informative in its own right, this
picture may be useful for deciding hard questions in Leibnizian schol-
arship. Our notion of encoding a property is very similar to Leibniz's
notion of concept containment. We could regard our notion of mirroring
a world as representing both Leibniz's notion of mirroring (in the
Monadology) and his notion of expression (in his letters to Arnauld).
Leibniz says repeatedly in the letters to Arnauld that every individual
substance of this universe expresses (in its concept) the universe into
which it enters. 15
In §56 of the Monadology, Leibniz calls monads both living and
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perpetual. On our understanding of monads, we can see how they could
be perpetual. By appealing to our AUXILIARY HYPOTHESIS, we suppose
that monads don’t have spatio-temporal location and therefore aren’t
subject to the laws of generation and decay. But it is difficult to
understand how monads could be thought of as "living." Has Leibniz
confused the blueprints of living persons with the persons themselves?
Could we find support for this idea in the fact that the word "Adam"
is used sometimes to talk about the existing person ("the actual Adam")
and used sometimes to talk about the complete individual concept of
Adam (one of the many possible Adams") in the correspondences with
Arnauld? These questions, and others, seem to be obvious points of
departure for future investigations.
§4. Modelling Stories and Native Characters
By adding a few primitives to the language of Chapter III, we
may model stories, and certain characters in them, as A-objects. First
we add abbreviations for any proper name of English which denotes an
object which, pretheoretically
,
we judge to be a story (for example,
novels, myths, legends, plays, dreams, etc.), or an author or character
thereof (where we take characters to be any story object, not neces-
sarily animate). So we shall have object names in our language which
abbreviate " The Tempest ," "Shakespeare," "Prospero," "The Brothers
Karamazov ," "Alyosha," " The Clouds ," "Strepsiades , " "Socrates,"
" Ulysses , " "Joyce," "Bloom," "Dublin," etc.
Secondly, we add the name of a new primitive relation which is
of central importance to our investigations—the authorship relation.
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The formula "Axy" shall say that x authors y, and we trust that our
readers have at least an intuitive grasp on what it is to author some-
thing.
Consequently, we may define:
D z is a story ("Story (z)") =
din
(F)(zF ->• Vac (F) ) & (3x)(E!x & Axz)
That is, stories are abstract objects which encode only vacuous proper-
ties and which are authored by some existing thing. Hence, it is a
contingent matter that there are any stories. Lots of A-objects might
have been stories, however. To say this is to say that they encode
just vacuous properties and that possibly there exists an object which
authors it.
Stories don't have to be consistent, nor do they have to be
maximal. If every proposition encoded in the story is true, then the
story is a "true story"; if it's possible that every proposition en-
coded in the story is true, then the story is a "possibly true story .
"
16
But stories and worlds do have something in common—they encode only
vacuous properties. It is therefore appropriate to use our defined
operator "Z" to talk derivatively about the propositions encoded in the
story. In fact, if z is a story, then we may utilize "I " as our trans-
z
lation for the English prefix "according to (in) the story z." So when
z is a story, "Z^F^" says that F^ is true according to z. This allows
us to prove an interesting consequence of D^g which helps us to identi-
fy a given story: a story z just is that abstract object which encodes
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exactly the properties F which are constructed out of propositions
true according to the story. That is,
THEOREM ("STORIES"): (z)(Story(z) -+ z=( iz
’ ) (F) (z ' F E
(3F°)(Z
z
F° & F= [Ay F°]))) 17
For example. Little Red Riding Hood is a story, so it is that abstract
object which encodes exactly the vacuous properties constructed out of
propositions true according to Little Red Riding Hood. Although this
is not a definition of "Little Red Riding Hood," we can identify this
story in so far as we have a good pretheoretical idea about which pro-
positions are true according to it. Fortunately, the data begins where
our suggestion ends, for we suppose that the data are intuitively true
English sentences of the form "according to the story, ... ." For
example,^
(1) According to The Tempest
,
Prospero had a daughter.
(2) According to The Iliad
,
Achilles fought Hector.
(3) In the Brothers Karamazov
,
everyone that met Alyosha loved him.
(4) In The Clouds
,
Strepsiades converses with Socrates.
(5) In Joyce’s Ulysses
,
Bloom journeys through Dublin.
Thus, STORIES helps us to understand which A-objects might be denoted
by the underlined terms in the above sentences. We next try to iden-
tify the denotations of some of the other terms.
We can say what it is to be a character of a story. Let us
use "s" variables as restricted variables ranging over stories:
x is a character of s ("Char (x,s)") (3F)Z
g
Fx
That is, the characters of a story are the objects which exemplify
properties according to it. As we noted previously, the characters of
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a story are any story objects, not just real or imaginary persons or
animals. Note also that this definition allows existing objects to be
characters of stories—we can tell stories (true or false) about
existing objects, just as we can about non-existent ones.^
Of the non-existent characters in a given story, some will have
originated entirely from that story. We call these the "native" charac-
ters, and they are to be distinguished from the other non-existent char-
acters which may have been borrowed or imported from other stories. But
the non-native non-existent characters are nevertheless "fictional,"
since, presumably, they are native to (originate from) some other story.
We may define the notions of being native and being fictional
by utilizing a higher order primitive relation—one which could be
analyzed in the context of some other work. This is the relation that
two propositions F^* and bear to one another just in case occurs
(obtains, takes place) before G^. We shall represent the fact that F^
occurs before G as "F^ < G^." This relation helps us to be more
specific about what it is to originate in a story:
D
^2
x originates in s ("Origin(x,s)") =
(j£n
Char(x,s) & ~E!x & (y) (y ' ) (s ' ) (Ays & Ay’s' & (Ay’s' < Ays)
~Char(x,s' ))
That is, x originates in s iff x is a non-existent object which is a
character of s and which is not a character of any earlier story. We
then define being native and being fictional as follows:
x is native to s ("Native (x, s) ") =
^£n
Origin(x,s)
x is fictional ("Fict(x)") =dfn (3s)Nat ive (x , s)
So fictional characters are native to (originate in) some story.
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Clearly, fictional characters may be characters of stories to which
they are not native. Sherlock Holmes is not native to The Seven Per
20
Cent Solution
. Nor is the monster Grendel, in John Gardner's recent
account of the Beowulf legend from the monster's point of view
(Grendel). For simplicity, we shall suppose that Achilles and Hector
are native to The Iliad
,
even though they may instead be native to some
earlier epic of which no copies have survived. Also, in what follows,
we shall suppose that Prospero is native to The Tempest
. Alyosha and
Raskolnikov are native to The Brothers Karamazov and Crime and Punish-
ment, respectively, Bloom is native to Joyce's Ulysses
,
and Gregor
Samsa is native to Kafka's Metamorphosis
.
It would be a philosophical achievement of great importance
were someone to discover a way of identifying fictional characters in
general. The best we can accomplish here is to present a means of
identifying the characters native to a given story. The identifying
properties of native characters are exactly the properties exemplified
by that character in the story. So we may utilize the following axiom
which identifies the native characters of a story as specific A-
...
21
obj ects
:
AXIOM ("N-CHARACTERS") : (x) (s) (Native (x , s) +
x=(lz)(F)(zF E Z Fx))
s
For example, since Prospero is native to The Tempest
,
Prospero is that
abstract object which encodes exactly the properties Prospero exempli-
fies according to The Tempest . This tells us an important fact about
the Z -operator and native characters— the Z -operator "transforms" a
s s
property a native character exemplifies according to story s into one
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which the character encodes. That is, it is a theorem that: 22
(x) (s) (Native(x,s) -*• (F) (xF = Z Fx) )
s
So if according to the play, Prospero had a daughter, it follows that
he encodes having a daughter.
This theorem assumes greater significance in the presence of
the following axiom schema which also should govern the Z
-operator:
AXIOH(S) ("^-SUBSTITUTION") : where <j> is any propositional
formula in which there occurs an object term o for which
x is substitutable, the following is an axiom:
(s) (Z <(> -* Z
g
[Ax <}>*]o)
For example, in the myth, Achilles fought Hector. It therefore fol-
lows from Z -SUB both that in the myth, Achilles exemplifies the
s
property of fighting Hector and that in the myth. Hector exemplifies
the property of being fought by Achilles. From the supposition that
Achilles and Hector are both native to the myth in question, we may
deduce that they encode these properties, respectively, by N-
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CHARACTERS
.
With these definitions, axioms, and consequences, we can
translate a wide variety of data. We begin with (1 )
—
( 5 ) above. The
translation procedure is straightforward—since the Z
g
-operator is
defined only on proposition terms, we translate the English "in the
story" using the operator, and translate the rest of the sentence just
as we would into an ordinary predicate calculus:
( 1 )’
( 2 )'
( 3 )’
Tempest
Z
.
,Fah
Iliad
£
fiK
(x) (I;Ixa Lxa )
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(A)'
(5)'
^Clouds^s 2 S 2
JbdUlysses
There is an interesting class of sentences relevantly similar
to (1) which we should discuss briefly. These true sentences begin
with the story prefix and involve the predicative copula "is." For
example, (6) and (7):
(6) According to Crime and Punishment
, Raskolnikov is a student.
(7) In the Conan Doyle novels, Holmes is a detective.
Frequently, there are contexts in which it is acceptable to drop the
story prefix and just use the remainder of the sentence. We can think
of the resulting sentences "Raskolnikov is a student," "Holmes is a
detective," as true if we suppose that the English copula "is" is to
be read as "encodes." We can therefore assimilate more phenomena con-
sistent with our earlier discovery about the possibility of the ambi-
guity of "is.
I think we can partially accommodate the views of philosophers
who object to (4)' and (5)' by arguing that the real Socrates and the
real Dublin aren't characters of The Clouds and Ulysses
,
respectively.
We do this by supposing, instead, that the objects known as "the Socra-
tes of The Clouds ," and "the Dublin of Ulysses , " are the relevant char-
acters of these stories. We could suppose that these latter objects
were native to these stories and use N-CHARACTERS to identify them.
Such a procedure could be broadened to identify all non-native fiction-
al characters. For example, we could say that the Sherlock Holmes of
The Seven Per Cent Solution is native to that work, even though Sher-
lock Holmes isn't.
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The problem with this procedure is that one is forced to say
something about the relationships between the real Socrates and the
Socrates of The Clouds, between the Sherlock Holmes native to the
Conan Doyle novels and the Sherlock Holmes native to The Seven Per Cent
Solution, etc. This is no easy task. Clearly, the notions of weak
correlation or embedding won’t be of much help— the Socrates of The
Clouds exemplifies-according-to
-The Clouds (and consequently, encodes)
properties not exemplified by the real Socrates. A full discussion of
the host of problems which arise here would take us too far afield.
Much further investigation is warranted before this procedure is to be
adopted
.
Consider next the following data:
(8) Santa Claus doesn't exist.
(9) Franz Kafka wrote about Gregor Samsa
.
(10) Some Greeks worshipped Dionysus
.
(11) Prospero is a character of The Tempest
(12) Raskolnikov is a fictional student.
Clearly, (8)-(10) are to be translated as follows:
(8)
'
~E ! sc
(9)
' Wks
(10)
’ (:3y) (Gy & Wyd)
Once we've identified Santa Claus using N-CHARACTERS
,
it is provable
that he fails to exist. And it is a consequence that all fictional
objects fail to exist.
We translate (9) and (10) using exemplification formulas be-
cause they involve extranuclear properties which abstract objects may
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exemplify. Being written about and being worshipped are extranuclear
properties. They were not ascribed to (exemplified by) Samsa and
Dionysus in the relevant stories. But given our AUXILIARY HYPOTHESIS,
these are just the kind of properties Samsa and Dionysus would exem-
plify.
Given our work above, (11) should be translated as:
(11)' Char (Prospero, The Tempest )
However, (12) is a more subtle case. Being fictional is a notion we've
defined— it may not be a property ([Xx Fictional (x) ] is ill-formed).
But being a student is a property that Raskolnikov encodes, since he
is native to Crime and Punishment and exemplifies that property in the
novel. Consequently, we may define:
D^ x is a fictional student ("F-student (x)") =
(3s) (Native(x, s) & Z
g
Sx)
,
dfn
where "S" denotes being a student. Then from the assumptions that
Raskolnikov is native to Crime and Punishment and that he is a student
according to that story, we have (12)' as a consequence:
(12)' F-student (Raskolnikov)
In fact, we can generalize and suppose there is a whole group of
notions, each one defined with respect to a given property G:
D_, x is a fictional G == (3s) (Native(x,s) & Z Gx)
do drn s
So Holmes is a fictional detective, Achilles is a fictional Greek
25
warrior, etc., given the appropriate assumptions.
Finally, we discuss definite descriptions. Consider (13) and
( 14 ):
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(13) The detective who lived at 221 Baker St. of the Conan
Doyle novels is more famous than any real detective.
(14) In Crime and Punishment
, Porphyry arrested the student
who killed an old moneylender.
It would be inappropriate to read the description in (13) as "the ob-
ject which exemplifies detectivehood
,
exemplifies living at 221 Baker
St., and exemplifies being a character of the Conan Doyle novels,"
since this description fails to denote. But we often use the descrip-
tion in (13) to refer to Holmes. The proper way to translate it is as
the object which according to the Conan Doyle novels exemplifies both
detectivehood and living at 221 Baker St." Using "MFT" to abbreviate
more famous than," and other obvious abbreviations, we may read (13)
as
:
(13)’ (y)(Dy & Ely -*» MFT(tx) E (Dx & Lx)y)
This says that every existing detective y is such that the object which
according to the Conan Doyle novels exemplifies both detectivehood and
living at 221 Baker St. is more famous than y.
A similar reading must be given to the definite description in
(14). The following would be the wrong symbolization of (14):
E
Cp
Ap(ix)(Sx & (-3y) (OMLy & Kxy))
The definite description fails to denote anything, even though it is
entirely within the scope of the story operator. There may not be an
object which exemplifies being a student and which killed an old money-
lender. Or there may be two. But there is exactly one object which
according to Crime and Punishment exemplifies being a student and
killing an old moneylender. Consequently, (14) is properly read as
( 14 )’:
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(14)
'
Z
CP
AP( lx)E Cp (Sx & (3y) (OMLy & Kxy))
When we read (hear) definite descriptions in the context of a story,
there is an implicit understanding that the description denotes a
character of the story. This implicit understanding is captured by
placing the appropriate Z-operator immediately after the iota-operator
of the description. This guarantees that the description, should it
denote, denotes a character of the story.
To see this, consider the above example (14'). If we assume
that Raskolnikov is the object which according to Crime and Punishment
is a student who killed an old moneylender, we can show that Raskolni-
kov is a character of that story. So assume (15)
:
(15) r=(ix)Z
cp
Sx & (3y) (OMLy & Kxy)
By DESCRIPTIONS, it follows that according to Crime and Punishment
,
Raskolnikov is a student who killed an old moneylender, i.e.,
(16) ^
Cp
Sr & (3y) (OMLy & Kry)
By E^p-SUB, it follows that Raskolnikov exemplifies being a student
who killed an old moneylender, i.e.,
(17) E
cp
[Ax Sx & (3y) (OMLy & Kyx)]r
So there is a property which Raskolnikov exemplifies according to
Crime and Punishment . By D Raskolnikov is a character of that
story. So by placing the story operator immediately after the iota
operator in the description, we guarantee that the object denoted, if
there is one, is a character of the story.
Finally, note that (15) is a true identity statement. From
(14') and (15), it follows that according to Crime and Punishment ,
Porphyry arrested Raskolnikov, i.e.,
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( 18 > ZCP
AP r
The above results should establish at least a prima facie case
for thinking that stories and characters are abstract objects. The
groundwork has been laid for further investigations which might fill
in more details.
§5. Modelling The Fountain of Youth
We now examine another class of English sentences which seem to
be true a priori. They have the form "The F
,
F_
, . . . ,
F is G," where12 n
G is logically implied by one of the F^ and where there isn’t an object
which (uniquely) exemplifies F_
,
F„ , . . .
,
F . Here are some examples:
1 2 n
(1) The fountain of youth is a fountain
(2) The set of all non-self-membered sets is a set
(3) The existent golden mountain is colored
For considerations similar to those in Chapter II, §2, we translate the
English definite descriptions as A-object descriptions. Except in
these cases, we translate "the F
,
F
, ..., F " as "(iz)(G)(zG = F
1 2 n l
G v F-^G v ... v F =^G)," where "F=*G" means that necessarily,
2 n
everything exemplifying F exemplifies G.
Consequently, the English descriptions in ( 1) — ( 3) are repre-
sented as following, using obvious abbreviations:
(a) (iz) (G) (zG = FY=>G)
26
(b) (iz) (G) (zG = [Xx Sx & (y)(yex = Sy & yey)]^G)
(c) (iz) (F) (zF = E!^F v G =>F v M=*F)
In the metalanguage, we signify this reading of the definite article
as "the^," and we assimilate the reading of the definite article
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proposed in Chapter II, §2 to this reading. Let's abbreviate (a)-(c)
respectively as (iz)^ - (iz)^. By A-DESCRIPTIONS
,
it follows that
any property satisfying the formula on the right of the biconditional
m is encoded by the object denoted by the entire description.
Take (a) for example. Since being a fountain is logically
implied by being a fountain of youth, it follows that (iz^F, where
"F" here denotes being a fountain. Our representations of (l)-(3)
turn out to be theorems
:
(1') (iz^F
( 2 ') (lz)iP
2
S
(3’) (lz)^
3
C
This reading of the English definite article may prove to be
useful for another group of problem cases. Consider (4):
(4) Necessarily, the teacher of Alexander is a teacher
If we symbolixe the description in (4) as "(ix)Txa," (4) would be
false. That's because our definite descriptions are rigid designators,
and even if we assume that there was a unique object which exemplified
teaching Alexander and that that object was Aristotle, it seems wrong
to suppose that Aristotle taught Alexander in every possible world.
Many philosophers have then concluded that if we are to preserve the
truth of (4), we need to translate the English description as a non-
rigid description or eliminate the description altogether.
But this conclusion is not warranted. We can preserve the
necessary truth which seems to be embedded in (4) another way. We
can translate the English description as in (d)
:
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(d) (lz)(G)(zG = [Ay Tya] =^>G)
Abbreviating (d) as (iz)l^, „e then read (4) as:
(A*) Q(i z)i[i T
4
It is true that necessarily the
A
teacher of Alexander encodes being a
teacher. Again, we suppose the copula "is” to be ambiguous.
Philosophers since Russell have supposed that "scope distinc-
tions" were the source of the trouble with the following arguments:
(4) Necessarily, the teacher of Aristotle is a teacher
(5) Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander
•
• (6) Necessarily, Aristotle is a teacher
(7) Necessarily, nine is greater than seven
(8) Nine is the number of planets
•
• (9) Necessarily, the number of planets is greater than seven
In these arguments, the premises appear to be true and the conclusions
false. Russellians have explained the apparent invalidity by supposing
that (4) and (9) exhibit de re/de dicto ambiguity. On the Russellian
analysis, the definite descriptions get eliminated in terms of exis-
tential and uniqueness clauses, but in the presence of the modal
operator, there is a way to eliminate the description so that these
clauses appear before the operator (wide scope, de re) and a way to
eliminate the description so that these clauses appear after the oper-
ator (narrow scope, de dicto). For example, two readings of (4) are:
(4") (3x) (Txa & (y) (Tya -» y=x) & DTx) (re)
(4"') D(x) ( (3y) (Tya & (u) (Tua u=y) & y=x) -* Tx) (dicto)
(4) is false when read as (4") and true when read as (4'") . On the
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other hand, (9) is false when read de dieto and true when read de re.
There is an alternative way of looking at the matter, however.
We may agree that (9) and (9) are ambiguous, but we don't suppose that
there is a problem of scope. That's because we don't eliminate the
descriptions in terms of existential and uniqueness clauses. By using
descriptions constructed with propositional formulas to represent a
reading of the English descriptions, the question of scope doesn't
arise. The arguments turn out to be perfectly valid. We translate
"the teacher of Alexander" as "(ix)Txa" and "the number of planets" as
"Ox)Nx{y|y is a planet}." Let's abbreviate our translations as (lx)*
and (lxH
6 ,
respectively. Then we represent the above arguments as
follows
:
(4a) ClT(lx)<|>
(5a) a=(ix)4>
5
(6a) ClTa
(7a) C39 > 7
(8a) 9=(ix)4>
o
•
*
• (9a) CKixH > 7
In both arguments, the conclusion follows by a simple application of
=E. It's just that (4a) is false—the description rigidly denotes
Aristotle
. If we want to translate (4) as a truth, we have to trans-
late it as (4') above. (4') and (5a) don't imply (6a).
(9a) is true— the description "(ix)<J)
6
" rigidly denotes the
number nine. By A-conversion on (9a), we get that [Ay D y>7 ] (ix)^
,
i.e., the number of planets exemplifies being necessarily greater than
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seven. However, (9a)
(9) seems to express.
doesn't do justice to an apparent falsehood which
Such a falsehood might be (9b)
:
(9b) (iz)(F)(zFE [Ax
<f> 6 ]
=»F) [Ay y>7]
(9b) asserts that necessarily the
A
number of planets encodes being
greater than seven. This is false since the property of being greater
than seven is not logically implied by the property of being a number
which numbers the planets. Clearly, (7a) and (8a) don’t imply (9b). 27
Our explanation of these matters consists in translating
English descriptions into descriptions of our formal language. We
don t systematically eliminate the definite article of English in
terms of existential and uniqueness clauses. Rather, we suppose that
the word the" in natural language is captured by the iota operator.
But the different formulas behind the iota represent the different
ways the English description may be functioning in a given sentence.
CHAPTER IV ENDNOTES
1
See F.P. Ramsey, [1927].
2
The material in this section was first developed during the
writing of the first draft in Fall 1979.
3 f
1
'
m indebted to Blake Barley for noting this simplification.
I ve presented the proof in great detail primarily so that
the reader may become familiar with the inner workings of the non-
standard modal system. Intuitively, the proof is quite simple. We
can visualize the proof more easily by "thinking semantically," using
the notion of a possible world as primitive: by definition, at some
possible world, all and only the true propositions at that world are
encoded in z^. So go to an arbitrary such world and see how z^
behaves there. It must encode, for an arbitrary proposition Q°,
either [Ay Q ] or [Ay ~Q^], depending on whether or is true
at that world. Since A-objects rigidly encode their properties from
world to world (LA9)
,
z^ encodes either [Ay Q] or [Ay ~Q] back at the
actual world.
Although this semantic visualization of the proof greatly
simplifies matters, it has some curious disadvantages in the context
of the present work. Were we to use this proof technique in the text,
it would often be confusing as to whether we were using the word
"world" as defined in or in its primitive sense as used in Chapter
III. If our A-object theoretical reconstruction of worlds is correct,
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this confusion wouldn't be significant. But for purposes of clear ex-
position, it seems inappropriate to use the word "world" one way in
the statements of the theorems, and another way in the presentation of
the proofs. A second disadvantage of this simplification is that it
fosters the wrong impression. I don't want the reader to think as if
certain A-objects can represent the worlds; I want the reader to think
that worlds just are A-objects.
For these reasons, the exposition of the theorems and proofs
in the text will be proof-theoretic
. Those who prefer to think model-
theoretically should be able to satisfy themselves that the theorems
are provable, without attending so closely to the proofs provided in
the text.
^The proof is in Appendix D.
^See L. Wittgenstein, [1921].
^See D. Lewis, [1968].
g
The material in this section was first developed in my
[1979e]
,
written for an independent study on Leibniz under Robert
Sleigh's supervision.
9
The best attempt I know of to make this view precise in
orthodox theory is Benson Mates [1968].
"^Parsons was the first to attempt a precise modelling of monads
in an object theoretical framework. See his [1978], [1980]. Parsons'
results are proven as metatheorems, with the notion of possible world
as primitive. Nevertheless, two of his metatheorems served as the
inspiration and prototypes for the results which follow. Castaneda
claims to have suggested similar results along these lines in [1974],
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p. 24. The reader is encouraged to evaluate his suggestion.
11
Compare Parsons [1978], p. 147, R
2 ,
and [1980], Ch. VIII,
Metatheorem 1, §3.
12
.
13
'Compare Leibniz [1686b], §9, and [1714], §56.
Compare Parsons [1978], p. 147,
14
Compare Parsons [1978], p. 147,
,
and [1980], VIII, §3,
Metatheorem 2.
15
See Leibniz [1686a], pp. 44, 52, 57, 63, and 64. These
references are to G.41, 47, 51, 56, and 57.
16^ T,
J3. Partee notes that nothing has been said to distinguish
stories from essays. The intentions of the author may be relevant
here
.
Suppose StoryCz^). (-*-) Assume ZqP, for an arbitrary property
P. Since z^P
,
Vac(P). So for some proposition (f*
,
P=[Ay Q^]. So
z
0
[Ay Q°] & P=[Ay Q°]. By El, (3F°) (Z
z
F° & P=[Ay F°]); that is,
0
4y So by A-DESCRIPTIONS , (lz')(z'F = (}))P.
_ p(*") Assume (t.z')(z'F = 4>)P. Then ([> . By reversing the
r
reasoning, z^P.
Consequently, z^ and (iz ' ) (F) (z ' F = ({)) encode exactly the same
properties, so they are identical.
1
8
Of course, it may be a matter for literary debate as to which
propositions are true according to a given story. And the construction
of principles which help us to decide the conditions under which a
given proposition is true according to a story poses an interesting
philosophical problem. That's because the sentences inscribed by the
author in the manuscript (or uttered in a storytelling) are not the
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only sentences which denote propositions true according to the story.
By far, the majority of propositions true according to the story are
not explicitly stated. Most are the result of an extrapolation process
which facilitates communication between the author and his audience.
The principles governing the extrapolation process are rather mysteri-
ous (see Parsons, [1980], Ch. VII). However, we need not concern our-
selves with such mysteries, since the place to begin investigation is
with the authorship relation—a relation we take as primitive. To the
extent that this relation is unclear, so, too, will our proposal be.
However, it should be said that this really reflects a genuine unclarity
in our pretheoretical conceptions of the relevant stories.
19
I believe that this is an important result. It seems to me
that much of the potential fiction has for affecting us is bound up
in our being able to project ourselves into unreal circumstances which
involve objects with which we're already familiar.
20
The Seven Per Cent Solution
,
a novel by Nicolas Meyer, is
supposedly about the secret life of Sherlock Holmes. In this novel,
Holmes is a heroin addict. The novel is meant to be consistent with
the Conan Doyle novels.
^Compare Parsons' [1980], Ch. Ill, §2.
22
By N-CHARACTERS and A-DESCRIPTIONS
.
23Whenever the notion of relevant entailment ("^") is
K
formulated precisely, we can replace E-SUB by the following axiom:
(0 \p & I
s
<}))
->
This latter axiom seems to be a principle intimately connected
(governing?) the extrapolation process. That is, when we add a
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proposition to our "maximal account" of the novel, we want to add all
the propositions relevantly entailed by this proposition. E-SUB
should therefore be justified as a special instance of this more
general principle, since it should be a consequence of the axioms for
relevant entailraent that
<J>
=S> [Ax cf)
X
] o
.
R o
24
D. Lewis poses the following rhetorical question in his
[1978], p. 37: "Is there not some perfectly good sense in which
Holmes, like Nixon, is [his emphasis] a real-life person of flesh and
blood?" We agree that there is. The sense of "is" in question is
"encodes .
"
25
If we want to represent "Holmes is a famous fictional detec-
tive," we suppose that being famous ("F") is an extranuclear property,
and that this is a property Holmes exemplifies. Consequently, we get:
Fh & F-detective(h)
.
However, see Appendix E for a possible method of construing
[Ax Fx & F-detective (x) ] as denoting an abstract property.
26
If we were concerned primarily with the sentence "Fernando
de Soto searched for the fountain of youth," we would suppose that
"the fountain of youth" was intended to denote a character of a legend.
We would then apply the analysis of the previous section. But our
purposes in this section are somewhat different.
27
There are other ways to get a false reading of (9) which use
descriptions of A-objects:
(9c) (x)(WCor(x, (iz) (F) (zF = [Ay + x>7 >
(9d) (v)([Ay y>7](ix)Z
w
cj)
6 )
CHAPTER V
THE TYPED THEORY OF ABSTRACT OBJECTS
The typed version of our theory courts us not only to abstract
objects, but also to abstract properties, abstract relations, abstract
properties of properties, abstract properties of relations, etc. He
can use these entities to model impossible relations, like the sym-
metrical, non-symmetrical relation, and fictional relations, like
simultaneity
.
1
However, the primary motivation for developing the
typed theory is to account for the data concerning the propositional
attitudes
.
The verbs of propositional attitude (e.g., believes, knows,
desires, hopes, expects, discovers, etc.), often combine with the word
"that” and an English sentence to produce logically problematic predi-
cates like "believes that Cicero was a Roman," and "hopes that
Kennedy is elected President." Frege noticed that terms (simple, com-
plex names) inside these propositional attitude constructions exhibit
rather strange behavior. In particular, Frege noticed that from the
fact that someone believes that it doesn’t follow that they
believe that even when t
;l
=t
2
(where ...t^... is any English
sentence in which term
^
occurs, and
. ..x
2
..
(
. is the result of re-
placing one occurrence of x^ with X
2
).^ For example, each of the
following triads of English sentences is consistent
:
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(1) S believes that Cicero was a Roman
(2) S doesn't believe that Tully was a Roman
(3) Cicero is Tully
(4) S believes that Socrates was the teacher of Plato
(5) S doesn t believe that the son of Phaenarete was the
teacher of Plato
(6) Socrates is the son of Phaenarete
(7) S believes that x is French fire engine blue
(8) S doesn't believe that x is Crayola crayon blue
(9) French fire engine blue is Crayola crayon blue. 3
It seems that the law of identity elimination (=E) doesn't preserve
truth when applied to terms in propositional attitude contexts, and
this constitutes the problem of "the logically deviant behavior of
terms in intermediate contexts."
If in a given case, the law of identity elimination appears to
fail, philosophers call the belief (context) de dicto, and distinguish
it from a belief (context) de re, in which identity elimination pre-
serves truth. When S's belief is de re, it does follow from the facts
that S believes that . ,.T . .. and T
^
=T
2 »
that S believes that . ..T
2
*««
To account for this phenomenon of de dicto propositional at-
titudes, Frege theorized that there must be distinct entities, "senses,'
associated with the terms and T These entities lend the term with
which they're associated information, or cognitive value by serving
somehow to re-present the object or relation denoted by the term.
This "mode of presentation" embodied by the sense of the term stores
information about the denotation of the term, assuming it to have one.
And it is the sense of the term which the term denotes when it is
situated in a de dicto context. Frege would argue that identity
elimination is a perfectly good rule of inference; it is just that
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English terms are ambiguous, and have different denotations when
they re in and out of de dicto contexts. Identity elimination pre-
serves truth when you substitute terms which have the same denotation.
Using the theory we have so far, we could construe the senses
of English names and descriptions which denote objects as abstract
objects. An association of abstract objects with English terms would
allow us to picture how a given term had "information" or "cognitive"
value. Abstract objects could "re-present" an object denoted by a
term by encoding properties the object exemplified. They could serve
to store information by encoding many such properties. Finally, they
could serve as the denotation of the term when the term is located
inside de dicto contexts.
Such an association between terms denoting objects and abstract
objects is one of the most important features of the language developed
in this chapter. We use this language to translate data similar to
( 1 ) — ( 6 ) in §1 of Chapter VI. However, (7 ) — (8) — (9) constitute an
example of the de dicto phenomenon with respect to English names which
denote relations. "French fire engine blue" and "Crayola crayon blue."
are names of certain properties
—
properties which we could suppose to
be identical. In order to account for the logically deviant behavior
of these names, we associate with them abstract properties—properties
which encode properties of properties. These abstract properties can
lend property names their information value—they could store informa-
tion about the properties denoted by such names by encoding properties
of them. And these abstract properties can serve as the denotation of
these names when the name is located in a de dicto context
.
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Similarly with English names which denote relations—we utilize
abstract relations, relations which encode properties of relations, to
serve as their sense. A completely general account of the senses of
names of relations in the type hierarchy requires that we have abstract
entities at each type which encode properties of the entities of that
type. This is by far the most interesting application of the typed
version of our theory.
In what follows, we shall use the word "object" in a new
manner. The things which we have been calling "objects" will now be
called individuals." We shall now use the term "object" to discuss
any kind of entity whatsoever—existing and abstract individuals,
existing and abstract properties and relations, existing and abstract
properties of properties (relations), etc. Thus, we call the develop-
ments in the next few pages "the typed theory of abstract objects,"
and we affectionately refer to it as "metaphysical hyperspace .
"
§1. The Language
In the usual manner, we recursively define the set of types.
^
For our purposes, we may think of them as a group of symbols which
serve to categorize simultaneously the terms of the language and the
entities they denote.
TYPES
1. "i" is a type (for individuals)
2. "p" is a type (for propositions)
3. If t^,...,t are types, then (t^,...,t )/p is a type
(for relations)
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The properties (and the expressions which named them) which we used in
Chapters I- IV were of type i/p. The relations were of type (i,...,i)/p .
But now we have an infinitely branching hierarchy.
A, Primitive terns. Officially, „e use aj, a\, ... as names, and
t t
x
i»
x2’ * ' * as variables for objects of each type t. These are the
only primitive terms of the language. However, whenever a, b, c,
and x, y, z, ... appear without typescripts, we assume they denote
(range over) individuals (unless their first occurrence in a formula
has a typescript and it is understood that the typescripts have been
omitted for convenience from the later occurrences). Also, we use
„(t1 ,"-, tn)/p 0 < ci>--->tn)/p (t-p . . . ,t )/p
,
... and F *- n
)/p
°
,
... as names and variables for objects of relational
types (t^ , . .
.
, t^) /p
.
And we use P^, Q^, ... and F^
, ,
... as names
and variables for objects of type p. We indicate other abbreviations
when the occasion arises.
It will be convenient to distinguish certain names for special
purposes. We use as the existence predicate for objects of
type t . We use Ex' 1 n
( (t-p • • • » t ) /p , tp...,t )/p
.“as the explicit exem-
plification predicate, for all types t,,...,t . We use B,in 1 (i,p)/p
(i.p)/p
,
... to translate the verbs of propositional attitudes,
Finally, we use as the representation predicate—an object
of type t represents another object of type t with respect to an in-
dividual of type i.
In addition to these terms, we utilize our usual list of
grammatical symbols: connectives: ~, &; quantifier: 3; lambda: A;
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lota: l; box: ; parentheses and brackets: (, ), [, ]. „e add t0
this list a one-place sentential operator: that-.
B.
_
Formulas
_
_and terms
. We simultaneously define (propositional )
formula and term of type t. The definition has ten clauses and is
rather complex—we sometimes insert extended comments and give ex-
amples between the clauses:
1. All primitive terms of type t are terms of
type t
2* If t is a term of type p, then T is a (proposi-
tional) formula
3. Atomic exemplification: If p is a term of type
(t^ , . .
.
, t^) /p and T^,...,x are terms of type
t,,...,t
,
respectively, then PT....T is a
-1
- n In
(propositional) formula
We call p the init ial term of the atomic exemplification formula.
are called the argument terms. We call any atomic exempli-
fication formula which has the Ex predicate as the initial term an
explicit exemplif icational formula.
4. Atomic encoding: If p is a term of type t/p, and
T is a term of type t, ip is a formula
5. Molecular, Quantified, and Modal: If
(f) and ip are
(propositional) formulas and a is a variable of any
type, (~4>)
, (<p & \p) , ( 3a)<t> , and ( 4>) are (proposi-
tional) formulas
In the usual manner, we define:
D.. x*” is abstract ("A! t ^x") == Q'-EJ^^x
l dtn
We use variables to range over the abstract objects of type t.
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By inserting the parenthetical remarks in the definition thus
far, it follows that ^ is a propositional formula iff 4> has no en-
coding subformulas. This constitutes an expansion of our old notion.
We now allow formulas <p with quantifiers of any type to be proposi-
tional— in particular, formulas
<J> with quantifiers binding initial
variables are propositional. For example, (3Fi/p )Fxi is proposition-
al. Formulas relevantly similar to it in earlier languages would not
have been. However, (3Gl/p ) (x^ & ~Gx) and (G) (xG Gx) are not
propositional
.
6. Complex terms of relational type: If
<f> is any
propositional formula which has no quantifiers
binding initial variables, and . .
.
,a are any
variables with types respectively, and
none of the a^'s are initial terms in 4>, then
[ Xcx^ • • • &
n
<J>] is a term of type (t
1 ,
. .
. ,
t ) /p
Given this clause, there are three important restrictions on the
formulas <p which may appear behind the X: (1) <j> may not contain en-
coding subformulas, (2) <p may not contain any quantifiers binding
initial variables, and (3) no variable bound by a X may appear as an
initial variable somewhere in
<J). There is a way, however, to effec-
tively eliminate the latter two restrictions. [Xx (3F^ P )Fx] vio-
lates restriction (2). But we could suppose that it abbreviates
[Xx (3Fi/p )ExFx]
,
which will denote the first projection of the
exemplification relation of type (i/p,i)/p.^ Also, [XF^ P Fb] vio-
lates restriction (3). But we could suppose that it abbreviated
[XFi/p ExFb]
,
which will denote the property which results by plug-
ging the exemplification relation of type (i/p,i)/p in its second
place by the denotation of b.
We can make this abbreviation procedure general and eliminate
restrictions (2) and (3) in two steps. First we define the explicit
exempli ficational form ("4>Ex") of a propositional formula
<J) as fol-
lows :
(i) If <j> is any primitive term of type p,
AEx
4> =
<t>
Ex(ii) If (p = pT 1> ..T , then if p ^ Ex, <j>
ExpT
1
...T
n
and if p = Ex, <j)
Ex
=
<J>
(iii) If <j> = (-4), (ip & x), (3cx)ip, or (Cty),
4)
Ex
= (~,p
Ex
), (/x & xEx ), Qa)/X , and
Ex(ip ), respectively
Secondly, we propose the following definition schema:
Where
<J) is any propositional formula and a^,...,a
are variables with types t^,...,t
,
respectively,
and either
<f>
contains a quantifier binding an ini-
tial variable or one of the a.'s is an initial
l
variable somewhere in <£, then [Aa. . . .a <}>] ab-
Ex
in
breviates [Aa, . . .a d> ]1 n
So if = (3G i/,p ) (Gx
1
& Gb)
,
then [Ax (j)] abbreviates [Ax (3G^ P )
(ExGx & ExGb)]. The effect is that any propositional formula may
appear after a A. So [Ax (3G 1//p )(xG & ~Gx)] and [Ax (G) (xG -* Gx) ]
are still ill-formed, and this prevents the known paradoxes.
7. Complex propositional terms: If 4) is any proposi-
tional formula, (f) and that-(f) are terms of type p
8. Sense terms: If k
C
is any primitive name of type
t, and a is any primitive term of type i, is a
term of type t
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Intuitively, what this does is give us a means for denoting the ab-
stract object an individual associates with a given name as its sense
We suppose, with Frege, that the sense of a name varies from person
to person (see VI, §1). For example, "Socrates" and "Frege" are
names of type i, so Socrates.
^
is a sense term of type i. It
shall denote the abstract individual which serves as the sense of the
name "Socrates" with respect to Frege. "French fire engine blue" is
a name of type i/p. So "French fire engine blue_ " is a sense
Frege
term of type i/p and will denote the abstract property which serves
to represent the property of being French fire engine blue to Frege.
This abstract property encodes properties of type (i/p)/p, i.e.,
properties of i/p-properties
.
9. Object descriptions: If 4> is any formula with one
free variable x of type t, then (ixt )(j) is a term
of type t
For example, where "T" denotes the (i,i)/p-relation of teaching, and
"p" denotes Plato, (ix)Txp reads "the teacher of Plato." Where "C"
denotes the (i/p) /p-property of being a color, and "L" denotes the
preference relation of type (i,i/p,i/p)/p, and "m" denotes Mary,
(ix
1//,p
)(Cx & ~(3y)(Cy & Lmyx)) might read: the i/p-property x such
that x is a color which Mary prefers to all others" (i.e., "Mary's
favorite color").
10. Sense descriptions: If (j> is any propositional
formula with one free x variable of type t,
( ix*
1
)^ is a term of type t
These sense descriptions will help us to model the senses of English
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definite descriptions. Uxb* shall end up denoUng ^
object of t,pe t which encodes just the property (Ax' 0 & (y) (iy *
YV>1 C'^ing the u„ique *»). For sample, ( , x i )Txp shaU dm^#
the abstract individual which encodes just the property of being the
teacher of Plato. When we concern ourselves specifically with the
fact that the English description "the teacher of Plato" exhibits
logically deviant behavior inside de dicto attitude contexts, we
shall translate the English as we normally would into the standard
type-theoretic language and then underline it. By doing so, we will
have formed an expression which denotes the sense of the English
description.
Finally, we say that I is a tern iff there is a type t such
that t is a term of type t.
C. Definitions for identity
.
°2
xt
E t>
rt
-
dfn OE!
t/p
x & OE! t/py & d(F t/p ) (Fx = Fy)
r
t/p.D
3
xt=yt
=
dfn xSyt v (A|t/Px & A! C/Py 5 0(F L 'P)(xF = yF))
These definitions work for objects of every type. We have now defined
identity
£ , instead of taking it as primitive. That's because
[Axy x=
Ey] is "well-formed"— it abbreviates a much longer, well-formed
A-expression. So we won't need an axiom governing identity}
E
When t i, D-j reduces to our old definition of general identity
among objects. [^xy x-y ] is still not a well-formed A-expression, nor
does it abbreviate a well-formed A-expression. When t=i/p, says
that properties F* P and G i//p are identical just in case they are
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identical^iYp or they are both abstract and encode the same i/p/p-
properties. Consequently, we no longer need a special definition of
identity among property types. If we want to say Ft//p = G ty,p
,
we
use D
2
. If we want to say F
t/p
= G
t/p
,
we use D . It will be provable
that F ^P = G ^P = (x ) (xF E xG)
,
i.e., t/p-properties F and G are
identical iff they are encoded by the same t-objects. 7 So there are
two conditions on the identity of t/p-properties
—
(i) they must both
exemplify (or encode, if they're abstract) the same t/p/p-properties
,
and (ii) they must be encoded by the same t-objects.
Nor do we need to specially define identity among propositions
i , , , . d p p p (t , . . . , t ) /p
and relational objects. F = G
,
F = G
,
F 1 n =
E
(t^,..., t^ ) /pn
,
and F
(t, » • •
•
» t ) /p (t,»*»*»t )/pl n
_ q l n are already
defined using and .
§2. The Semantics
A. Interpretations . An interpretation, 7, of our type theoretic
language is any octuple, <W, V, e>c£^, L
,
F>, which
meets the conditions described in this subsection. The first member
of 7 is a non-empty class, W, called the class of possible worlds . The
second member of 7, is a member of W and is called the actual
world . The third member of 7, V, is a non-empty class called the
domain of objects . V is the union of a collection of non-empty,
indexed, classes, i.e., V = u V . Each class in the collection,
tETYPE t
is called the domain of objects of type t. We call V
^
the domain
of individuals , V
^
the domain of propositions , the domain of
t \ /„ the domain of n-place
i
’
* • *
’V /Pproperties of type t objects ,
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relations among objects with types t r _ • i°
~
— i >
• •
• * ^ » rGspGc t ively
• Wg usg
t
11
' as a metalinguistic variable ranging over the objects in P
t
.
For convenience, we call the class of all objects with types
not equal to i the class of higher order obi errs and we use "R" to
denote this domain. So R = R is closed under all the loglfial
functions specified in 1, the fifth member of an interpretation. R
may be subdivided into domains of relational types R( t
. jt )/p and
the domain of propositions R
p
. We use as a metalinguistic
variable ranging over the higher order objects of type t.
We also let "A
t
" denote the class of abstract objects of type
t. A
t
= {o
C
|
(W) (0
C
f- exyF(E! t/p )))}, where IxX
,
and F are the
fourth and eighth members of the interpretation, as defined below. We
use a " as metalinguistic variables ranging over the members of A .
t
The fourth member of 7, is a function defined on RXW as
follows
:
(a) ^ t)/p«« + (Pt XM...X!)t )
-* n 1 2 n
(b) R
p
X W -* (T,F>
Thus, the function distributes an exemplification extension at
each world to all the higher order objects.
The fifth member of I, L, is a class of logical functions with
members: PLUG PROJ CONV. REFL.
,
VAC.
., CONJ, NEG, and NEC.
J J J>K j>t
These functions are defined as follows:
(a) PLUG. is a function from
lijin 1(t , . . . ,t , . . . ,t )/p ^ .
l<ji (tl’*“’ tj-l’ tj+i’---’ tn ) /p
subject to theinto
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following conditions:
(1) for n>l, exX^(PLUG. (si ~ " 0 J)) =
(t
1 >
...,t
n
)/P
o
tj
'1
>
o
t
J+l 0\
t
. T
t
.
t
. t
<0 > • • • >o J ,0 J ,0 2 ,...,o
n
>e
(t
, > • • • » t ) /
p
e
*V* ) >
(2) for n=l
,
zxt (PLUG. (/tt ^p
,
o
C
)) =
tv X
T iff o
fc
e ext (^.
t/p
)w
F otherwise
(b) PPOJ
.
is a function from V, J R
,
. . into
3 l<J<n
{t
l
t.,...,t
n
)/p
subject to the conditions:l Jr.
l-j-n (t l’ - * ‘ ^j-l^j+l’ * * * ,1:n)/p
(t
,
. .
• ,t )/p
(1) for n>l
,
&xt^(PROJ
^
(ti )) =
t, t. . t... t
{<0 3 \o 3 n>
I
t. t t
-
t
(3o J )(<0 ,...,0 J ,0 '’jO ,...,0
n
> £
(t
, .
.
.
,t )/p
))}
(2) for n=l , ext
w;
(PR0J
1
(^
t/p
)) =
T iff (3c t )(o t £ ext
w
(*.
t/p
))
F otherwise
(c) CON l/. , is a function from
j > k l£j<k<n (t l* ‘ * * * C j ’ * ‘ * ’V •
*
* ’
t
n
) /p
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into
1£J <kS"
(t
l
tj-l ,tk’ tj+l’ , "’ tk-l> t j> tk+l’”-> t„)/P
subject to the following condition:
(t,
,
. .
.
,t )/p
VtfJCON l/ 4 n (* n )) =w j ,k
{<0
* 1
C
j
c
k t n (t .,t )/p<0 f-yO ,...,0 ,...,0 > £ £)ct (A. 1 nWT )}
(d) REFL is a function from l J R
l^j<k<n • • • jtj > • • • >tk , . . . ,tn)/p
into R,
i<j^k<n (t i’*-*’ tj’*"’ tk-i’ tk+r---’ tn)/p
sub:|ect: to
the following condition:
(t.,..., t ) /p
eKtJREn.yA )) =
{<o
tl
,... > o
t
j
> ...,o
tk-1
,o
tk+1
,... > o
tn
>
|
t
l
fc
i
t
k
t
n
(t, , • .
.
ft )/p
<0
,
. .
. ,0 J
,
. .
. ,0
,
. .
. ,0 > £ <LXt (H 1 )
vv
t
.
t
and 0 J =0 K }
(e) [/AC.
,
is a function from ( l J R, . . )
l<Sn+l (t l tr"-’
t
n)/P
U R into (
P l<j<n+l (t l’ • •• ,tj-l ,t ' ^j^j+l* ' * * st n)/p)
U ^
t »/p
subject to the conditions
(1) if t=(t. t
t
)/p, then l<j<n+l and
1 J n
exilic.
r
,U c )) -
IV J 9 t
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^ 1 .i t
{<0 1 0 J~\o ,0 3 ,o 3+1 0 n.
<0 3 ,...,o
n
> e ext: (A.
1
)}
tv
(2) if t=p, then j=l and ext^Cl/AC^
t
.(^P )) =
{o’
1
I
zxt^(n?) = t}
(f) COWJ is a function from RXR into R subject to the
following conditions:
(1) if t=(t , . .
.
,t )/p and t'=(t ',...,t ')/p,in l m
then &xX^(CO )) =
t t t_* t ' t. tr^l nl m^i^l n
i <0 ,0 ,...,0 >
|
<0 ,...,0 >
t » t ’
,
e ext: iti") and <o
1 m
> e ext C*
1
" )}
W/ tv
(2) if t=(t
,
. .
.
,t
n
)/p and t ' =p , then
t t t t
{<o n>
I
<0 ,...,0
n
> e ext^C*. )
and ext (-6 P ) = T>
Iv
(3) if t=p and t
,
=(t_,...,t )/p, thenx 1 m
exXJCONJC^y )) =
t, t
{<0
m
>
|
ext^(^P ) = T and
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t t
<o
,
. .
.
,0
m
> e nxZ (4
t
)
}
mr ' J
(4) if t=p and t ' =p
,
then C.x£^(C0NJ (/LP ,4 P )) =
|
T iff = T and = x
[ F otherwise
(g) NEG is a function from R into R subject to the conditions:
(1) if t=(t 1> . . . ,t )/p, then M (NEG(>i fc )) =
tv
C
1
t t t
{<0 ,...,0 >
I
<0 ,...,0 n> f. £Xt (tL^) }
(2) if t=p , then e^(WEG(^.p )) =
I
T iff ex^(/iP ) = F
{ F otherwise
(h) NEC is a function from R into R subject to the conditions:
(1) if t=(t
1
,...,t
n
)/p, then ext^NECC^)) =
^1 Pn ^--i t
{ <0 >---,0 >1 (w')(<o n>e C^))}
(2) if t=p, then vxt (NEC(/iP )) =
tv
J
T iff (IV’) (ex^
w ,
(^i
P
) = T)
( F otherwise
This completes the definitions of the logical functions. The sixth
member of I, ax£
. ,
is a function defined on R . . For a givenA tETYPE t/p 6
type t, maps R^ into assigns each higher order
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property of t-objects an encoding extension among these objects.
Let W
t
be the set of primitive names of type t of our language.
Then, the seventh member of I is the sense function, im, which maps
P. X W
t
into A
fc
(the set of abstract objects of type t). For conveni-
ence, we index the 4en function to its first argument. Thus, for a
given individual 0, 6Q.yi
Q
associates with a given name K fc of type t an
abstract object of type t. We call 6<M
n (
k) the sense of K with respect
9
to 0. Intuitively, if "Socrates" is a name of type i, then
Socrates ) is the abstract individual which serves as the
sense of the name "Socrates" with respect to Frege. We shall assign
this object to the sense term "Socrates
•Frege
And we shall make it a
logical truth that Socrates
^
^
represents Socrates to Frege. 10 We
shall sometimes superscript the sense function to the type of the name
upon which it is operating. For example, 6 ("French fire engine
blue") is the abstract i/p-property which serves as the sense of
"French fire engine blue" with respect to Frege.
The eighth member of T is a function, F, defined on the primi-
tive names and on the closed sense terms of the language. For each
name K of type t, F(ic
t
) £ V . For each closed sense term k*" of type
t
—
o
t, F(k^) = (k*1 ) . Recall that sense terms can have only primi-
tive terms as subscripts. So the closed sense terms will have only
primitive names as subscripts .
^
In addition, we place the following two restrictions on F:
((tl, . . . ,tn )/p , t ± , . . . ,tn)/p^ =
(t,,...,t )/p t, t
{<*. 1 n
,
0 0 n>
I
(1) ex^:^(F(Ex
C
n * ,
(t 15 ...,t )/p
<0 1
,
. .
.
,
0
> £ 1 n )>
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So F must assign to the explicit exemplification predicate a rela
tion with the appropriate" extension.
(2) ex*
w
(F(R^ t * t » 1 )/ p )) =
(<a t
,
o
t
,
o
x
>
I
(3 k0 )(F(jc0 )
=
& F(k) = o'1 & F (a) = o 1 )}
Thus
,
"R^t » t > i) /
P
m denotes any three place relation which objects
,
0
,
and 0 bear to one another iff there is some closed sense term
-a
such that a} is the sense of k with respect to o x (F(a )) and o C
is the denotation of K. We say that a1 represents o t with respect to
i
0 .
Finally, we call ex^(F(E
!
1 /p
) ) the set of objects of type t
which exist at M ("E*"). We call ex^(F(E! t/p ) ) the set of existing
objects of type t ("EtM ) . And we call {o t |(3w)(o t e dxt (F (E! t/p ) ) )
}
ia)
the set of possibly existing objects of type t ("PEtM )
.
B. Assignments and denotations
. For the most part, the definitions
partitioning the A-expressions are similar to those developed in
Chapter III, §2, B. However, we need to type the added place in the
definition of vacuous expansion. We also need to concern ourselves
with argument variables (rather than the "object" variables of Chapter
III) throughout these definitions.
If y is an arbitrary A-expression, [Aa^...a
n
<f>], y is defined
as follows:
1. If (3j)(l£j£n and oy. doesn't occur free in (J) and t' is the type of
a. and j is the least such number), then y is the j , t ' -vacuous
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expansion of [Aa ...a. ,a ...a cb 11 3-1 J+l n
2. If p is not a
-vacuous expansion, then if (3j)(l<j<n and a. is
not the j free argument variable in
<J) and j is the least such
number), then where a
R
is the j
th
free argument variable in*, y
is the ^-conversion of [Xb,.
.
•
•»„ ].
3. If y is neither of the above, then
(a) if
<t>
= (~\p ) , y is the negation of [Aa, ...a ilil
1 n
(b) if
<t> & X) * and \p and x have no free argument variables in
common, then where (^,...,0^ are the variables in ip and
a
m+l ’ ' • •
»
a
n
are variables in x> V is the disjoint conjunc-
tion of [Aa
. . .a and [Aa , . . .a yl.I m nH-1 n AJ
(c) if $ = (33)^, and 3 is the free argument variable in
ththen y is the j -projection of [Aa, ...a, _6a.,....a iM .
1 J-l J+l n YJ
(d) if 4> = (Oip)
,
then y is the necessitation of [Aa, ...a iLl.
— l n
4. If y is none of the above, then if (3j)(l-j-n and a^ occurs free in
more than one place in <p and j is the least such number) , then
where
:
(a) m is the number of free argument variables between the
first and second occurrances of a.,
J
(b) <j)' is the result of replacing the second occurrence of a.
with a new variable 3 (with the same type as a^ )
,
^
(c) k = j+m+1, then
y is the j ,k
tll
-reflection of [Aa, ...a., 3a, ...a * 1
.
1 j -rm k. n
5. If y is none of the above, then if x is the leftmost argument term
occurring in (p, then where
(a) k is the number of free argument variables occurring
before x.
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(b) <p is the result of replacing the first occurrence of t
by a new variable 8 (with the same type as t)
,
(c) j=k+l, then
til
y is the j -plugging of [Xa, . . .a. -,8a a A'l by t.1 k-1 j n J -JL
6. If y is none of the above, then
(a)
<f) is atomic
(b) a is the order in which these variables first occur
in <t>,
(c) y = [Xa 1 ...a p
n
a . . .a ], for some term p
n
,
andlnln
(d) y is called elementary
I-assignments . If given an interpretation I of the language,
an I-assignment will be any function,
^
,
defined on the primitive
variables of the language such that when a is a variable of type t,
6 (a) e Vt .
Denotations . If given an interpretation I and an I-assignment
j$, we recursively define the denotation of term T with respect to I
and ^ ("d^ /(t)") as follows:
1
> 6
1. where K is any primitive name, d 7 ,(k) = F(k)
1
»
6
2. where K is any closed sense term, d, ,(k) = F(k)
-a 1,6
3. where a is any primitive variable, dj ^(a) = &(ol)
4. where is any open sense term of type t,
= iend
5. where y is an elementary X-expression [Xo^.-.o^ p
1
^...^],
d
i
, 6
(v) = dU (p“>
where y is the j -plugging of £ by T
,
dM (p) - PLUGj(dJ((D, du (T»
6.
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7. where y is the j
th
-proj ection of d (y) = PROJ
.
(d
r .(£))
th 3
7
’0
. where y is the j ,k -conversion of C, d
? ^(y) = CONI/. k (d ? ^))
9. where y is the j ,k
th
-reflection of £, d (y) = REFL.
. (d 7 .(£))
10. where y is the j,t'
-vacuous expansion of C,
dM (M) -
11. where y is the conjunction of C and £,
dM ao = coMj(dI><(5 ). dIf<(o)
12. where y is the negation of C, d, .(y) = NEG(d 7 ,(£))1
» o 7
, 6
13. where y is the necessitation of C, d, ,(y) = NEC(d 7 .(C))
14. where y is any propositional formula
<J>, d 7 ,(cj>) is defined as
follows
:
(a) if
<f> is primitive term of type p, dj
^
(<J>) is already defined
if * =
pn
V--V =
PLUG
1
(PLUG
2
(...(PLUG
n
(dJJ ( p
n
) , d^C^)), ...),
(b)
15
d
I,lJ
<T
2
)) ’ dI,^ (Tl ))
(c) if * - (-«, = NEG(dj
(d) if
<f>
= (4» & X). dj ^(<J>) = CONJ (dj
^(40, d ? ^(x))
(e) if 4 = (30^)4, dj ^(<J>) =
PPOJ^dj
^
( [ Xot
11
4 ] ) ) iff a
1
" is not an initial variable
occurring in 4
PROJ^(dj ^([Aa*" 4>Ex ])) , otherwise
(f) if 4> = ( £340 , d
T ^(<|>)
= NECddj
^(40)
where that-(j) is any complex propositional term, d 7 , (that~4>) =
7
> 6
where (lx )4 is any object description, d 7 ,((lx )4>) =
7
> 6
16.
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ot iff 5 i’ (x
t )=0 t & i'
w
0
& & nxW’ & r
w
0 - o^-ob)
satisfies
(ft with respect to
satisfies
<}> with respect to
undefined, otherwise
17. where Xl.x )4> ls anY sense description, dj
^
( ( ix
11
) d> ) =
dj
>|(
((lz t )(Ft/p)(zF E F= [Ax (yW - y- x)])) 12
x E
-
Satisfaction
. Given an interpretation I and an I-assignment
rf, we
may define £ satisfies (p with respect to IV as follows:
1. If
<P is any primitive term of type p, satisfies cj) with respect
to tv iff exi
w
(
dj ^(4>)) = T
2. If
<P = pnx
1
-*- T
n » ^
satisfies <j> with respect to IV iff
<d
I,
lJ
(T
l ) e e*ydI;|( (p
n
))
3. If
(f>
= op
,
satisfies 4> with respect to (V iff
dJ,^ 0) £ e>CtA (dI,^
(pl))
4. If
<f>
= (~ip)
,
($ satisfies <J> with respect to u) iff fails to
satisfy ip with respect to tv
5 . If <p = (\p & x) , satisfies <j) with respect to tv iff satisfies
both ^ and y with respect to tv
6. If ({) = (3a )ip,
^
satisfies
<f> with respect to (V iff
satisfies \p with respect to IV)
1. If <(> = (D^)
, ^
satisfies 4> with respect to iV iff
(iV’)(6 satisfies cf) with respect to u)’
)
D. Truth under an interpretation .
<J> is true under I iff every I-
assignment satisfies
<J) with respect to
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§3. The Logic
—
'
—
loSlcal axioms . Axioms LA1-LA9, DESCRIPTIONS, and A-EQUIVALENCE
are transposed from the modal theory with typescripts where needed:
LA 1 :
<t>
+ (\p -* 0)
LA 2
: ((p (ip -> x) ) -»• ( (4) -* \p) -+ (<p + )
LA 3: (~<J> -* ~\jj) + ((~<j> + ip) -- <*>)
LA 4: (a)cf> - ((36)6=t ^ provided t is substitutable for a in 4) 13
LA 5: (a) (4> - ip) + (<J> + (cx)^)
,
provided a isn't free in £
LA 6 :
<f> <f)
LA 7: (<£ + p) -> (Qcf) ^ Q^)
LA 8: O -> q<>(J)
LA 9: (x t )(Ft/p)(OxF - OxF)
DESCRIPTIONS: where \p is any atomic (or identity) formula, the
universal closure of the following is an axiom:
^
1X )<P
= (3!y t )(^ & & (3.^)^
X-EQUIVALENCE: for any formula <p where F*'^ ’
* *
’
’^ isn't
free, the universal closure of the following is an axiom:
(x 1 ) • . • (x
n)D([Xa ...a (+)]x tl . . .xtn E tf^ 1 , . . . ,x tr\
1 n
<*l ,-.-,an
In addition to these logical axioms, there are four other logical
truths validated by our semantic structure:
t
LA 10: ,
(t,.
(F 1 ’
t
"
)/P
)(x
tl
) (x
n
) (ExFx
1
.
n
_
= Fx
. . x
LA10 is a consequence of our restrictions on the F function of any
interpretation. It tells us that the explicit exemplification
predicate works as it should.
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LA 11: where
<J> is any propositional formula, the universal
closure of the following is an axiom: that-<J> =
<f>
LA 12: where
^
is any closed sense name, the following isan axiom: 6
Aft/pt
a r ^
^ ^ > i) /p tA. K & R rK KO
—a
Recall that we read the second conjunct of LA12 as: "the sense of the
name k with respect to a represents k to a." Again, the paradigm
example is: Socrates
Frege represents Socrates to Frege. LAI 2 is also
a consequence of the restrictions we placed on the F function.
LA 13: where
<J> is any propositional formula, the universal
closure of the following is an axiom:
-£l
-
x H ( Iz ) (F^P) (zF = F=[Xx t
(f> & (y
t
)(<|)y -* y= x)]) 14
x E
LAI 3 is a consequence of clause 17 in the definition of denotation
* > o
Our sense descriptions denote Platonic Forms of type t (i.e., abstract
objects of type t which encode a single t/p-property) which encode an
individuating property (i.e., one which at most one object of type t
can exemplify)
.
B. Rules of inference
.
1.
->-E: If h- <p-+\p and
I
— ,
then hip
2. UI: If f— , then 1— (a
t
)<{), where t is any type
3. Ol: If }—<}), then h-d<f>, where (f) has no descriptions
Unofficially, we use the usual derived rules of inference and proof
techniques
.
We call the metaphysical system which consists of the inter-
preted typed language (without the unusual complex terms or distin-
guished predicates), together with LA1-LA9, DESCRIPTIONS, X-EQUIVALENCE,
and the rules of inference, the typed object calculus . The addition of
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the unusual kinds of complex terms and distinguished predicates, to-
gether with their interpretation and logic (especially LA10-LA13)
,
con-
stitutes a special modification of the typed object calculus which has
been designed specifically for the data about propositional attitudes.
§4. The Proper Axioms
We assert the following four axioms to be true a priori:
AXIOM 1 ("NO-CODER 1"")
: (x
t )(OEJ t/px + ~(3Ft/p )xF)
AXIOM 2 ("IDENTITY"): (a=g) - (<|>(a,a) - 4>(a,B)), where <J>(a,g)
is the result of replacing some, but not necessarily all,
free occurrences of a by g in <j>(a,a), provided that g is
substitutable for the occurrences of a which it replaces.
AXIOM 3 ("A-OBJECTS ") : For any formula cj) where x *" isn’t free,
the universal closure of the following is an axiom:
(3x C ) (A!
t/p
x & (F
t/p )(xF = 4>)
)
AXIOM 4 ("NECESSARY EXISTENCE"): For every type t, t^i, the
following is an axiom:
(xt )(OE! t/px -* E! t/px)
Since we've defined = for all types t, we no longer need E t -IDENTITY.
hi
NO-CODER 1", IDENTITY, and A-OBJECTS*" should be straightforward, given
our familiarity with their counterparts in Chapters I and III. Note
that abstract objects of type t might encode abstract t/p-properties
,
as well as (possibly) existing ones.^ The F*"^ P-quantif ier in A-
OBJECTS*" ranges over all t/p-properties.
We have added one extra axiom to the typed theory to preserve
the intuition that higher order objects are not contingent beings.
Since higher order objects either possibly exist or fail to possibly
exist, it follows from NECESSARY EXISTENCE that either they necessarily
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exist or they necessarily fail to exist. Philosophers who do not share
the intuition that higher order objects aren't contingent beings may
not wish to embrace this axiom.
I believe that NO-CODER 1"
,
IDENTITY, A-OBJECTS 1
,
and NECESSARY
EXISTENCE are jointly consistent, though it may be a while before a
proof is discovered
.
16
We have taken steps to prevent the offending
instances of property abstraction from being denoted. However, we have
assumed that the presence of "higher order" quantifiers (that is,
quantifiers binding initial variables) in X-expressions is not the
source of paradoxes. Consequently, we have allowed such X—expressions
to be well-formed (or at least abbreviate well-formed X-expressions)
.
We have also assumed that it is safe to have abstract objects of type t
encode abstract properties of type t/p. I don't think that these moves
reintroduce paradoxes, but they might. Should they do so, there are
still ways to weaken the theory and preserve many of the applications
which follow. There is a great deal of investigation which must be
done before we can feel confident that this particular version of the
theory is consistent.
As usual, we add abbreviations for the appropriate English
gerunds to our primitive vocabulary. In addition, we add abbreviations
for English proper names—names which aren't necessarily associated
with works of fiction. 1 ^ Finally, we use the distinguished constants
B^C 1 ’?)/?, B
2
^ i,P^ P
,
... to abbreviate the verbs of propositional at-
titudes such as believes, hopes, knows, expects, etc.
CHAPTER V ENDNOTES
There may even be a way to model our metaphysical notions
like Form, Monad, World, etc., as abstract properties. Recall that
we can't guarantee that they are real properties because their defini-
tions involve encoding formulas. So maybe they are abstract. See
Appendix E for the attempt to model them as abstract properties.
2
Frege [1892], pp. 56-78.
3
I'd like to thank Mark Aronszajn for contributing this
example. It was a result of a discussion with Mark that I discovered
that the type theory could be used to model the senses of expressions
denoting higher order objects.
A
See Russell and Whitehead, [1910]. Also Church [1940], pp
.
56-58.
^I'm indebted to Barbara Partee here, whose comments on the
syntax of the type theory in the first draft helped me to be more
careful in the final formulation.
6
It should be clear what the type of the Ex predicate is.
In what follows, we frequently omit its type.
^The proof is similar to the one described in Chapter I, §4,
where we justified the definition of "F^=G ."
^We may need to add = [Ay F^]=[Ay G^] if it is not de-
rivable. The same goes for relation identity^,.
9
If we wanted to follow Frege a little more closely, we would
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define the set of senses of type t, S
,
as follows:
=
dfn e \ ( (3o* ) (0 £ <LxX^{h.) -+
o’ £ extMW) + (3 !o')Ut/p )(o £ extA +
o' £ ex^(/t)))}
Thus, the objects in are the abstract objects of type t which have
at most one weak correlate. This preserves Frege's intuition that
senses determine at most one object. For example, any A-object of type
t which encoded an "individuating" concept of type t/p would be in S
,
where
is an individuating concept = _
dfn
(iv)((Jo t )(o £ zxtXn.)) -* (3!o t )(o £ zxt M))
IAJ IAJ
Should one decide that Frege's constraint on senses is essential, one
would have to redefine 4e.n so that it mapped P. X W into S .it t
Note that if is not in the vocabulary of 0 or if o is an
abstract individual without representational capabilities, then we may
suppose that 4G.H^(i<c t ) is the null object of type t.
^Should it become necessary, we could expand this device by
allowing any complex term of type i to serve as subscripts on sense
terms. This complication need not be developed for our purposes in
Chapter VI.
12 t
"z " ranges over abstract objects of type t. Consequently,
the assignment to " (ix^tj) " is the abstract object of type t which en-
codes just the t/p-property of being the
13
So T must have the same type as a.
Again, recall "z tu ranges over abstract objects of type t.
^1 believe that we can do this consistently. However, the
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theory could be weakened so that A-objects of type t encode only
(possibly) existing objects of type t/p. One might think that it is
an encouraging sign that the semantics is all set for abstract t/p-
properties to have encoding extensions that are non-empty.
See footnote 8. We may need to add axioms for identity^,
among propositions and relations.
17
We sharply distinguish between those English terms which
simply lack denotation from those which denote non-existent or abstract
objects (see Parsons [1979c]). If there are English proper names which
simply lack a denotation, then we need to revise our specification that
F map all the primitive names to a denotation. We are already covered
by LA4, which handles terms which might lack a denotation.
CHAPTER VI
APPLICATIONS OF THE TYPED THEORY
§1. Modelling Frege's Senses (I)
Frege's explanation, by way of ambiguity, of what appears to be
the logically deviant behavior of terms in intermediate con-
texts is so theoretically satisfying that if we have not yet
discovered or satisfactorily grasped the peculiar intermediate
objects in question, then we should simply continue looking.
David Kaplan^
In this section, we translate and discuss the propositional at-
titude data which involve English names and definite descriptions that
denote individuals. The data sentences are labelled (A)-(U), and be-
cause we are supposing with Frege that certain English terms occurring
in them are ambiguous, there are several readings possible for each
one. These readings are provided immediately after the particular
datum is presented, and a discussion usually follows. In these discus-
sions (in this section only), we revert to using the word "object" to
refer to individuals and the word "property" to refer to properties of
individuals (i.e., i/p-properties)
.
Also in these discussions, we shall modify somewhat the
standard Fregean metalinguistic and metaphysical terminology. On the
strict Fregean view, a term expresses its sense and denotes its denota-
tion. And it is also said that the sense of a term belongs t£ the de-
notation of the term. Pictorially, these relationships are sometimes
represented as follows:
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sense
expres:
term T belongs to
denote:
denotation
Now we shall talk as if terms do denote their denotations (this is made
precise by our definition of denotation
^
V, §2), but we shall not
suppose that terms "express" their senses. Instead, we shall talk
about the A-object which is associated with the term with respect to
an individual. Sometimes, we shall say that the A-object serves as the
sense of the term with respect to a given individual. We assume with
Frege that the sense of a term (especially proper names) varies from
person to person. The special sense terms (and their interpretation)
that we added to our language in Chapter V help us to represent this
phenomenon and help to make the above terminology precise.
in terms of the metaphysical "belonging to" relationship between senses
and denotations. Instead, we shall talk about the weak correlates
which the A-objects that serve as senses may have. Should the A-object
have one or more weak correlates, we do not suppose that any of these
objects necessarily serves as the denotation of the term in question.
For reasons which will soon become apparent, we shall not talk
Diagrammatically
,
we get:
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A-object (sense)
is associated with
(with respect to an
individual)
may be a weak
correlate of
obj ect
may be identical
obj ect
A. S believes that Lauben is late
(.1) Bsthat-LJl (de re)
(.2) Bsthat-L&k (de dicto )
Suppose I feel ill one morning and resolve to stop in at the
first physician's office I happen to pass on my way to work. I round
O
a corner and see a sign on a door:
DR. GUSTAV LAUBEN
General Practitioner
8:00 A.M. - 4:00 P.M.
At this point, I've now become part of a causal chain of events in-
3volving the name Gustav Lauben.' I associate an A—object with this
name—an A-object which serves as the sense of that name for me. We
call that A-object "Lauben,,
, .
.
" Lauben„
, lends the name "Lauben"Zalta Zalta
its cognitive significance or information value for me. It does so by
encoding properties which serve to re-present to me the object that I
suppose is denoted by the name. Lauben„ may encode such properties
ZjSL it 3.
as: being a (the) doctor whose office is at 15 High St., being a (the)
doctor named "Gustav Lauben," being the doctor whose signpost this is,
being a doctor who works from eight to four, etc.
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Some other person, S, who first encounters the name "Lauben"
under different circumstances will not associate with this name the
A-object I've utilized. The A-object S utilizes will encode properties
presented to S as being characteristic of the object named "Lauben."
Thus, Laubeng lends the name "Lauben" a cognitive significance for S
which is distinct from the cognitive significance this name has for me.
On the theory we've developed in Chapter V, it is axiomatic
that Lauben
s
represents Lauben for S. This is one way of capturing
Frege's principle that the sense of a term account for its information
value. Frege also required, however, that the sense of a term deter-
mine at most one object, and that this object, should there be one,
serve as the denotation of the term. It requires additional semantic
complexity to capture these Fregean principles, and were we interested
in a more strict modelling of Frege's ideas, we could modify our
4
semantics. However, we've chosen not to place these constraints on
senses because: (a) the successful explanation of the data on which
we've chosen to work doesn't seem to require that we have such con-
straints on senses, and (b) there are cases which suggest that Frege's
principles are too strong.
Suppose that the week before I went to Lauben' s office, the
Medical Review Board stripped him of his license to practice, his
medical school invalidated his degree, and he subsequently sold his
office, never to return. It's just that no one bothered to take the
sign down. In this situation, all of the properties which we have sug-
gested might be encoded by Lauben
^j^ are not exemplified by Lauben.
Lauben is not the weak correlate of Lauben„ , . ; in fact, no objectZalta
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is. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that if I haven't
learned about Lauben's recent calamity, Lauben^^, as described,
still serves as the sense of "Lauben" and lends it cognitive signifi-
cance
.
To see this more clearly, suppose I knock at the office door
and no one answers. I notice that it's just after 8:00 A.M. I be-
lieve that Lauben is late (our datum sentence). My belief is not de
re, since I believe this without believing that the friend of Leo
Peters is late (suppose Lauben is Peters' unique friend). So my belief
is de dicto.
Now even though Lauben is not the weak correlate of Lauben
Zalta
the latter A-object could still be instrumental in helping me to
construct a proposition which serves as the "object" of my de dicto
belief. We may suppose that the propositional object of my de dicto
belief is PLUG^^ibelng late., Lauben
^^^) . Had my belief been de re,
the propositional object of my belief would have been PLUG^(belng leute,
Lauben) . My de dicto belief will be true just in case this latter
proposition is true.^ Since Lauben no longer comes to his office, my
de dicto belief is a false one.
Consequently we seem to be able to describe the important facts
of this situation without having to suppose that Lauben
.,^^
has a
(unique) weak correlate, and without having to suppose that one of its
weak correlates has to serve as the denotation of "Lauben." It is for
this reason that we have chosen not to further complicate our semantics
in order to present a more strict modelling of Frege's ideas.
We have, however, validated another one of Frege's principles
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m the process— the A-object which serves as the sense of the term also
serves as the denotation of the term inside de dicto belief contexts.
To make this clearer, let’s look at our two readings A.l and A. 2 in
more detail. Our de re reading is Bsthat-U (A.l). From A.l, we can
prove (1) — (4) :
(1) (3x) Bsthat-Lx
(2) [Ax Bxthat-L£]s
(3) [Ax Bsthat-Lx]
£
(4) [Axy Bxthat-Ly ] s£
On the assumption that Lauben exists, A.l also implies (5):
(5) (3y)(E!y & Bsthat-Ly)
We’ve symbolized the de dicto reading of A as Bsthat-L£ (A. 2).
Thus, it is the sense of the name "Lauben" with respect to S which
serves as the denotation of the name inside the de dicto belief
context. From A. 2, we may prove (6) — (10)
:
(6) (3x) Bsthat-Lx
(7) (3x)(A!x & Bsthat-Lx) (LA 12)
(8) [Ax Bxthat-L£ ]s
—
s
(9) [Ax Bsthat-Lx]
£
—
s
(10)
[Axy Bxthat-Ly ] s^
Quantification into the belief context works normally
,
as does A-
conversion.
An examination of another case should help—here is one in-
g
spired by Quine’s work.
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B. Ralph believes that Cicero was a Roman
(.1) Brthat-Rc (de re)
(.2) Brthat-Rc (de dicto)
—
r
C. Ralph doesn’t believe that Tully was a Roman
(.1) ~Brthat-Rt (de re)
(.2) ~Brthat-Rt (de dicto )
D. Cicero is Tully
(.1) c=t
( - 2) CV
The triad B-C-D (and other triads like it) constitutes a para-
digm case where the English proper name exhibits logically deviant
behavior. From B.l and D.l (or D.2), it follows that Brthat-Rt.
Identity elimination works normally. But from B.2 and D.l, nothing
follows. And there is no reason to think that B.2, C.2, and D are
jointly inconsistent. From B.2 and C.l, we can conclude both that
c it and that Rc ^Rt . From B.2 and C.2, we can conclude both that
—r t
c it and that Rc ^Rt . Thus, we follow Frege in thinking that it is
—
:r .r —r —
r
the ambiguity of the English proper name inside de dicto contexts which
accounts for its logically deviant behavior.
We now precisely define the conditions under which someone has
a true belief. Let us define the erasure of a formula <|>
("4> ") as the
formula which results by deleting all the underlines and subscripts
from terms occurring in cf>. So where cj^Rt^, <f> =Rt • We now
deflne:
*
D S truly believes that (£ ("TBsthat-<t>" )
=
(jfn
Bsthat-(f> & 4>
4
So from B.l or B.2 and the supposition that Cicero
was a Roman, it fol-
belief . From A.l or A. 2 and the suppositionlows that Ralph has a true
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that Lauben isn't late, it follows that S doesn't have a true belief.
Note that in the case of de dicto readings, S can truly
believe that
<J> even when
<J> is false. In B.2, the propositional ob-
ject of Ralph's belief is a false proposition
—by our AUXILIARY
HYPOTHESIS, no A-object exemplifies the (nuclear) property of being a
Roman. This false proposition, however, is just a neutral object
which helps Ralph to represent PLUG^b^ng a Roman, CldUiO ) . Conse-
quently
,
we must abandon a certain principle some philosophers hold
about true belief. The principle that S truly believes that <{> iff S
believes that ()> and (j) is true must be given up, not just because it is
inconsistent with our treatment of belief, but also because doing so
allows us to construe the logic of propositional attitude contexts as
another application of the philosophical logic of encoding properties.
The usefulness of abandoning the old principle is a good reason for
doing so.
E. S believes that Lauben was mugged
(.1) Bsthat-M£ (re)
(.2) Bsthat-M#^ (dicto)
F. S' believes that Lauben was mugged
(.1) Bs'that-M£ (re)
(.2) Bs'that-M£
,
(dicto)
—
s
Suppose I go to a party in the evening of the day I knocked on
Lauben' s door. Suppose also that Lauben is in good standing in the
medical community, but that he just didn't go to work that day. Leo
Peters (Lauben is his unique friend, and I'm unaware of their relation-
ship) is there and I overhear him say "Dr. Lauben was mugged last
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night." The proposition I grasp whan I hear this utterance is
mugged,
. My bellef is de dicto
_
because £
believe that Lauben was mugged without believing that the friend of
Leo Peters was mugged. "Uuben^" may or may not be the (semantic)
name of the A-object I associated with "Lauben" this morning. As 1
went through the day, I might have been involved in another context in
which the name was used. The new information I gather might get
"encoded" by associating some distinct A-object which encodes all the
old and new properties I now use to re-present Lauben to me via the
name Lauben. For now, however, let's suppose that this name retains
Its earlier cognitive significance.
Now is there any reason to believe that the proposition I
grasped when Peters uttered his sentence was the same proposition that
Peters was entertaining? Suppose his belief were de dicta. It seems
like there would be "more intimate" properties encoded by Lauben.
——
^Peters
than are encoded by Lauben.^^. We've supposed that Lauben is
Peters' friend, and there might be a very complex A-object which Peters
associates with "Lauben." Although the fact that Lauben +
deters
^^Zalta is not a grantee, it seems likely that the propositional
object of Peters' de dicto belief may differ from the object of my de
dicto belief.
Despite the fact these propositions may differ, there may
still be good reason for thinking communication has taken place. A
full discussion of how the communicative process operated in this situ-
ation would take us too far afield. We would have to discuss the in-
tentions of the speaker to refer to Lauben, determine whether the
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speaker succeeded in referring to Lauben, and these might involve a
discussion of the presuppositions of the context of the utterance.
Even if we had a reasonable understanding of these features of the
communicative process, it now seems in order to consider two further
features. And they are, the degree to which Lauben and
Peters
Laube
n
^
a ^ t
a
are similar" A-objects and the kind of correspondence
there is between the properties these A—objects encode and the proper-
ties Lauben exemplifies.
In the ideal case, Lauben
,,
and Lauben^, will be identical (or
one will be embedded in the other) and Lauben will be the unique weak
correlate of both of them. At the other extreme, Lauben„ and Lauben„,
will have no properties in common and Lauben will be the unique weak
correlate of neither of them. Communication takes place to a greater
or lesser degree depending on whether the former or the latter of
these two extremes is more closely approximated. So despite the fact
that "Lauben was mugged" might be used by S to express one proposition
and used by S' to construct another proposition, communication between
S and S' takes place to a greater degree if both Lauben
^
and Lauben
,,
,
encode, for the most part, properties which Lauben exemplifies. In
the cases where Lauben,, and Lauben n , have little in common (with
J u
Lauben), communication is rather crude and not straightforward. Yet
even in these latter cases, it is important to note that the language
is holding everything together (as we might expect for de dieto be-
liefs). Lauben„ and Lauben„, would have in common the fact that they
b b
are both associated with the name "Lauben." If Lauben was mugged, S
and S’ have true beliefs.
176
G. S doesn't believe that the friend of Leo Peters was mugged
(.1) ~Bsthat-M( lx) Fxp (-re)
(.2) ~Bsthat-M(ix)Fxp (dicto)
Recall that we established that my belief that Lauben was
mugged was de dicto by the fact that I didn’t also believe that the
friend of Leo Peters was mugged. But the English definite description
exhibits logically deviant behavior inside belief contexts as well. On
the de re reading of G, the proposition that I fail to believe is
PLUG^balng muggad, tha isU&nd. oh Lao Patau), i.e.
,
PLUG
1
(batng muggad,
Lauban). On the de dicto reading of G, the proposition I fail to be-
lieve is PLUG
1
(batng muggad, tha 6>Ue.nd oh Lao Patau ). The friend of
-.
e
.°.
Peters is the abstract object which encodes just the property of
being the friend of Leo Peters (by LA 13). That is,
(lx) Fxp = (lz)(G)(zG = G= [Ax Fxp & (y) (Fyp -* y= x) ]
)
E
The friend of Leo Peters serves as the sense of "the friend of Leo
Peters." It lends the English description cognitive significance and
information value. It also has at most one weak correlate, and in this
case, its unique weak correlate happens to be the denotation of the de-
scription. Finally, the friend of Leo Peters serves as the denotation
of the description when the description is inside a de dicto context.
H. Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy
(.1) Brthat-S(lx)<{> (re)
(.2) Brthat-S(lx)(^ (dicto)
Ralph doesn't believe that the mayor of the town is a spy
(.1) ~Brthat-S(lx)(J>2 (re)
(.2) -'Brthat-S (ix)<J>„ (dicto)
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J. Ralph believes that the mayor of the town isn’t a spy
(.1) Brthat-~S (ix)<f>
2
(re)
(.2) Brthat S (lx) (dicto )
K. Ortcutt is both the man in the brown hat and the mayor of the town
(•1) o = (ix)^ & o = (ix)<{>
(.2) o =
e
(ix) 4>
1 &
o =
e
(ix)4>
2
If Ralph's belief in H is de re, the object of his belief is
PLUG
1
(b(Ung a *py, the man In the b/iom hat), i.e., PLUG^bUng a &py,
Ofitcutt)
. Given H.l and K, we may conclude (11):
(11) Brthat-So
Given 1.1 and K, we may conclude (12):
(12) ~Brthat-So
So H.l and 1.1 are inconsistent. Ortcutt himself is the constituent of
the propositional object of the de re belief— the descriptions inside
the relevant belief ascriptions "contribute" their denotation to the
proposition. From H.l and DESCRIPTIONS, we also get (13):
(13) (3 ! y) ($ 1^ & Brthat-Sy)
However, let's suppose Ralph's belief is de dicto. The object
of his belief is PLUG
1
(bex.ng a 4py, the man In the baoivn hat ) . From
H.2 and K, nothing follows. From H.2 and 1.2, it follows that the man
in the brown hat ^ the mayor of the town . If the mayor of the town is
a spy, then it follows from H.2 that Ralph has a true belief. (14)
also follows from H.2, given LA 13 and DESCRIPTIONS:
(14) (3!x)(A!x & (F) (xF = F=[Ax (f)^ & (y) (4>1^ y=Ex)]) & Brthat-Sx)
Besides these, we have the usual consequences of H.2 based on exis-
tential introduction and A-conversion
:
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(15) (3x)Brthat-Sx
(16) [Xx Bxthat-S (lx)(f>
^
]r
(17) [Xx Brthat-Sx] (ix)^
(18) [Xxy Bxthat-Sy ]r (ix)(j)
Note that H.l and J.l ascribe contradictory beliefs to Ralph.
Given K, H.l implies (11) and J.l implies (19):
(19) Brthat—-So
From (11) and (19) we get (20):
(20) (3F
0
) (Brthat-F0 & Brthat—F°)
However, (20) doesn t imply that Ralph believes a contradiction.
If H.2 and J.2 correctly describe Ralph's state of mind, then
we cannot prove that Ralph has inconsistent beliefs. From H.2 and J.2,
we cannot deduce that (ix)(f)
^
^ (lx)4> ^, but we can prove this from the
plausible assumption that the property of being the man in the brown
hat is distinct from the property of being the mayor of the town.
Since (ix)c^
^
(ix)^
,
no substitutions into H.2 and J.2 would lead us
to think that Ralph has inconsistent beliefs. However, from J.l or J.2
and the fact that Ortcutt is a spy, we can prove that Ralph has a false
belief, where,
S falsely believes that <j> ("FBsthat-<f>") = _dfn
Bsthat-(|) & ~TBsthat-<f>
L. Ralph believes that the shortest spy is a spy
(.1) Brthat-S (lx)<f>^ (re)
(.2) Brthat-S (ix)^ (dicto )
If L.l expresses what Ralph believes, then his belief would be of in-
terest to the FBI. (21) follows from L.l:
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(21) [Xx Brthat-Sx] (ix)^
If Bond is the shortest spy, then (22) follows from L.l, and (23)
follows from (21) or (22)
:
(22) Brthat-Sb
(23) [Xx Brthat-Sx]b
If we assume that Bond exists and that an existence claim is built into
4> 3 >
then we can generalize on (21)-(23) to get:
(24) (3x)(E!x & Brthat-Sx)
(25) (3y)(E!y & [Xx Brthat-Sx]y)
All of this results because the propositional object of Ralph's belief
has an existing object, namely Bond, as a constituent.
None of these results follow if L.2 expresses what Ralph
believes. There is no way to use "exportation" on L.2 to produce (24)
or (25). We can only reap the "standard" inferences from L.2 based on
existential and lambda introduction:
(26) (3x)Brthat-Sx
(27) [Xx Brthat-Sx] (lx)(j)
^
(28) (3y)(A!y & [Xx Brthat-Sx]y)
I take it that the FBI wouldn't be interested by the fact that Ralph,
like most everyone, uses an abstract object to represent whoever it is
that is the shortest spy (in the absence of a de re belief)
.
M. Ralph believes someone is a spy
(.1) (3x)Brthat-Sx
(.2) Brthat- (3x) Sx
M.l and M. 2 disambiguate M. M.l is similar to (24) and we might prefer
to use the latter to read M properly. M.2 relates Ralph to the
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proposition PROJ^ipyhood). No legitimate exportation on M.2 will get
us to M.l.
N. S believes that Newton met Leibniz
(.1) Bsthat-Mn£ (re)
(.2) Bsthat-Mn £
—
s
(dicto/re )
(.3) Bsthat-Mn£
—
s
(re/dicto )
(.4) Bsthat-Mn £ (dicto )
In order to determine which of the readings of N is the correct one,
we have to examine data triads to discover how the names "Newton" and
"Leibniz" are functioning.
O. Frege believes that Hesperus is Hesperus
P. Frege doesn't believe that Phosphorus is Hesperus
Q. Phosphorus is Hesperus
There are various ways to represent the triad 0-P-Q. The pre-
ferred representation is as follows:
O. ' Bfthat-h =_h
—r E
P. ' ~Bfthat-£^=
E
h
Q.
' P=E
h
Suppose Frege as a young man is being taught the names of the
stars. Early one evening, his teacher points out Venus and says
"That's Hesperus— it's the first visible star of the evening." Frege
becomes, at that moment, part of an historical, causal chain of events
connecting him with the name "Hesperus." So we suppose that Frege as-
sociates an abstract object sense with the name. Hesperus
^_ ^
may en-
code: being the star to which my teacher is pointing, being the first
visible star of the evening, being named "Hesperus," being situated in
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position p in the western sky at 5:30 P.M. Thursday, December 7, 1860,
etc. "Hesperus” would have different cognitive value for someone who
learned the name in different circumstances.
Now suppose Frege's teacher points out Venus to Frege early the
next morning and says "That's Phosphorus— it's the last star visible in
the morning. The young Frege will associate some new, distinct A-
object with "Phosphorus." That's because the features of the learning
situation are radically different. The object pointed out to him is in
a position of the sky that appears unrelated to the position of the ob-
ject pointed out the evening before. The names introduced are distinct.
There is no reason for Frege to believe that the object pointed out to
him now is identical with the object pointed out to him the evening be-
fore.
So if Frege's teacher doesn't tell him that Phosphorus is Hes-
perus, Frege could believe that Hesperus is Hesperus without believing
that Phosphorus is Hesperus. Although there are various ways to repre-
sent this data as a consistent triad, we have chosen the reading on
which Frege believes PLUG^(PLUG^(Jde.ntdXy^, H&6p<2AuA)
,
H&ApeAuAj
-^^^^)
and fails to believe PLUG^(PLUG^(Jd2.nduXL/^, He^peAtM), PhoApkotiuAj
-^^^).
R. John hopes that the strongest man in the world, whoever he is,
beats up the man who just insulted him.
Preferred reading:
(R') Hjthat- B(lx)cf)^ (ix)(})i- (dicto/re )
On the preferred reading of R, we interpret the first definite descrip-
tion as occupying a de dicto position and suppose that it contributes
its sense to the proposition which is the object of John's hope.
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S. Mary believes that the wife of Tully is the wife of Tully
T. Mary doesn t believe that the wife of Cicero is the wife of Tully
U. The wife of Cicero is the wife of Tully
9Preferred representation:
S. ' Bmthat- (ix)Wxt = (ix)Wxt (dicto )
^m E
T. ' ~Bmthat- ( lx) Wxc = (ix)Wxt (dicto)
__
E
U. ' (ix)Wxc = (ix)Wxt
S-T-U is an interesting triad since it requires that we use the
senses of the names "Tully" and "Cicero" with respect to Mary to con-
struct the senses of the English descriptions "the wife of Tully" and
"the wife of Cicero." That's because the wife of Tully and the wife of
Cicero are identical, and so (S") and (T") are inconsistent:
S. " Bmthat- (ix)Wxt = T,(lx)Wxt
T. " ~Bmthat-(lx)Wxc =^,(lx)Wxt
h.
The wife of Tully and the wife of Cicero are identical because Cicero
is Tully, and so being the wife of Tully just is being the wife of
Cicero. Since these properties are identical, the object which encodes
just being the wife of Tully is identical with the object which encodes
just being the wife of Cicero. So we can't use (S") and (T") to help
us understand how S-T-U is consistent because the proposition that the
wife of Tully is identical^, with the wife of Tully is identical with
the proposition that the wife of Cicero is identical^, with the wife of
Tully.
So we must use the senses of "Tully" and "Cicero" with respect
to Mary in order to suppose S-T-U is consistent. Thus, the wife of
Tully^ is a constituent of the propositional object of Mary s belief in
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(S ). Though the wife of Tul ly^ could have at most one weak correlate,
it fails to have any. By the AUXILIARY HYPOTHESIS, A-objects fail to
exemplify the (nuclear) property of having a wife. 10
Our definition of true belief still works fine:
(29) TBmthat- (ix)Wxt = (\x)Wxt = Bmthat- (ix)Wxt = (ix)Wxt
1 11
—m E
& (ix)Wxt = (ix)Wxt
E
Given (S') and given that there is a unique wife of Tully, it follows
that Mary has a true belief. If the negation of (T') represented
Mary's state of mind, she would still have a true belief. If Mary
believes that the wife of Cicero was not the wife of Tully, and this
was correctly represented as Bmthat- (ix)Wxc ^_(lx)Wxt, then she would
m E
have a false belief.
We may conclude this section with a few general remarks about
our treatment of definite descriptions. G-L and R-U give us evidence
for thinking that English descriptions have both a sense and a denota-
tion. The sense of the definite description lends it cognitive value
—
a value to beings with representational capacities in that it enables
them to recognize (or understand what it might be like to recognize)
objects which have (never) been presented to them. If we are inter-
ested solely in describing the cognitive value of a given English
description, we always have available to us a sense-description of our
formal language. English descriptions don't come with their property
terms marked as to whether the property denoted is exemplified or en-
coded by the object being described. And it might be that some other
description of our language is better suited in having the intuitively
right denotation of the English description. For example, we might
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prefer to use a description which contains an encoding subformula to
translate the student who killed an old moneylender," where this
English description is meant to refer to Raskolnikov of Crime and
Punishment (Chapter IV, §4). But insofar as we are interested purely
in the phenomenon of the apparent deviant behavior of this English
description inside de dicto contexts, it might just be that the student
who killed an old moneylender serves well enough as its cognitive value.
This depends on whether there is conclusive data which shows that the
question of getting the denotation right and the question of explaining
apparent deviant behavior are not independent . ^
^
§2. Modelling Frege’s Senses (II)
We now consider the propositional attitude data triads which
involve English terms that denote higher order objects.
A. John believes that Woodie is a woodchuck
(.1) Bjthat-Ww (de re)
(.2) Bjthat-W^.w (de dicto ) ^
B. John doesn't believe that Woodie is a groundhog
(.1) ~Bj that-Gw (de re)
(.2) ~Bj that-G.w
-J
(de dicto)
C. Being a woodchuck just is being a groundhog
(.1) G=W
(.2) G=El/pW
A.l and B.l are inconsistent, given C.l (C.2). A.l asserts
that John believes the proposition PLUG^(being a woodchuck, Hoodie,)
,
whereas B.l asserts that John doesn't believe PLUG^(b(Ling a groundhog
,
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Woodie). But since. C is a true identity statement which asserts that
the properties of being a woodchuck and being a groundhog are identi-
cal, it’s provable that these propositions are identical. So either
A. 1 or B.l must be false.
A. 2 and B.2 can both be true together, however. A. 2 asserts
that John believes PLUG
1
( being a woodchuckj { doodle). Being a
woodchuckjobn is the abstract property of individuals (i/p-property)
which serves as the sense of the name ’’being a woodchuck" with respect
to John. The function of our semantics (Chapter V, §2, A)
assigns "being a woodchuck" a member of (that is, a member of the
abstract objects of type i/p). So "being a woodchuck,
,
" denotes
“ John
("being a woodchuck").
Being a woodchuck
^^ ^
can be plugged up with any individual
—
our PLUG function is defined so that it operates on all i/p-properties
.
Consequently, PLUG
1
( beinq a woodckuckj
j
,
Woodie) is a type p object
and can serve as the propositional object of someone's belief.
B. 2 asserts that John doesn’t believe PLUG^( being a qfiound-
JqIui*
hoodie) . Being a groundhog
^
is the abstract i/p-property
which serves as the sense of "being a groundhog" with respect to John.
If A. 2 and B.2 are true, it follows both that PLUG^( being a ttiood-
chuckj
o iin ,
Woodie) ? PLUG
^
( being a groundhogjo im , Woodie) and that
being a modchuckj
^^
? being a groundhog So as Frege predicted,
the senses of the property terms flanking the identity sign in C are
distinct
.
This seems right—"woodchuck" and "groundhog" probably entered
John's vocabulary under different circumstances. Maybe on one
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occasion he saw and was told he was seeing a woodchuck. He encoded
properties of the property of being a woodchuck into an A-object which
represented the property of being a woodchuck to him. And maybe on
another occasion, someone described woodchucks to him improperly, in
the process saying only that he was describing an animal called a
"groundhog." John would not have known that in fact these properties
are the same. Sentence C would be informative to him.
D. John believes that the chair in front of the class
is Crayola crayon blue
(.1) Bjthat-CCBClx'*’)^ (re)
(.2) Bj that-CCB
_.
( lx
1
) (dicto
)
E. John doesn't believe that the chair in front of the
class is French fire engine blue
(.1) ~Bjthat-FFB(lx^)(j)^ (re)
(.2) ~Bj that-FFBj ( lx
1
) (j>^ (dicto)
F. Crayola crayon blue just is French fire engine blue
(.1) FFB=CCB
(.2) FFB=^i/pCCB
D-E-F is analyzed analogously with A-B-C. We may suppose "French fire
engine blue" and "Crayola crayon blue" to be names of the same shade of
blue. So F is an informative identity statement about properties. As
a boy, John may have become directly acquainted with this property.
But the label on his Crayola crayons just read "blue," and he has never
seen that shade of blue labeled "French fire engine.
G. John believes that Bill has the property of being a student
(.1) Bj that-HasSb (re)
(.2) Bj that-HaSj Sb (dicto)
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H. John doesn’t believe that Bill exemplifies the property ofbeing a student
(.1) ~Bjthat-ExSb (re)
(.2) ~Bj that-Ex^ Sb (dicto )
I. Having a property just is exemplifying a property
(.1) Ex=Has
(.2) Ex =
E
(i,p,i)/p Has
G-H-I might describe a student beginning in philosophy, unaware
of the technical sense philosophers have for the word "exemplifies."
"Has" and "exemplifies" both denote relations of type (i/p,i)/p. We
suppose that there are abstract objects of this type which serve as
the senses of these names with respect to John. G.2 asserts that John
believes PLUG
1
( PLUG., (having
j
/
,
&M)
,
b<ung a Atudunt ) ; whereas H.2
asserts that John doesn't believe PLUG^(PLUG^( e.xe/npt£^Lf£ngj
^^^,
Bl&t)
,
buying a 6£ude.nt )
.
To handle our next triad, J-K-L, we need to add some function-
al notations to our language:
where p is a term of type and x is a term of type
t^, then p(x) is a term of type
Let us interpret this notation as follows:
to
dj ^(p(x)) = dj
^
( (lot )pxa)
So p(x) is the object which is such that T bears p to it. Using this
interpreted notation, we might construe adverbs as names of rela-
tions of type (i/p,i/p)/p, i.e., relations which relate two i/p-
properties. For example, "slowly" might denote a relation between the
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property of walking and the property of walking slowly. In the lan-
guage, "slowly” combines with "walk" to form "slowly (walk) ,
" which
denotes the property of walking slowly.
This gives us a means of representing J-K-L consistently.
J. John believes Bill walked bravely ....
(.1) Bjthat-B(W)b (re)
(.2) Bj that-Bj (W)b (dicto )
K. John doesn t believe that Bill walked courageously
....
(.1) ~Bj that-C (W) b (re)
(.2) ~Bj that-C (W)b (dicto)
L. Walking bravely
. .
.
just is walking courageously
. .
.
(.1) B(W) = C (W)
(.2) B(W) =
£
C(W)
Examples like G-L should demonstrate that our analysis for de
dicto belief is generalizable throughout the types. This treatment of
beliefs about higher order objects suggests a solution to the "para-
dox" of analysis. Central to this puzzle are data triads similar to
the ones we've been discussing. Here's an example:
M. It's trivial that the concept brother is identical with
the concept brother
N. It's not trivial that the concept male sibling is identical
with the concept brother
O. The concept brother is identical with the concept male
sibling
Although there are various ways to state the puzzle precisely, all we
need to say is that the puzzle involves the question of how an identity
statement like (0) can be (an) informative (analysis) . Philosophers
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who believe that property terms denote sets and express properties, and
who hold that "brother" and "male sibling" express the same property
are left with no means of accounting for the informative nature of the
identity statement formed by flanking an identity sign with the proper-
ty denoting terms the concept brother" and "the concept male sibling."
What is to serve as the senses of these expressions?
We suppose here that property analyses are sentences which say
that two properties are identical. We simply extend Frege’s view of
their informative character by supposing that there are distinct
abstract properties which serve as the senses of the above property
denoting expressions. In order to represent M-N-0 correctly, we need
to note that strictly speaking, triviality is person relative—what is
trivial for one person may not be trivial for another. We assume that
triviality is a relation between persons and propositions. Consequent-
ly, we introduce "T" to be a name of type (i,p)/p and we read
"Txthat-(J>" as: it is trivial for x that <j). This forges an analogy
with the other propositional attitudes. Terms which follow the "it is
trivial for x" prefix behave like terms in propositional attitude
contexts—sometimes they denote their senses.
Clearly, if we're restricting ourselves to a discussion of a
particular individual S, then (P
'
)- (Q' )
—
(R
’
)
would be the proper way to
capture the triad P-Q-R:
P. It is trivial for S that the concept brother is identical with
the concept brother
Q. It is not trivial for S that the concept male sibling is
identical with the concept male sibling
R. The concept brother is identical with the concept male sibling
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P. ' Tsthat-B = B
—s E
Q.
’
-Tsthat-MS^ =
£
B
R. ' MS=B
The proposition asserted to be trivial by P is PLUG
1
(PLUG UdontUu
1 2 y E’
boding a bH.oth.QA ) , boh,ng a bnothoA^ ). Its triviality derives from the
logical truth that being a brother^ represents being a brother to S.
The proposition that’s not trivial according to (Q* ) is PLUG
1
(PLUG
2
(
tdontltg^, botng a bn.othoX), boiyig a. maJLo. -ihbZing
^
)
.
(P* )~ (Q* )— (R* ) may be a good account of P-Q-R, but the original
triad was M-N-0. How are we to represent it? Well, since the English
prefix "it is trivial" as it occurs in (M) is not relativized to a par-
ticular individual, it seems that (M) asserts that it is trivial for
everyone that the concept brother is identical with the concept brother.
The relevant reading of (N) seems to be: everyone is such that it is
not trivial for them that the concept male sibling is identical with
the concept brother. If we recall that we have allowed primitive
variables of type i to serve as subscripts for sense terms, then (M')~
(N’)-(O’) seems to be the correct way to translate the data triad:
M. ' (x) Txthat-B = B
-x E
N. ' (x)-Txthat-MS = B
—x E
O. ' MS=B
An even closer representation of M-N-0 would be one which uses
the iota-operator to capture the English definite article. Let us
represent "the concept brother" as (ly*^) (y=B) and "the concept male
sibling" as (ly
X ^ P
) (y=MS) . A consistent reading of M-N-0 would be:
M." (x)Txthat-(iy
1//p
) (y=B ) = (iy
1//p
) (y=B)
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N* " (x) ~Txthat- ( ly
1//p
) (y=MS^) =
£
(ly l/p )(y=B)
0.” (iy l/p )(y=MS) = (iy
l/p
)(y=B)
§3. Modelling Impossible and Fictional Relations
A. Impossible relations
. Sometimes we think about "impossible" indi-
viduals. These are not individuals which are such that some contradic-
tion is true. Rather, these are individuals like the^ round square,
which encode incompatible properties. We can also think about "im-
possible" relations—the symmetrical non-symmetrical relation is one.
Here is an a priori truth about this relation:
(1) The symmetrical non-symmetrical relation is symmetrical
We can’t analyze "the symmetrical non-symmetrical relation" as a de-
scription involving exemplification formulas since it would fail to
denote. There are no higher order objects which exemplify both being
symmetrical and being non-symmetrical. (1) would be turned into a
falsehood
.
However, we may read the description as "the object which
encodes symmetricality and non-symmetricality , " and then generate the
a priori truth that this object encodes symmetricality. Let us sup-
pose that the properties in question are of type ((i,i)/p)/p-"*’^ We
then have the following instance of A-OBJECTS
:
(3x (i,i)/p ) (A! ( ^
i
’
i
^ /P ')/p
x & (F
((l,l)/p)/p
) (xF = F=S v F=S))
This axiom, plus the definition of identity among (i , i) /p-objects
,
justifies our talking about the abstract relation which encodes being
symmetrical and being non-symmetrical. As in Chapter II, we define:
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the^ symmetrical non-symmetrical relation =
(i *)/
dfn
(lx I,i;/P ) (A!x & (F) (xF = F=S v F=S)
,
dropping the obvious typescripts. It is then provable that the
A
sym-
metrical non-symmetrical relation encodes symmetrically
. This theorem
represents (1).
The analysis proposed for data about the
A
round square seems,
therefore, to generalize within type theory to the data about the,
A
symmetrical non-symmetrical relation.
B. Fictional relations
. When we see a sentence like "Einstein dis-
covered that there is no such thing as simultaneity," how are we to
understand it? Did Einstein discover that no two events ever exemplify
the relation of simultaneity? Or did he discover that the simultaneity
relation doesn't exist? ^ I'm not sure how to decide the issue, but
the latter reading seems a legitimate option. We might therefore
suppose that simultaneity is a fictional relation, and for our present
purposes, we could suppose that it is native to the Newtonian (science)
fiction. So let us identify it in a way analogous to our earlier work.
Let us suppose that events are special kinds of propositions,
and that they are type p objects. A relation among two events would be
of type (p,p)/p. Newtonian mechanics presupposes that simultaneity is
a (possibly) existing relation of type (p,p)/p. However, in our view,
it must be an abstract relation .
^
Let "s" be a name of type (p,p)/p
which denotes this relation. We analyze (2) as (2)':
(2) Einstein discovered that simultaneity doesn't exist
((P,P)/P)/P S(2)' Dethat—E!
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But which abstract relation does "s" denote? Well, we note that by
typing the definitions of character ("Char (x^~
,
s) ") and native
("Native (x *~
,
s) ") , we may construct a typed N-CHARACTERS axiom such
18
as
:
(x
1
”) (s) (Native (x, s) -* x=(lz t ) (Ft//p ) (zF = I
g
Fx))
Let "n" denote the story of Newtonian mechanics. We then get the fol-
lowing instance of N-CHARACTERS:
Native(s,n) -* s=(iz)(zF = Z Fs)
,
n
where "s" denotes simultaneity and is not a restricted variable. This
may prove to be an interesting way to identify other fictional rela-
tions of disproven scientific theories.
Could someone write a story about non-scientif ic
,
fictional
relations? Could we dream about non-existent relations? If these are
genuine possibilities, we will have further data for the application
of our type theory.
CHAPTER VI ENDNOTES
^D. Kaplan, [1968].
O
I've borrowed this name, and a few others, from Frege's late
essay [1918]. The discussion here is not meant to be understood in
the context of that work, however.
3
See K. Donne 11an [1974], pp . 3-32, and [1972], p. 377. Also
see S. Kripke [1972], p. 302.
^Placing such constraints adds the following complexities. As
in footnote 9, Chapter V, §2, we would first define the set of senses
of type t, S^, as the abstract objects of type t which have at most one
t .
weak correlate. Then we would have to define, for each object o in
V
,
the set of senses of which 0 is the unique weak correlate ( 5^(0) ).
Then we would require that the function assign to a given
name
K an object drawn from SJ F(k)), i.e., an object drawn from the set
of senses of which F(k) is the unique weak correlate. The
assigned
object would serve as the sense of k with respect to o'. So where
F(O) = O’, F(k^) = Aen^.(K). The object determines F(x).
Although this succeeds in modelling Frege's ideas,
I doubt that
language works this way.
5
We could even imagine a situation in which
some other object
besides
latter
Lauben was the weak correlate of LaH^£FLZa i ta
*
6
It follows from the fact that I believe
the former and not the
that these propositions are distinct.
This doesn't follow from
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the fact that Lauben + Lauben^^. Recall the footnote in Chapter
III, §4 where we showed that some propositions with distinct constitu-
ents might be identical.
Cases in Kripke [1972] and Donnellan [1972], [1974] would be
relevant here. However, it is slightly tricky to transpose their
arguments designed to refute the Russellian view that names are dis-
guised descriptions into arguments designed to refute the Fregean view
that senses determine a unique object as the referent of the term.
8Quine [1956].
9
Note that the English "is the wife of Tully" could be repre-
sented either as "[Ax Wxt & (y) (Wyt -+ y= x)]" or as "=(ix)Wxt."
L.
^That is, any weak correlate of the wife of Tully would be the
zzzzzzF1
wife of an abstract object. By the AUXILIARY HYPOTHESIS, this never
happens
.
^Mary's belief here is trivial because the wife of Tully
• J m
represents the wife of Tully to Mary. However, you might think that
the propositional object of Mary's belief when she believes that the
wife of Tully is the wife of Tully is an a priori truth. But consider
the a priori truth that the wife of Tully encodes the property of being
the wife of Tully. In our formal language, we express this as:
(ix)Wxt [Ax Wxt & (y) (Wyt -* y= T,x) ]L
Being an encoding formula, this sentence doesn't denote a proposition.
We could, however, develop a new logical function ENPLUG ("encoding
plug"), which maps a property A and an object 0 to the proposition,
ENPLUG(*,o)
,
which is such that &xtM(ENPLUG(ti,o))
= T iff 0 £ ex*
A
(A)
.
This would give us propositions for atomic encoding formulas to denote
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propositions which, if true, would be a priori. Then we could repre-
sent the object of Mary's belief (above) as an a priori proposition.
We could also represent "Meinong believed that the round square
is round" as a relation between Meinong and the proposition
ENPLUG(bex.ng tiOLind, H.ou.Yid AC[LuzAc). And we could represent "S
believes that Holmes is clever" as a relation between S and the propo-
sition ENPLUGCbexng cleveA, HolmeA). There are other possibilities
here
.
12
There could be a problem here. Is the following triad con-
clusive data showing that these questions aren't independent?
(i) S believes that Dostoyevsky wrote about the student
who killed an old moneylender (according to Crime and
Punishment )
(ii) S doesn't believe Dostoyevsky wrote about the student
who was arrested by Porphyry (in Crime and Punishment )
(iii) The student who killed an old moneylender (in Crime and
Punishment ) is the student arrested by Porphyry (in
Crime and Punishment )
The following representation gets the denotation of the descriptions
correct, but doesn't account for the (apparent?) consistency of the
triad
:
(i)' Bsthat-Wd(ix)I (Sx & (3y) (OMLy & Kxy))
Li
(ii) ' ~Bsthat-Wd(lx)E^,p(Sx & Apx)
(iii)' (lx)£
cp
(Sx & (3y) (OMLy & Kxy)) = (lx)Z
cp
(Sx & Apx)
But we can't underline these descriptions to produce sense-descriptions.
For an attempt to solve this problem, see Appendix E.
Also, Parsons has suggested that there is another kind of sen-
tence which causes trouble: "Some biblical prophets are real, some are
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unreal, and some I'm unsure about."
To handle this sentence, let "B" denote the Bible, let "K"
abbreviate the verb knows, and let "p" denote being a prophet. Then
consider
:
(3x) (Char (x , B) & I Px & E!x) & (3x) (Char (x, B) & I Px & A!x) &c B
(3x) (Char (x,B) & IgPx & ~Ksthat-E!x & ~Ksthat-A!x)
13
In Appendix F, the reader will find a presentation and dis-
cussion of an objection developed by E. Gettier and T. Parsons. The
objection is an attempt to produce two pieces of data which seem to
have incompatible translations.
14
Of course, there are other de dicto readings:
B . that-Ww
.
3
B
. that-W.w.
3 ~3~3
The same goes for sentence (B) and many of the other sentences which
follow. We are now presenting the preferred readings.
I'*There is typical ambiguity here. It should be unobjection-
able. See Parsons [1979a].
1 f)
Some philosophers may prefer to say that Einstein discovered
that there were an infinite number of simultaneity relations—one for
each frame of reference. So we have to restate our datum sentence as
"Einstein discovered that there is no such thing as absolute simul-
taneity."
^Recall that to say it is abstract is not to say that neces-
sarily it fails to have a correlate.
18
In this axiom, "s" is a restricted variable ranging over
stories
.
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APPENDIX A
CLARK’S PARADOX
1. (3x)(A!x & (F) (xF E F=[Xx (3F) (xF & ~Fx) ] )
)
A-OBJECTS, <$>: F=[Xx (3F) (xF & ~Fx) ]
2. A! a
Q &
(F)(a
Q
F = F=[Xx (3 f) (xF & ~Fx) ]
)
EE, 1
3. (F)(a F = F= [ Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx) ]
)
&E, 2
4. a
Q
[Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx) ] 5 [Xx (3F) (xF & ~Fx) ] =
[Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx)] UE, 3
5. [Xx (3 F) (xF & ~Fx) ] = [Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx)
]
=1
6. a
Q
[Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx) ] EE, 4, 5
7. [Xx (F) (xF -> Fx)]a Q
Assumption
8. (F) (aQ
F -v Fa
Q )
X-E, 7
9. a Q
[Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx) ] + [Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx)]a Q UE,
8
10. [Xx (3 F)(xF & ~Fx) ]a Q
+E 6, 9
11. (3F)(aQF & -Fa 0 )
X-E, 10
12. ~ (F)
(
a
Q
F - Fa
Q )
QN, 11
13. [Xx (F) (xF -> Fx)]aQ = (F) (a Q
F -*» FaQ )
X-EQUIV
14. ~[Xx (F) (xF Fx)]aQ EE 12,
13
15. ~ [Xx (F)(xF -> Fx) ]
a
Q
IP 7-14
16. '(F) ( aQF
-> Fa
0 )
EE 13, 15
17. (3F)(a QF &
-Fa
Q )
QN, 16
18. a 0
R & ^0 EE, 17
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19. a
o
R PI h—
1
00
20. aQ
R = R= [Xx (3F)(xF & -Fx) ] UE, 3
21. R= [ Xx (3F)(xF & -Fx)] EE 19,
22. ~Ra
0
&w h-* 00
23. ~ [Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx) ]
a
Q
=E 21,
24. [Xx (3F)(xF & ~Fx) ] Q
XI, 17
Contradiction, lines 23, 24
APPENDIX B
McMICHAEL'S PARADOX
1. (3x) (A! x & (F) (xF = (3u) (F= [ Xy y=u] & ~uF))) A-OBJECTS
2. A!a
1 &
(F)(a
1
F = (3u)(F=[Xy y=u] & ~uF)) EE, 1
3. a
x
[ Xy y=a 1 ]
Assumption
4. a^[Xy y=a^] = (3u)([Xy y=a^]=[Xy y=u] & ~u[Xy y-a^]) UE, 2
5. (3u) ( [ Xy y=a ]=[Xy y=u] & ~u[Xy y=a 1 ])
-E, 3, 4
6. [Xy y=a^] = [Xy y=a 2 ] &
~a
2 ^Y Y=a ^l
EE, 5
7
=1
/ • a
l
3
1
8 . [Xy y=a
1
]a
1
XI, 7
9. [Xy y=a
2
]a
1
ii tn O' 00
10. a l=
a
2
XE, 9
11. ~a
1
[Xy y=a
1
]
=E, 6, 10
12. ~a
1
[Xy y=a
1
]
IP, 3-11
13. ~(3u) ( [Xy y=a 1 ]=[Xy
y=u] & ~u[Xy y=a
±
]) =E, 4,
12
14. (u) ( [Xy y=a 1 ]
= [Xy y=u] -* u[Xy y=a± ])
QN, 13
15. [Xy y=a 1
]=[Xy y=a
1
] + a^Xy y=a 1 ]
UE, 14
16. [Xy y=a
x
]=[Xy y=a
1
]
=1
17. a
x
[Xy y=a
1
]
->E, 15, 16
Contradiction, 12, 17
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APPENDIX C
INCORPORATING NON-RIGID DESIGNATORS
Had we decided to have non-rigid definite descriptions in our
language, we would have needed to redefine the notions of denota-
tion
j ^
and satisfaction. On the definition of denotation presented
below, every term receives a denotation with respect to a possible
world
:
Denotation . Given an interpretation I and an 7-assignment
fa ,
we
recursively define the denotation of term x at^ world IV with respect to
I and
fa
as follows:
1. where K is any primitive name, dj ^(k,iV) = Fj(k)
2. where a is any primitive variable, d
3. where (lx)(J) is any non-rigid description, dj (lx) (p ,lV) =
0 iff (3fa')(fa’=fa & j$'(x)=0 & fa' satisfies <p with respect
to IV & (fa")(fa"=fa & fa"U)=0' & satisfies <p with
4.
5.
6 .
respect to IV -* o'=o))
undefined, otherwise,
where satisfaction is defined as in this appendix, below,
where [Xv^...V is any elementary X-expression,
d
I,<
([X
'V" vn p
n
vr ..vn ],,0)
= d
ui (pV>
where y is the i
th
-plugging of ^ by O, =
PLUG
±
(dj dj ^(o ,tv))
where y is the i
th
-projection of £, dj^(\i,W)
PR0J
i
(d
J
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7. where y is the i
,
j
^-conversion of d ,(y,w;) =
* > 0
cosiv.'.cdj^a,^)
t li
8. where y is the i,j -reflection of E, y d 7 ,(y,w) =
* > lj
REFL
i,j (dj,( ( Z’
w))
til
9. where y is the i -vacuous expansion of d 7 , (y,w)) =
t/AC
i
(d
I,^ (? ’
W,))
10. where y is the conjunction of E, and £, d 7 , (y,W) =
1
> o
C0SIJ(dj'£(Z,w), dj ^(c,w))
11. where y is the negation of d 7 , (y,W) =
NEG(dj^a,uf))
12. where y is the necessitation of dj^(y,W) =
NEC(dj^(Z,u)))
13. where 4> is any propositional term, dj
^
( 4> , U7) is defined
as follows:
(a) if (j) is a primitive propositional term, dj ^((j),W) is
already defined
(b) if
<f>
= p
n
0r ..0n , dj ^(C|>,u0
= PlUG
1
(PLUG
2
(...(PLUG
n
(
dj
^(p ,w) , dj
^
(o^,w) ),...), dj ^(o
2
,w)))>^j ^(o^,tu))
(c) if <p = (~ip) , dj ^(<J>,w) = NEG(dj'j(\lJ,w))
(d) if 4> = (ip&x)
*
^(4>,w) = C0NJ(dj dj^(x,w0)
(e) if (j) = (3 v)i/>, dj
^
( 4> , ) = PP0J 1 (d I
^([Av ip] ,w»
)
(f) if (j) = Dip, dj = NEC(dj'j(\l>,u»)
Satisfaction. Given an interpretation I and an I-assignment ($ , we de
fine satisfies (j) with respect to world u> as follows:
209
1. where
<J> is any primitive propositional term, satisfies <p with
respect to u) iff zxt^Cdj ^(<j>,w)) = T
2. where ()) = p
1
^..^, satisfies <j> with respect to VO iff
£ e*V di,
lS
<p
n
>w>>
3. where (p = op,
^
satisfies 4> with respect to u) iff
dj'j(o,w) e e.zt
A
(dj ^(p,w))
4. where <p = (~<P) , 6 satisfies 4> with respect to W iff £ fails to
satisfy (j) with respect to W
5. where 4> = (ip&x)
, & satisfies (j) with respect to W iff ^ satisfies
both and x with respect to L0
6. where <j) = (3a)ip, satisfies (J) with respect to U) iff
satisfies \p with respect to IV)
where (j) = ( D^) , satisfies <J) with respect to vo iff
(to 1 )(j$ satisfies ip with respect to w')
7 .
APPENDIX D
A PROOF
We want to show that So suppose z^ is a D^-world. So
every property z^ encodes is vacuous. Consequently, all we have to
show is that 0 (F^) (Z z^F^ = F^) . We're given that 0(F^)(Z z^F -* F*"*).
So let 0 = ^F^) (Z z F^ -* F^)^. We try to show that 0 -* 0, where
0/ = ^F^) (Z„ F^ = F*"*)
-
? Consequently, all we need to prove is thatZ
0
Q°
-> Z
z
Q^, for an arbitrary proposition Q . So assume Q , i.e.,
~~q0. By instantiating ~Q^ into 0, we get Z^-Q^ -+ ~Q^. So ~Zz ^~Q^.
Since Zq is a D-^-world, it is maximal. So Z z^Q • So 0 -* 0, and hence
(0 -> 0). Since 00 is true by the definition of z Q , it follows by
our S^-theorem that 00'
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APPENDIX E
MODELLING NOTIONS
Throughout this work, we've talked about notions. Syntactic
notions like term, occurrence, the erasure of a formula 0, etc.,
aren't all that mysterious—they seem to be bona fide relations among
linguistic objects. However, there is a group of metaphysical notions
which are rather puzzling. These are all the notions constructed out
of the primitive notion of encoding. These notions fall into two
groups: defined notions (such as correlation. Form, Monad, World,
complete, maximal, etc.) and paradoxical notions (such as exemplifying
a property that is not also encoded, exemplifying every property that
is encoded, and identity). The former group of notions may not be
relations (since the formulas (f> which would ’’express" them violate
restrictions on A-formation and RELATIONS) and it's provable that the
latter group could not be relations—if they were, some contradiction
would be true. The reason these notions are puzzling is because as
ontologists, we like to avoid uncategorizable entities ("ontological
danglers"). So if these notions aren't relations, what are they? Do
they have independent ontological status? Or is talk about notions
just a convenient reification, disguising metalinguistic talk about
objects which satisfy definitions?
Even if the answer to the last question is yes, it might be
worthwhile to look for a reification procedure whereby we do find some
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appropriate object in our ontology to code up, or go proxy for our
notions. An easy, though risky way to do this would be to add an
axiom which asserts that there is a primitive encoding relation and a
relation behind every one of our defined notions (and leave the
paradoxical notions to dangle) . Until we have an easy way of confirm-
ing the consistency of the theories which result, such a procedure
seems suspicious and unsystematic.
There may be a better way, however; one which allows us to
find proxies for the primitive notion of encoding, the defined notions
and the contradictory notions. The trick is to build the notional
formula in question into the defining formula for an abstract rela-
tion. Consider the following two instances of A-OBJECTS:
(1) (3Z
(1,i/p)/p)(F ((:L ’ l/p)/p)/p )(zF E (3X1 ) (3H
l/p
) (xH &
F=[AG^ 1 , 1 ^ P ')/,pGxH]))
(2) (3z
(l,l)/p
) (F
((l,l)/p)/p
) (zF E (3X
1
) (3y
1
) ((H
l/p
) (yH E Hx) &
F=[AG (l ’ l)/pGxy]))
(1) says there is an abstract (i, i/p) /p-relation (between individuals
and properties of individuals), z, which encodes a property of such
relations, F, iff F is the property of: being the relation which re-
lates an object x* with a property H
1,/p it encodes. (2) says that
there is an abstract relation among individuals, z, which encodes a
property of such relations, F, iff F is the property of: being the
relation which relates an object y
1
with its correlate x
1
.
These two
abstract relations are unique. It seems reasonable to suppose that
they could represent the primitive notion of encoding and
the defined
notion of correlation, respectively.
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Note that by abbreviating a crucial subformula, (H 1/,p )(yH E
Hx)
,
in (2), we could rewrite (2) as:
(2)
' (3z)(F)(zF E (3x) (3y) (Cor(x,y) & F=[AG Gxy]))
(3)
and (4) are further examples:
(3) (3z
i/p )(F (i/p)/p )(zF E Ox1 ) (World (x1 ) &
F=[AG1 ^ P Gx]))
(4) Oz l/p )(F (l/p)/p )(zF = (3x1 )((3H
l/p )(xH & -Hx) &
F=[XGl/p Gx]))
These abstract properties could serve to represent the notions of being
a world and being a non-self-correlate, respectively. Necessarily, the
latter fails to have a weak correlate—if it did, some contradiction
would be true.
It is important to see that this modelling of a contradictory
notion doesn't reintroduce Clark's Paradox. Let us use [Ax (3H) (xH &
-Hx)] to denote the abstract property that (4) gives us. That is,
we're using what previously had been an ill-formed A-expression to name
a unique abstract object. But we cannot allow this A-expression to be
used in instances of A-EQUIVALENCE . That's because we've permitted
abstract objects of type t to encode abstract properties of type t/p
so we know that there would be an abstract object of type i which en-
codes [Ax (3H)(xH & -Hx) ] (the abstract property given by (4)).
This
would be the first move in Clark's Paradox. The second
would be to
suppose it exemplified [Ax (F) (xF -* Fx) ] (an abstract
property con-
structed using an axiom like (4)). But we can stop
the paradox from
developing to completion by not allowing A-conversion
in the (formerly
ill-formed) A-expressions we've just used to name our
abstract
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properties. Metaphysically speaking, this means that we are not sup-
posing that the abstract properties we've chosen to represent the notions
of being a non-self-correlate and being a weak correlate of one's self
have in their respective exemplification extensions just the objects
which are non-self-correlates or which are weak-self-correlates. And
in general, we do not suppose that the abstract relations which repre-
sent our defined and contradictory notions have in their exemplifica-
tion extensions all and only the n-tuples of objects which satisfy the
defining formulas of these relational notions. This prevents the
paradoxes from being reintroduced.
A question then immediately arises. If the proxy abstract re-
lations don't have the "appropriate" exemplification extensions, why is
our modelling procedure worthwhile? Well, the answer is that it is
useful. If we generalize our procedure, we can handle data which we
couldn't handle before. First, here's our generalization:
where (f> is any non-propositional formula, and a^,...,an
are any variables of types t^...,^, respectively, then:
[Aar ..an 4>]
=
abbr (i2
( t l > ... > tn)/P )(F
((ti,...,tn)/p) /P )
(t-,
,
•
(zF = (3a ) . . . (3a
n
) (<J) & F=[XG r
'
' '
"Go^. . .aj))
This gives us a way to easily name the abstract object which goes
proxy for the defined or contradictory notion "expressed" by <J>. This
procedure allows us to represent the following data triad.
A. S believes that Dostoyevsky wrote about the student who killed
an old moneylender according to Crime and Punishment
B. S doesn't believe that Dostoyevsky wrote about Raskolnikov
C. Raskolnikov is the student who killed the old
moneylender ac
cording to Crime and Punishment
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To get the denotation for the English definite description correct, it
must be symbolized as (lx)Z
Cp
(Sx & (3y) (OMLy & Kxy)). This is the way
we did things in Chapter IV, §4. But we can’t underline our represent-
ing description and turn it into a sense description because it's not
constructed out of a propositional formula. "(ix)I <j>" is not a well-
defined sense description. So we didn't have a definite description in
our formal language which had the right denotation and which, when
underlined, represented the sense of the English definite description.
But now we can do this. We can suppose that "(lx) I was
defined as follows:
(lx)£
cp
4> =dfn (lz)(F)(zF = F=[Xx £cp 4> &
** y=E
x ) 1
)
The A-expression used in this definition abbreviates a definite de-
scription of an abstract property. (\x)Z <J) is the abstract object
which encodes just this abstract property. Consequently, we may
represent A-B-C as follows:
(A') Bsthat-Wd ( is) E^
p
(j) (dicto )
(
B
'
)
~Bsthat-Wdr (dicto)
—
s
(C
'
r=(ix)£
cp
cf>
This should give the reader a good idea how to handle the data
in footnote 12, Chapter VI, §1. But what about the following
data
:
D. S believes that the person who killed an old moneylender
according to Crime and Punishment was a student
E. S doesn't believe that Raskolnikov was a student
F. Raskolnikov is the person who killed an old moneylender
according to Crime and Punishment
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To handle data like this, we would need to incorporate the new logical
function described in footnote 11, Chapter VI, § 1 . ENPLUG(>i,o)
is the proposition that 0 encodes H. It would be denoted by "Tp,"
where T denotes 0 and p denotes A. We then get:
(D’ ) Bsthat-(lx)Z
cp
(Px & C3y)(0MLy & Kxy))S
(E T ) "Bsthat-r S
—
s
(F ? ) r=(ix)Z
Cp
(Px & (3y) (OMLy & Kxy))
But there is still a problem about making this more general.
Consider G and H:
G. S believes that Porphyry arrested the student who killed
an old moneylender.
H. S doesn't believe that Porphyry arrested Raskolnikov
To represent G and H correctly, and in a way which suggests a com-
pletely general treatment, we recall that "Z
<J>" abbreviatesLi
"CP[Ay So can we represent G and H as:
(G') Bsthat-CP [ Ay Ap(lx)Z
cp
(Sx & (3u) (OMLu & Kxu))]
(H * ) ~Bsthat-CP [ Ay Apr ]
—
s
The general solution is to use ENPLUG on the vacuous property encoded
by Crime and Punishment to get the proposition that Crime and Punish-
ment encodes the vacuous property. This vacuous property is denoted by
a A-expression, [Ay Ap(lx)Z^,
p
(Sx & (3u) (OMLu & Kxu))]; but in trying to
capture the sense of the English description involved, we have to un-
derline the translating description, thereby denoting an abstract ob-
ject which encodes an abstract property.
appendix f
AN OBJECTION AND A REPLY
The Gettier-Parsons objection is that the theory, plus our
techniques for applying it, seems to commit us to a pair of sentences
which cannot both be true. Consider the following case of John, an
I.R.S. agent who dabbles in philosophy.
Suppose John is assigned to watch a lottery and determine
whether it has been fixed. The draw has not yet taken place, but the
winner, whoever it is, will earn $100,000. Suppose also that John,
having accepted the theory of abstract objects and the AUXILIARY
HYPOTHESIS, thinks both that the property of earning $100,000 is
nuclear and that no abstract objects exemplify this property.
Given such a situation, the following two English sentences,
(V) and (W)
,
may both be true:
(V) John doesn’t believe that the winner of the lottery,
whoever it is, will fail to earn $100,000
(W) John believes that the abstract object which encodes
just the property of being the winner fails to
exemplify earning $100,000
Now let "j" denote John, "W" denote the property of winning the lot-
tery, and "E" denote the property of earning $100,000. The techniques
for applying the theory developed in Chapter VI, §1, apparently com-
mit us to the following two translations:
(V’) ~Bjthat
—
E ( lx) Wx
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(W’) Bjthat E(lz) (F) (zF E F= [Ay Wy & (u) (Wu -> u= y)])E
However, (V ) and (W' ) cannot both be true since it is a principle
of the theory (LA13) that:
( lx) Wx = (iz) (F) (zF E F= [ Ay Wy & (u) (Wu -* u= y) ] )E
A simple application of =E shows that (V’) and (W’ ) are incompatible.
So, put bluntly, the objection is that (V) and (W) seem to be
compatible pieces of data which receive incompatible translations.
To reply to this objection, we either deny that both (V) and (W) are
pieces of data or deny that both (V* ) and (W’ ) correctly translate
(V) and (W)
,
respectively. In the first part of the following reply,
we argue that either (W) is not a datum or (W' ) does not correctly
translate (W)
.
To do this, we must recall our discussion in the Introduction
(where we tried to give the reader some idea of what the data was) and
appeal to the reader’s own intuitions about what constitutes data.
Clearly, beliefs about specific A-objects, and beliefs involving the
technical notions of being abstract and encoding a property could not
have been part of the data we were trying to explain. Though we may
have had beliefs about Sherlock Holmes or the round square, these
beliefs were pretheoretical and any ascription of such beliefs would
be couched in non- technical English.
Consequently, if we want to think of (W) as a datum, we have
to suppose that the words "abstract" and "encodes" as they occur in
(W) have their non-technical senses. This supposition makes it easier
to argue that (W* ) is not the proper translation of (W)
.
We may summarize our first response in the following argument:
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Data sentences do not contain technical terms. So if "abstract" and
"encodes" in (W) are technical terms, (W) is not a datum. If "ab-
stract" and "encodes" in (W) are non-technical terms, (W' ) is not the
proper translation of (W)
. Therefore, either (W) is not a datum or
(W T ) is not the proper translation of (W)
.
Although the above argument may defuse the objection as
stated, some questions immediately arise: Do we acquire new beliefs
about abstract objects during the exposition of the theory? Do such
beliefs constitute new data to be explained by the theory? If one
thinks that the answer to these two questions is "yes," then one must
presuppose that the word "believes" as it occurs in the technical
English sentences like (W) has the same sense as it does when it oc-
curs in our original, non-technical data. This may require an
argument, since it is not clear that when we say that we acquire new
"beliefs" about abstract objects as a result of the presentation of
the theory, we mean the same thing that we do when we ascribe "be-
liefs" to others in natural language.
If one has good justification for thinking that "believes" is
used univocally, and that (W) is a new datum to be explained, then
finding a consistent representation of (V) and (W) remains a puzzle.
If this constitutes the only puzzle the theory cannot explain, then
it must be admitted that the outstanding, recalcitrant data of the
Russellian paradigm has been successfully explained. It is only
natural that along with the more finely grained view of things that
accompanies a paradigm shift, new puzzles not characterizable from
within the old paradigm should arise. Let us, then, close with a few
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brief comments about this new puzzle.
There are two suggestions which might prove fruitful in
future investigations. The first is to suggest that (W') may, never-
theless, not be the correct translation of (W) . Maybe we should avail
ourselves of the technique developed in Appendix E for representing
the senses of non-propositional descriptions and translate (W) as
(W">:
(W") Bjthat— E(lz) (F) (zF E F=[Ay Wy & (u) (Wu + u= y)])
Ju
By doing this, we suppose that it is the sense of the English descrip-
tion in (W) which is a constituent of the propositional object of
belief. We've identified the sense of such a description in Appendix
E as an abstract object which encodes an abstract property.
An alternative suggestion is to suppose (W’) is the correct
translation of (W)
,
but that (V) is not the correct translation of
(V) . Such a suggestion would require that we give up the specific
treatment proposed in Chapter VI. But we could replace it with an
alternative translation procedure which incorporates abstract ob-
jects. For example, maybe (V) is to be translated as (V"), where "R"
here denotes our representation relation:
(V”) (3z) (Rz
,
(lx)Wx, j & ~Bj that-~Ez)
So (V) will be true just in case some abstract object represents the
winner for John (maybe this abstract object just is the winner) and
John fails to believe that it fails to earn $100,000. We would leave
our treatment of the de re cases just as they are, but propose a gener-
al analysis along these lines for the de dicto cases. So there
still
be of involving abstract objects in the analysis of belief.may

